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Abstract 
 
The current programme of research had four main aims. First, we hoped to extend existing 
work on experimentally induced distress with non-clinical samples of adult participants (male 
and female college students aged approximately 18-50 years), with a particular focus on 
finding an appropriate preparation that would lend itself to the exploration of brief 
therapeutic interventions. Second, we investigated the impact of techniques referred to as self 
as context in terms of ameliorating distress induced by the single-sentence preparation. Third, 
we compared effects of mindfulness and self as context techniques on distress reduction, and 
subsequently investigated effects of individual components of mindfulness. Finally, we 
explored the potential role of concepts derived from relational frame theory (RFT) in 
enhancing self as context techniques.  
Experiment 1 systematically compared a single-sentence preparation first proposed by 
Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant and Teachman (1996) to a multi-sentence distress 
induction procedure with a nonclinical sample of undergraduate participants (N = 64). The 
experiment was interested in determining which procedure was more effective in inducing 
distress (i.e. discomfort, anxiety and stress). Visual Analogue Scales (VASs) were used to 
measure changes in these dependent measures. We predicted that the multi-sentence 
preparation would generate greater distress. However, statistical analysis including a series of 
mixed between within analysis of variance (ANOVA’s) demonstrated that the preparations 
were equally effective in inducing emotional distress.  
The single-sentence distress induction procedure was employed again in Experiments 
2-5 (N = 90). These studies also incorporated a number of brief analogue interventions 
derived from acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). Put simply, the research question 
was: Would ACT interventions that targeted acceptance, defusion, values and contact with 
the present moment successfully ameliorate experimentally induced distress in a non-clinical 
8 
 
sample of undergraduates. We also investigated whether each of these individual ACT 
components would be enhanced by a self as context technique. Similar to Experiment 1, 
VASs were used to measure any changes in discomfort, anxiety and stress as a result of the 
interventions. We hypothesised that the combined interventions (e.g. self-enhanced 
acceptance) would reduce distress more effectively. However, a series of mixed between 
within ANOVA’s demonstrated that all interventions, either stand alone components or 
combined with self as context, had little or no effect on levels of induced distress.  
In Experiments 6-8, we employed an alternative form of distress induction to previous 
experiments with a nonclinical sample of undergraduate participants (N = 80). In Experiment 
6 we investigated the impact of mindfulness versus self as context techniques in reducing 
distress (i.e. discomfort, anxiety and stress) in a non-clinical sample as measured on the 
VASs (N = 30). We did not make any specific predictions about the outcomes, but were 
concerned with the possibility of differentiated outcomes based on the fact that self as context 
techniques encourage a focus on psychological events (i.e. thoughts), while mindfulness 
techniques encourage a focus on somatic events (i.e. the body). A series of mixed between 
within ANOVA’s demonstrated that both interventions were equally effective in reducing 
distress.  
In Experiment 7, we distinguished between two mindfulness-based exercises, physical 
mindfulness and verbal mindfulness, and thereafter investigated which of these would be 
more effective in reducing distress (e.g. discomfort) in a non-clinical sample (N = 26) of 
undergraduates (as measured by the VASs). Again, we refrained from making specific 
predictions about potentially different outcomes for the two mindfulness-based components 
because there are no such experimental comparisons available in the research literature to 
date. A series of mixed between within ANOVA’s demonstrated that both conditions reduced 
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distress as measured via VASs and the difference in distress levels prior and subsequent to 
intervention was statistically significant.  
In Experiment 8, we turned our attention to an investigation of effects of sequence of 
mindfulness exercises and to the possibility that combining physical and verbal mindfulness 
exercises would enhance effects observed with either exercises individually. We 
hypothesised that the sequence which presented physical mindfulness followed by verbal 
mindfulness would show greater reductions in distress (as measured by the VASs) than the 
reverse because this is the format employed in most mindfulness-based therapeutic packages 
(e.g. Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction). A series of mixed between within ANOVA’s 
demonstrated that this prediction was upheld with our non-clinical sample of (N = 24), 
undergraduates and although both conditions resulted in reduced scores on all measures of 
distress, the physical-verbal sequence demonstrated superiority. 
Experiments 9 and 10 employed the same distress induction procedure and a similar 
non-clinical sample of undergraduates as Experiments 6-8 in an effort to investigate the role 
of RFT in ACT exercises (N = 84). In particular, in Experiment 9 we investigated distinction 
and hierarchical relations when targeted specifically in a self as context exercise (N = 36). 
We hypothesised that the hierarchical self as context intervention would show superiority 
over the distinction self as context condition in terms of reductions in discomfort, anxiety and 
stress, based on previous research by Luciano et al. (2011). A series of mixed between-within 
ANOVA’s demonstrated results that were consistent with this prediction as the hierarchical 
intervention was the more effective in reducing distress as measured by the VASs. 
 Experiment 10 attempted to explore this issue further using a different ACT exercise 
with undergraduate participants (N = 48). Participants were also exposed to a practice interval 
placed between two exposures to the distress induction task, to determine potentially lasting 
impacts of the interventions. A second aspect of the research examined the extent to which a 
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focus on the self played a specific role in the outcomes described above. Accordingly, 
Experiment 10 compared interventions that focused on participants’ thoughts about a specific 
self-criticism (i.e. self-focused) versus interventions that focused on thoughts about an 
inanimate object (i.e. object-focused). We hypothesised that the self-based hierarchical 
intervention would be the most effective in terms of distress reduction (e.g. discomfort) 
because it aimed to target both self-specific content and hierarchical relations. This prediction 
was somewhat supported as statistical analysis demonstrated that both hierarchical conditions 
showed superiority in terms of distress reduction compared to both distinction conditions. 
Furthermore, both hierarchical conditions were associated with significantly less avoidance in 
the second exposure to the distress induction task.  
In the General Discussion the current thesis discusses the implications of the research 
and extending the existing literature on experimental distress induction procedures, ACT, 
mindfulness and RFT. 
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General Introduction 
 
Contextual Behavioural Science (CBS) is a broad church that encompasses three core 
areas of knowledge. First, functional contextualism provides clear and pragmatic assumptions 
about the scientific agenda (Gifford & Hayes, 1999). Second, relational frame theory (RFT) 
identifies basic contextual elements that permit the prediction and influence of verbal 
behaviour (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). And third, acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) directly addresses the “challenge of the 
human condition” (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012). The challenge now faced by the 
CBS community is to draw these three strands into a broad, scientific and coherent agenda. 
This is not an easy feat and has rarely, if ever, been successfully achieved in the history of 
psychology. But as a starting point, Hayes et al. (2012) suggested the following model for 
how this might be achieved:  
a reticulated (that is, web-like) model of scientific and practical development, in which 
theoretical and technological progress occurs at multiple levels but in an interconnected 
way, with differing standards of progress appropriate to the particular level of the work 
(p.6). 
 
The integration of RFT and ACT is central to the CBS reticulated model and the 
programme of research it promotes and relies upon. For example, RFT scholars are often 
asked by ACT clinicians for RFT-based definitions of cognitive fusion. Because the concept 
of fusion is pivotal to ACT assumptions and practices, and because RFT is after all an 
account of language and cognition, this might seem like a simple question indeed. However, 
an RFT translation of fusion (and all other ACT concepts) is still a long way off for various 
reasons. First, the necessary experimental procedures are not yet developed. Second, basic 
research is slow and labour intensive, and is often too slow for the demands of clinical 
development and progress. Third and perhaps most importantly, ACT-based concepts are 
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middle level terms that do not yield readily to scientific scrutiny. We will return to this final 
point towards the end of the current chapter.   
Although the description of the reticulated model is a recent development for CBS, it 
comes on foot of a wealth of basic research on RFT and a host of mostly outcome studies on 
ACT. A brief summary of the history of RFT research allows one to see where the reticulated 
model is currently at. According to Foody et al. (under review), the first generation of RFT 
research saw the development of the core concept of arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding and identification of the basic relational frames (i.e. co-ordination, distinction, 
opposition and comparison), as well as the defining features of the frames, such as: mutual 
entailment, combinatorial entailment and the transfer/transformation of stimulus functions 
(Hayes et al., 2001). The second generation of research marked the expansion into more 
complex relations and relational networks, such as: analogy (e.g. Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, 
Roche, & Smeets, 2001); perspective-taking (e.g. McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2004); and rule-governance (e.g. O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004). 
The third generation contained the beginnings of the integration of RFT with ACT through 
componential analyses of therapeutic components (e.g. Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, & 
Fink, 2004), experimental analogues of de/fusion (e.g. Keogh, 2008) and applications of the 
perspective-taking protocol with clinical populations (e.g. Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, 
Freixa i Baqué, & Loas, 2008).  
Although the volume of research is simply staggering for such a young scientific field 
(approx. 260 studies have been published from labs at Reno and Maynooth alone), a great 
deal has yet to be learned. One might argue therefore that we are now at a new research 
crossroads at which these three research waves do not appear to answer our current questions 
about how to translate ACT into the language of RFT, while adhering to functional 
contextualism (e.g. by creating a functional definition of fusion). Hence, Foody et al. (under 
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review) have argued, that the community is on the cusp of a fourth generation of RFT 
research, part of which aims specifically to define concepts that are central to ACT (Foody, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2012).  
The current programme of research is the beginning of this generation of work. The 
two sections that follow in the current chapter contain summaries of ACT and RFT, 
respectively, before proceeding towards a recent account of the integration of these two 
strands in terms of understanding a sense of self as relational responding and identifying the 
processes through which this might be embraced in ACT. 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
Acceptance and commitment therapy is one of the third wave behaviour therapies that 
has been applied across the full range of mental health problems (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Indeed, its breadth of benefits is now well established in the 
clinical literature with positive outcomes reported in: diabetes self-management (Gregg, 
Callaghan, Hayes, & Glenn-Lawson, 2007); weight control (Lillis, Hayes, Bunting, & 
Masuda, 2009); obsessive compulsive disorder (Twohig, Hayes, & Masuda, 2006); 
depression (Zettle & Hayes, 2002); chronic pain (Wicksell et al., 2005); and psychosis (Bach 
& Hayes, 2002). The breadth of application, and perhaps success, of ACT stems from the fact 
that the approach is based on a set of generic principles regarding human verbal behaviour 
that may be summarised as: emotional acceptance vs. avoidance; cognitive and emotional 
fusion vs. defusion; values-directed action; and the importance of a flexible sense of self.  
ACT processes. ACT is distinct from other behaviour therapies because of an 
underlying heuristic model (referred to as the ‘hexaflex’) that articulates conceptually 
specified and testable middle level processes (see Figure 1; see also Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Such a model with operationally definable behavioural processes 
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that have the potential for individual sources of empirical support (e.g. in componential 
analyses) would be the ideal bridge between basic science and clinical practice. Ideally, 
models should be dynamic in order to permit on-going adjustments to both science and 
clinical practice (i.e. the therapy poses questions for the science and the science validates 
therapeutic techniques or dictates technical adjustments). There should also be synergy 
among individual components and all processes should be consistent with the model’s 
underlying theoretical and philosophical assumptions. In the case of ACT, the model must be 
contextual, functional and behavioural. Each of the model’s component processes in the 
hexaflex is summarised below. 
 
Figure 1. The hexaflex model of the psychological processes ACT seeks to strengthen, as taken from 
Foody et al. (2012). 
 
Psychological flexibility. There is empirical evidence to support the view that 
behavioural inflexibility is associated with many forms of mental distress (e.g. Bond & 
Flaxman, 2006; Bond, Flaxman, & Bunce, 2008; Vowles & McCracken, 2010). In addition, 
flexibility is also a well-established behavioural term (Skinner, 1984). Hence, it is not 
surprising that psychological flexibility rests at the centre of a behavioural hexaflex of mental 
health.  
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From an ACT perspective, psychological flexibility is in principle both a process and 
an outcome. In practice, however, it is more likely the former because you are unlikely to 
ever reach a point at which you have acquired maximum flexibility in any skill. According to 
Hayes et al. (2006), psychological inflexibility is the “inability to persist in or change 
behaviour in the service of long-term valued ends” (p.6), which results from verbal behaviour 
interacting with, and often over-riding, direct contingencies.  
Verbal behaviour often dominates contingency-shaped behaviour through the 
operation of verbal rules and rule-following has a long history in the literature on 
psychological suffering (Torneke, Luciano, & Valdivia, 2008; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). 
Specifically, mental distress is often characterised as excessive rule-following, at the expense 
of making contact with direct contingencies. From an ACT perspective, Plumb, Stewart, Dahl 
and Lundgren (2009) have argued that mental health involves flexibility between rule-
following and contingency sensitivity in a way that maximises consistency between values 
and behaviour.  
Acceptance. A focus on acceptance is not unique to ACT and is a central tenet of 
numerous contemporary treatment approaches (e.g. dialectical behaviour therapy, DBT; 
Linehan, 1993). There is considerable empirical support for the utility of acceptance, 
according to ACT, when investigated in both experimental (e.g. Hayes, Bisset et al., 1999) 
and clinical contexts (e.g. Bach & Hayes, 2002). Specifically, higher levels of acceptance 
have been associated with less depression (e.g. Polusny, Rosenthal, Aban, & Follette, 2004) 
and anxiety (e.g. Stewart, Zvolensky, & Eifert, 2002), as well as increased tolerance of 
chronic pain (e.g. McMullen et al., 2008).  
According to Levin and Hayes (2009), the ACT definition of acceptance is as follows: 
the active and aware embrace of those private events occasioned by one’s history without 
unnecessary attempts to change their frequency or form, especially when doing so would 
cause psychological harm (p.15).  
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This particular definition implies the importance of accepting all that exists in one’s history 
and all that occurs physically and psychologically in the present moment.  
Defusion. Although it derives from the cognitive concept of distancing (Zettle & 
Hayes, 1987), the term defusion is unique to ACT. Many ACT outcome studies that have 
shown positive results include defusion techniques (e.g. Bach & Hayes, 2002; Hayes et al., 
1999). And several componential analyses have also demonstrated the utility of defusion in 
experimental settings (e.g. Healy et al., 2008). For example, Masuda et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that the defusion generated by the rapid repetition of the words of a self-
relevant negative thought reduced the thought’s believability and its emotional discomfort in 
a non-clinical sample of undergraduates. 
In spite of this positive outcome evidence, defusion remains one of the most difficult 
concepts in ACT to operationally define. In short, defusion is the undermining or unravelling 
of cognitive/emotional fusion, which is itself another difficult concept to define. Hayes et al. 
(2006) defined fusion as:  
excessive or improper regulation of behaviour by verbal processes, such as rules and 
derived relational networks. . . . guided more by relatively inflexible verbal networks than 
by contacted environmental contingencies. As a result, people may act in a way that is 
inconsistent with what the environment affords relevant to chosen values and goals. (pp. 6-
7). 
 
According to this view, defusion techniques facilitate a reduction in the literal functions 
transformed by thoughts, thereby reducing the extent to which those thoughts appear to the 
individual to be literally true (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005). In support of this suggested process, 
findings reported by Masuda et al. (2009) indicate that defusion techniques do reduce the 
believability of thoughts. 
Values. Similar to acceptance, a focus on values is also not unique to ACT. For 
example, values play a prominent role in Rogerian humanistic approaches (Rogers, 1964) and 
are also prevalent in the Positive Psychology Movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2000). Numerous studies support the efficacy of ACT-based values clarification techniques in 
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both experimental (e.g. Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008a) and clinical contexts (e.g. McCracken & 
Yang, 2006). For example, Paez-Blarrina et al. (2008b) compared a values-based ACT 
protocol with a no-values protocol on electric shock tolerance and reported increased 
tolerance and reduced believability of pain-related thoughts in the former but not the latter. 
According to Hayes et al. (1999), values are defined as: “verbally constructed, global, 
desired and chosen life directions” (p.206) and verbally constructed future reinforcers. 
Values, therefore, provide an alternative source of behaviour regulation than fusion and 
avoidance (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005). Values exist in networks with higher order 
consequences, middle level goals (in the service of these consequences) and concrete actions 
that are driven by these goals. Valued living, therefore, involves high levels of value-
behaviour consistency. For ACT, values are almost entirely conceptualised as process (rather 
than outcome) variables, because an individual cannot readily reach a point at which a value 
is fully achieved (e.g. being a good partner; see Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). Values 
are also highly personalised in ACT.  
Committed action. Committed action is necessary for the attainment of values in the 
sense that values direct behaviour. Specifically, you can only move in the direction of your 
values if you achieve the short-, medium- and long-term goals in which your values are 
manifested through specified committed actions (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005). It is hardly 
surprising that a behaviour therapy such as ACT places a strong emphasis on overt action. 
But from an ACT perspective, the core issue is that this action must be consistent with 
overarching personal values and less influenced by current psychological content or 
contextual demands. 
Contact with the present moment. A focus on attending to the present moment is also 
not unique to ACT and is, of course, pivotal in mindfulness-based therapies. For example, 
Baer, Smith and Allen (2004) have suggested that mindfulness comprises four key 
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behavioural components: observing; describing; acting with awareness; and accepting 
without judgement. Kabat-Zinn (1994) proposed that a critical element of mindfulness 
involves paying attention in a particular way, and indeed the broad psychological concept of 
attention is often used synonymously with mindfulness (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Bishop 
et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
In a similar vein, Hayes et al. (2006) have proposed that mindfulness is comprised of 
four of the six hexaflex processes, namely contact with the present moment, self as context, 
acceptance and defusion. However, some sources have postulated a more direct link between 
mindfulness and contact with the present moment. For example, Fletcher and Hayes (2005) 
defined contact with the present moment as shifting attention to what is happening in the 
here-and-now and “contacting both internal stimuli, such as bodily sensations, thoughts and 
feelings and external stimuli, such as sounds, sights, smells and touch” (pp. 320-21).  
Self as context. The concept of self as context is unique to ACT and was initially one 
of the three selves (along with self as content and self as process; see Hayes, 1995). Self as 
context involves adopting a perspective from which a coherent sense of self is greater than 
(and distinguishable from), your thoughts, feelings and emotions (Flaxman & Bond, 2006). In 
short, self as context involves reductions in categorising and evaluating your psychological 
content as yourself. As a result, however, it is difficult to distinguish self as context from 
defusion.  
There is limited empirical evidence to support self as context as an individual 
component. However, one notable study by Williams (2006) reported lower scores on a post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) scale for war veterans who received all phases of ACT, 
relative to those exposed to an ACT protocol in which the self as context component was 
absent. We will return to self as context and the three selves below in more detailed 
discussions of the ACT and RFT approaches to self. 
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Relational Frame Theory 
Relational frame theory draws mainly on the concept of derived multiple stimulus 
relations and a process called arbitrarily applicable relational responding in its attempts to 
provide a contextual, functional, behavioural account of human language and cognition. This 
process, as argued by RFT, underlies many of the basic phenomena that comprise human 
language and cognition, including: naming; storytelling; metaphor; deception; humour; and 
perspective-taking (Hayes et al., 2001). 
The theory is based on the fact that most living organisms, when trained, can respond 
to relations among the physical properties of two or more types of stimuli. This behaviour is 
referred to as non-arbitrary responding (Hayes, Fox et al., 2001) and has been readily 
demonstrated with human participants (e.g. Reese, 1961), as well as with different species of 
animals and birds (e.g. Harmon, Strong, & Pasnak, 1982; Towe, 1954). What RFT adds to 
these repertoires is an account of how humans can also respond to arbitrary stimulus 
relations in a process known as arbitrarily applicable relational responding (also known as 
relational framing, see Barnes, 1994). In short, human verbal abilities allow them to respond 
to relations among stimuli that are not defined by their physical form, rather by additional 
contextual cues. For RFT, this contextually controlled relational responding results from a 
history of multiple exemplars from early natural language interactions (Luciano et al., 2009). 
Learning to name different objects through natural language is one of the earliest 
forms of arbitrarily applicable relational responding (Barnes, 1994). During these interactions, 
a child is taught to respond bi-directionally. Consider the example of a parent holding up a 
ball and saying “ball”. For RFT, this interaction comprises an object-name relation. If the 
child then looks at the ball when the parent says “ball”, this comprises a name-object relation 
(a reverse of the previous relation). Although during early language interactions, each type of 
relation will be explicitly trained, across multiple exemplars deriving the same relations with 
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novel stimuli becomes possible (Barnes). For example, if a parent points to a child’s shirt and 
says “this is your shirt” (object-name relation), the contextual cue ‘is’ and the naming context 
itself allow the child to later select the shirt when asked “where is your shirt” (name-object 
relation), without direct reinforcement.  
The existing empirical evidence on RFT has identified many different relational 
frames, but all have the same three defining properties of: mutual entailment, combinatorial 
entailment and the transformation of stimulus functions. Mutual entailment describes the 
relations that occur between two stimuli or events. For example, if stimulus A is explicitly 
established as equal to stimulus B, then a relation between B and A may also be derived (e.g. 
if A = B then B = A). However, not all mutually entailed relations are equivalent. Consider a 
trained relation in which A>B, then the correct derivation of the B-A relation is B<A (not 
B=A). Combinatorial entailment describes relations that occur among three or more stimuli. 
For example, if one is explicitly trained in the relations A≥B and B≥C, then the relations A≥C 
and C≤A can be derived.  
The final defining feature of a relational frame is the transformation of stimulus 
functions. Consider the following example. If an individual is explicitly taught to relate B as 
opposite to A and A is then given a conditioned punishing function, one would predict that B 
would acquire a derived reinforcing function, based on the opposition relation with A. This 
very specific transformation of stimulus functions based upon derived stimulus relations is 
exactly what numerous RFT studies have demonstrated (e.g. Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, 
Whelan, & Rhoden, 2008). It is a critical feature of relational framing and lies at the very 
heart of RFT. A number of different relational frames are described briefly in the section that 
follows. 
The relational frame of co-ordination. The examples above all involved relations of 
co-ordination or equivalence. And co-ordination appears to be the most basic frame that 
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infants come into contact with through natural language interactions, and may be the basis on 
which other frames are established (Lipkins, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993; Luciano, Gómez-
Becerra, & Rodríguez-Valverde, 2007). This frame requires an individual to respond to 
contextual cues such as “is” (“is the same as”, “equals”, etc.), which control the derivation of 
the co-ordination relations. In simple terms, “is”, for example, specifies that two stimuli are 
arbitrarily co-ordinated. Consider experimental trials presented by O’Connor, Rafferty, 
Barnes-Holmes and Barnes-Holmes (2009) who successfully employed multiple exemplar 
training (MET) to establish co-ordination relations in 15 children with ASD and three 
typically-developing children. Participants were trained to establish co-ordination relations 
among words, their related objects and their related pictures, using nameable and familiar 
stimuli. Training AB relations established mutually entailed relations between the written 
words (A stimuli) and pointing to objects (B stimuli). This was followed by BC training (i.e. 
see objects, point to pictures). The combinatorial entailment (equivalence) tests involved the 
AC and CA relations (i.e. see word-point to picture; and see picture-point to word). The 
results demonstrated that MET successfully facilitated co-ordination responding on a novel 
set of stimuli with six out of eight children. In addition, the findings suggested a relationship 
between verbal ability and training requirements, such that participants with lower verbal 
ability required more exposures to explicit training of the target co-ordination relations. 
Several other studies have also explored co-ordination relations. For example, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets and Luciano (2004) demonstrated the derived transfer of 
happy and sad mood functions through co-ordination relations in a sample of 16 adults. Carr, 
Wilkinson, Blackman and McIlvane (2000) also established co-ordination responding in low-
functioning individuals who showed deficits in these repertoires. 
The relational frame of opposition. The frame of opposition involves arbitrarily 
applying the relational cue “is the opposite of” or its equivalent along a specific dimension 
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(e.g. hot is the opposite of cold). Consider research by Barnes-Holmes et al. (2004) who 
successfully employed MET to establish opposite relations in three typically-developing 
children. The basic experimental trial required the child to select the most valuable coin/s 
(from four possible options). Consider the following instruction: “Coin A buys many and A is 
opposite to B and B is opposite to C and C is the opposite to D”. Explicit training and 
increasingly complex testing (e.g. where the coins were presented randomly) continued until 
participants were responding to trials with 10-coin sequences. Several other studies have also 
investigated this relational frame. For example, Dymond et al. (2008) demonstrated the 
derived transfer of avoidance functions in accordance with opposite relations, while Whelan 
and Barnes-Holmes (2004) demonstrated the transfer of a punishing function. 
The relational frame of distinction. The relational frame of distinction involves 
responding to arbitrary differences among stimuli. Like opposition, distinction involves 
responding to the relational cue “is different from” (e.g. men are different from women). 
Unlike opposition, however, distinction relations often do not specify the relevant dimension. 
For example, if you are told that ‘men are different from women’, it is unclear what these 
differences are. Several RFT studies have investigated this type of relation. For example, 
Roche and Barnes (1996), and Steele and Hayes (1991) established responding in accordance 
with distinction relations in teenagers and adults. 
The relational frame of comparison. The comparative frame involves responding to 
one event in terms of a quantitative or qualitative relation along a specified dimension with 
another event. Comparative frames may be divided into specific sub-types, such as bigger-
smaller, brighter-darker, etc. The different types are, in part, defined by the dimension along 
which the relation applies (e.g. size or speed). Comparative frames may also involve 
quantification of the dimension (e.g. ‘A is more than B and B is more than C’). Consider 
experimental trials presented by Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Strand and Friman 
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(2004) who successfully employed MET to establish comparative relations in three typically-
developing children. Training AB relations involved selecting the coin (from two possible 
options) that bought more sweets. Consider the following instruction: “Coin A buys less than 
coin B, so which coin would you take to buy as many sweets as possible”? Training BC 
relations was identical, but now compared coin B with a new coin C. Training ABC relations 
then involved all three coins. Consider the following instruction: “If coin A buys less than 
coin B and if coin B buys less than coin C, which coin would you take to buy as many sweets 
as possible”? This was followed by an ABC test with novel stimuli. The results demonstrated 
that MET was a useful way to establish comparative relations and related generalisation in 
young children. Berens and Hayes (2007) reported similar outcomes with typically-
developing children. 
The relational frame of hierarchy. Hierarchical relations involve responding in 
accordance with contextual cues such as “contains”, “is a member of” or “belongs to” or 
equivalent. The general form of a hierarchical relation is “A is an attribute or member of B” 
and kinship relations are a classic example. For instance, if you are told that John is the father 
of Dave and Claire, you can derive that Claire and Dave are siblings. Two RFT studies have 
examined hierarchical relations with adults (Gil, Luciano, Ruiz, & Valdivia-Salas, 2012; 
Griffee & Dougher, 2002). In particular, Luciano et al. successfully demonstrated the 
transformation of functions among members of hierarchical categories using MET in a 
sample of university students. 
The relational frame that appears to be perhaps the most complex and which has 
attracted much empirical interest involves perspective-taking relations. This frame will be 
reviewed in considerable detail below in the following section on self. Prior to doing so, 
however, short reviews of the traditional psychological literature on self and on the role of 
self in human suffering will be provided.  
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The Psychology of Self 
The concept of self has had a pivotal role in psychological knowledge and theorising 
from their earliest beginnings (e.g. James, 1910; Mead, 1934; Sarbin, 1952). This prominent 
position has continued in spite of a long-standing lack of consensus on the concept’s core 
definition and a diversity of emphases on specific proposed features (Epstein, 1973). For 
example, Skinner (1974) emphasised self-awareness as produced by social contingencies that 
reinforce discrimination of a human or animal’s own behaviour (see also Dymond & Barnes, 
1997). Alternatively, Erikson (1968) proposed the emergence of a conscious sense of self in 
childhood. Even these approaches, however, are not necessarily contradictory because both a 
conscious self and self-awareness refer to self-knowledge that has an essential quality of 
being on-going and which facilitates a more stable knowledge base about who we are (Farb et 
al., 2007; James, 1890).  
One of the few core features of a sense of self on which most psychological traditions 
agree is perspective-taking. In short, this involves the ability to see the world consistently and 
coherently from one’s own perspective, as well as to appreciate the perspective of others. In 
mainstream psychology, most recent theorising and research on perspective-taking has come 
from a school of thought known as Theory of Mind (ToM: Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen 2000; Howlin, Baron-Cohen, & Hadwin, 1999).  
 Theory of Mind. Theory of Mind has been loosely defined as “the appreciation of the 
representational nature of mind and its relation to behaviour” (Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 
1997, p.169). Perspective-taking is commonly viewed as a central feature of one’s ability to 
have a theory of mind of oneself or another and thus forms the underlying component of such 
a representational understanding. Specifically, traditional developmental psychologists have 
defined perspective-taking as an individual’s awareness of informational states in oneself and 
in others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The basic processes that 
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underpin theory of mind capabilities are thought to involve an individual understanding the 
relationship between his/her beliefs and actions and the beliefs and actions of others 
(McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). According to Baron-Cohen (2000), an 
individual has well-developed theory of mind skills when s/he displays “the ability to infer or 
attribute to oneself and others the full range of mental states (i.e. beliefs, desires, intentions, 
imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action” (p.3).   
In the language of ToM, there are five levels in the development of the attribution of 
information or mental states to the self and others that range from simple visual perspective-
taking to the more complex level of distinguishing between true and false beliefs (Howlin et 
al., 1999). Level 1 of the ToM model consists of simple visual perspective-taking at which 
individuals are believed to act on the principle that different people can have different views 
of the same situation. For example, with a two-sided card placed between two individuals, 
one person can see only one side while the other person can see the other side. Level 2 
involves complex visual perspective-taking and is based on the principle that people can see 
things differently. For example, if a picture is placed between two individuals sitting opposite 
one another, the picture will appear upside down for one individual and the right way up for 
the other. These two levels are collectively known as first-order false belief (Baron-Cohen, 
2000). Most of the studies concerned with these stages of ToM have investigated the 
developmental differences between normally-developing and autistic children. In general the 
findings demonstrated that the latter population show higher rates of deficits in first- order 
false belief, while the former do not (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith 1985; Leekam & 
Perner, 1991; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996).    
The next three levels of perspective-taking (Levels 3-5) are believed to be more 
complex as they require the individual to move from purely visual perspective-taking to 
understanding the relationship between seeing and knowing (McHugh et al., 2009). At Level 
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3, individuals are said to understand that seeing leads to knowing, based on the principle that 
people only know things they have seen (Taylor, 1988). This ability also precludes an 
understanding of deception because an individual who cannot keep track of what another 
person knows is unlikely to determine whether the other person is being truthful or not. 
Consider the example by Pratt and Bryant (1990), who presented young children with a story 
about two characters, one of whom looks into a box and another of whom simply touches the 
box. After the story, the three old children were asked to identify the character who knew 
what was inside the box. All of the children were able to correctly identify that the character 
who had seen inside the box would know what was inside, while that the character who 
simply touched the box would not know.   
Level 4 of this model involves the principle that actions can be predicted on the basis 
of true belief (Howlin et al., 1999). Consider a traditional training task in which two similar 
scenes are portrayed. In one scene, a toy car is placed beside a toy boat, and in the other scene, 
an identical toy car is placed beside a toy plane. The child is then presented with the 
following true belief story: “This morning, you saw the car next to the boat but you did not 
see the car next to the plane”. The child is then asked, “Where do you think the car is? Why 
do you think it is near the boat?  Where will you go to get the car? Why will you go to the 
boat?” The correct conclusions involve the knowledge that one will only know what one has 
seen, and will act on this basis. In short, in both levels 3 and 4, individuals learn that they and 
others can only determine a true belief on the basis of what is actually seen and they cannot 
know what they have not seen, even if they think they know what they have seen (McHugh et 
al.).  
The final Level 5 involves the principle that you can predict actions on the basis of 
false belief and can become aware that previous beliefs may have been false (Howlin et al.). 
This refers to a scenario where representations or beliefs are discriminated as incorrect or 
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false (e.g. events may have occurred without a person’s knowledge) and the individual has 
the ability to then alter their belief about these events.  
Empirical evidence suggests that children do not demonstrate perspective-taking until 
they reach certain developmental milestones. For example, Baron-Cohen, Tager-Fusberg and 
Cohen (2000) exposed children to the five levels of TOM understanding and found 
competencies only around age five. Deficits in ToM (often referred to as ‘mindblindness’) 
also appear to correlate with key characteristics of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and 
cognitive developmental theorists have postulated that ‘mindblindness’ in certain populations 
supports the core concepts of ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Similarly, although great apes and 
very young children appear to have some understanding of their own and others’ emotional 
states (such as desire or hurt), they cannot attribute informational states (knowledge or belief) 
that provide the specific context for these emotions to occur (Whiten & Byrne, 1997).  
 
The Role of Self in Human Suffering 
The emergence of a sense of self is a largely assumed pre-requisite for sound mental 
health and human functioning (Dymond & Barnes, 1997; Hayes, 1984). And clinical 
researchers have often argued that dysfunctional aspects of self are associated with, and 
contribute to, poor mental health. Authors differ markedly on whether they interpret this 
dysfunctionality as deficits, excesses, or problems pertaining to flexibility. 
Self-awareness, in which we display on-going watchfulness over our own thoughts, 
actions and emotions (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) has played a strong role in the literature on 
human suffering. Specifically, authors such as Ingram (1990) have highlighted the 
importance of synchronising one’s attention appropriately with one’s environment. In line 
with this, Ingram distinguished attention that is focused on self-referential internally 
generated experiences (called self-focused attention, SFA) vs. external experiences derived 
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through sensory receptors. Along similar lines, Watkins and Teasdale (2004) distinguished 
between analytical self-focus and experiential self-focus. Indeed, there appears to be 
considerable overlap between experiential self-focus and an external experience of self, as 
well as between analytical self-focus and SFA. 
Cognitive theories have generally proposed that excessive self-focus (presumably too 
much analytical at the expense of experiential) is associated with mental distress. For 
example, Mor and Winquist (2002) suggested that chronic self-focus, particularly after 
negative events, contributes to mental health problems (see also Duval & Wicklund, 1972; 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Ingram himself (1990) suggested that heightened 
SFA may contribute to the full range of human suffering, including anxiety, substance abuse 
and schizophrenia. Indeed, a number of sources of evidence support this view. For example, 
increasing the level of engagement in SFA in dysphoric participants correlates with more 
pessimistic expectations for the future (Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987), as well as 
increased memory of negative events in the past (Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, & 
Greenberg, 1989). Similar relationships have been recorded between heightened SFA and the 
symptoms of anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hartman, 1983; Hope, Gansler, & Heimberg, 
1989). Similarly, Watkins and Teasdale (2004) demonstrated that heightened analytical self-
focus was associated with increased risk of a depressive relapse in individuals diagnosed with 
depression (see also Crane et al., 2008; Rimes & Watkins, 2005).  
In a view of human psychological dysfunction as behavioural deficits, Linehan (1993), 
in the dialectical model of personality disorder, proposed that sufferers demonstrate 
deficiencies in taking the perspective of others and in emotional self-regulation (see also 
Dimeff & Linehan, 2001). Furthermore, other authors have offered perhaps a more complex 
and fluid approach that sees dysfunction not simply as excesses or deficits, but as an inability 
to behave flexibly. For example, Ingram (1990) also proposed that psychological suffering 
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resulted from an inability to shift attention or perspective appropriately between internal and 
external experiences. Taken together, these views present a picture of mental distress as 
imbalances in the functioning of a sense of self that have both cognitive and emotional 
ramifications. 
Although behavioural psychologists traditionally paid little attention to the role of self 
(even in verbal behaviour) and also showed sparse interest in psychological distress beyond 
developmental disabilities, behavioural flexibility is a well-established concept. From a 
behavioural perspective, the inability to shift perspective appropriately between experiential 
and analytical self-focus is an example of a lack of behavioural flexibility under appropriate 
stimulus control. Consider the following example. An individual who suffers from chronic 
pain bumps his elbow (experiential self-focus). He instantly has the thought that this might 
need to be watched in case it becomes something serious (analytical self-focus). This latter 
internal source of experience brings the individual into contact with a difficult history of 
chronic pain and all its ramifications (more analytical self-focus). In this context (which is 
largely unavoidable), it would be better for the sufferer to switch back to experiential self-
focus, rather than engage in further lengthy and painful analytical self-focus, in order to 
ensure that the latter does not quickly get the better of him. Too much analytical self-focus at 
this point will lead him undoubtedly to excessive rumination about his internal states, at the 
expense of attending to more on-going actual experience. It is not that the sufferer is 
somehow better at analytical than experiential self-focus. He can do both competently. The 
problem is that he cannot switch between the two when this is most needed, because 
analytical self-focus generates more of the same, rather than facilitating switching back.  
Research on the contingency insensitivity effect illustrates how excessive verbal 
behaviour (such as analytical self-focus) reduces your discriminations of external 
contingencies (such as experiential self-focus) and thus directly influences your subsequent 
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behaviour. This effect, therefore, offers an excellent example of the behavioural implications 
of a lack of flexibility, especially where verbal behaviour dominates that which is based 
directly on contingencies (Wulfert, Greenway, Farkas, Hayes, & Dougher, 1994). The next 
section reviews the ACT model of psychological health and distress, in which both 
behavioural flexibility and self occupy central positions in terms of understanding and 
clinical intervention. 
 
The ACT Approach to Self: The Three Selves 
From an ACT perspective, self was initially conceptualised in terms of the three 
selves -- self as content, self as process and self as context. Collectively, these have also been 
referred to as: three levels of self, three senses of the concept of self and three knowing selves. 
All are believed to be natural by-products of verbal behaviour (Hayes, 1995). The term ‘three 
senses of self’ is used predominantly in the sections that follow.  
Self as content. Put simply, self as content involves describing and/or evaluating 
yourself (i.e. creating verbal statements about yourself and evaluating these statements). In 
this conceptualised self, your individual world is structured by the literal meaning of your 
psychological content, such that who you are is interpreted in terms of what your mind tells 
you at various times. From an ACT perspective, this literality is problematic (Hayes et al., 
2006). To illustrate this point, one might simplify this behaviour into several steps. First, 
there is nothing inherently wrong with describing and/or evaluating yourself, whether these 
evaluations are positive or negative. Second, a problem begins to emerge when any aspect of 
your content becomes co-ordinated with who you are. This co-ordination relation (between 
content and I/self/observer) is often referred to as attachment, because the piece of content in 
question is attached to “I”, as a human being. Attached content automatically becomes part of 
the conceptualised self.  
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According to Torneke (2010), self as content “is, by necessity, an extreme 
simplification. This is its very point and at the same time a limitation” (p.110). In other words, 
self as content is an extreme simplification of all that the self is in the sense that there should 
be much more to the self than what the self as content suggests at any particular point in time.  
Self as content in therapy. From an ACT perspective, clients often come to therapy 
with a conceptualised self, which they want to change or swap for another (more, better, 
different) conceptualised self (Hayes et al., 1999). As such, they are open to change on 
specific features of their self and their content, but unfortunately are often wedded or attached 
to the construction of the conceptualised self as a generic strategy. Indeed, this strategy and 
the conceptualised self as a whole are often ardently defended by clients early on. In the 
language of ACT, they struggle with this relationship between self and content, and struggle 
with conceptualising the self as a strategy. It is in respect of this struggle and with reference 
to the ossified conceptualised self that the koan-like phrase: “Kill yourself everyday” has 
been used (Hayes, 2002).  
Self as process. Self as process is a psychological space in which on-going activity 
facilitates continuous distinctions between the observer and the doer. In short, who you are is 
distinct from what you think, feel, remember, etc. For ACT, this psychological space does not 
entail fusion, because the observer can perceive the processes of thinking, feeling, etc. (the 
doings) and the evaluations that accompany them. Naturally, this distinction has the potential 
to reduce the pain associated with those evaluations (i.e. the observer wouldn’t feel as 
overwhelmed as when in self as content).  
The on-going awareness of those content-based processes is a critical feature of self 
as process. In essence, because you can perceive your content as continuously changing, 
attachment to it is not facilitated. Consider the example “I feel depressed and am having 
depressed thoughts, but these are just thoughts and feelings at this moment and they may be 
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different tomorrow”. This on-going awareness is synonymous with the concept of 
mindfulness, because you are being mindful of your content as it comes and goes.  
Operating in self as process readily permits values-consistent behaviour, rather than 
content-driven behaviour, because you have a distinct awareness of your content, while 
remaining open to values. In simple terms, self as process permits both, thereby allowing you 
greater flexibility with regard to your actions. Hence, you can live a rich and full values-
based life if you can see your content for what it is. Notice, however, that self as process does 
not require you to somehow be ‘content-free’ (if that were even possible), but simply offers 
you a different place from which to observe the ever-changing nature of your content. 
On balance, it is also important to recognise that sticky psychological content (with 
which you have struggled in the past) is likely to create resurgence to self as content. That it, 
you cannot assume that all you need to do is stay in self as process, because your history will 
likely dictate that certain powerful content will slide you back into self as content, the minute 
it shows up. Accordingly, for ACT, there is a very fine line between self as content and self 
as process, and it is primarily on-going awareness that keeps you in the latter and away from 
the grasp of the former.  
Self as process in therapy. Learning to experience what is happening to us on an on-
going basis is a critical feature of our developmental histories, but there are many examples 
of how difficulties can emerge when this training history is problematic. In short, our 
experiences must be co-ordinated with descriptors that are consistent with the verbal world 
around us and problems emerge when they are not. For example, a client may not have 
appropriate breadth in using emotional terms to describe current feelings (Barnes-Holmes, 
Hayes, & Dymond, 2001). Hence, a core feature of ACT is to establish self as process skills 
and facilitate maximum co-ordination between the descriptors the client employs and those 
used by the verbal community. Doing so also allows the therapist to gain better insight into 
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how clients actually feel and what is happening for them in the moment. This, in turn, will 
permit a better understanding of how these descriptors feed self as content and thus foster a 
better understanding of the conceptualised self as constructed by an individual. Furthermore, 
facilitating self as process allows greater flexibility in shifting between self as process and 
self as context, thus making self as content less likely. 
Self as context.  Self as context is a psychological space in which there is the 
strongest distinction between the observer and his/her psychological content. For ACT, 
operating in self as context involves detachment (defusion) from your psychological content 
because who you are is distinct from what you think, feel, remember, etc. Consider the 
following example, “I feel depressed and am having depressed thoughts, but I know that who 
I am is more than these negative thoughts and feelings”. Naturally, this distinction has the 
potential to reduce the previous pain associated with content and its evaluations (i.e. the 
observer wouldn’t feel as overwhelmed as when in self as content). The following quotation 
from Hayes (1995) offers a nice definition of this sense of self:  
I in some meaningful sense is the location that is left behind when all of the content 
differences are subtracted out (p.3).  
 
Self as context in therapy. In a therapeutic context, ACT attempts to increase the 
extent to which clients engage in self as context, largely through experiential exercises (e.g. 
the Observer Exercise). Doing so, in turn, weakens the control of thoughts and feelings over 
behaviour (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001). Consider the example of an individual presenting 
with chronic pain. Training in self as context would permit the client to experience a sense of 
self that is distinct from the pain, as well as highlighting the fact that other experiences can 
co-exist with pain. When the client learns to make more contact with this sense of self, it also 
increases her access to values, as a dominant source of behaviour, and a greater sense of self 
as context will allow her to consistently keep this behaviour going in that valued direction. 
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Self as context will also foster greater acceptance by her because it opens up a safe place in 
which pain can be experienced as not completely overwhelming or dominant. As a result, she 
comes to see the pain as a part of who she is, but not all that she is.  
 
The RFT Approach to Self: Perspective-taking Relations 
Perspective-taking as deictic relations is one of the most widely studied areas of 
relational responding, as dictated by RFT (e.g. McHugh et al., 2004). Evidence supporting 
this concept has emanated from studies on both development and education with typically-
developing children, as well as those with developmental disabilities (e.g. autism) and other 
psychiatric diagnoses (e.g. Asperger’s syndrome). However, recent developments have also 
examined the potential role of relational perspective-taking in other diagnostic samples, such 
as schizophrenia, and have explored the role of perspective-taking in one’s sense of self.  
For RFT, perspective-taking is comprised of three types of derived stimulus relations, 
known as I vs. YOU, HERE vs. THERE and NOW vs. THEN. Put simply, these describe the 
three core aspects of your perspective. First, I see the world as I, not as YOU or as someone 
else (hence, we say, I versus YOU). Second, when I see the world as I, I always see it from 
HERE, not from THERE, or anywhere that is not HERE (hence, we say, HERE versus 
THERE). Third, when I see the world as I, I always see it from NOW, not from THEN, or 
some other point in time that is not NOW (hence, we say, NOW versus THEN). In summary, 
I always see my world from HERE and NOW and from my perspective, and I always see 
YOU from THERE and THEN. 
I versus YOU. When we operate from the perspective of I, we distinguish, compare 
and contrast ourselves to others across a myriad of dimensions. As children, we learn to do 
this initially through physical attributes (e.g. mummy is taller than me, but daddy is taller 
than her). Harmless as these may seem, the fact that we can already compare and contrast 
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ourselves with others means that we can also evaluate these comparisons. Consider, for 
example, Ann who has always felt inferior to her more attractive sister Mary. In relational 
terms, Ann’s perspective holds that Mary is more physically attractive than Ann and more 
attractive equals better, hence Mary is also better than Ann. Although the initial comparison 
between the sisters may have been based on a single physical attribute (which may have even 
been observed directly by others), Ann’s comparative relations have allowed her to contrast 
this physical superiority and her co-ordination relations have allowed her to co-ordinate this 
superiority with being better generally. Of course, the latter would also quickly have become 
co-ordinated with Ann feeling bad about herself. So, it is easy to see how even simple 
relations and the fact that they involve feelings can lead us early in our lives towards a path of 
low self-esteem.  
The above example also illustrates how perspective-taking behaviour becomes 
increasingly arbitrary and thus, at one level, moves further and further away from physical 
attributes. Indeed, as verbally sophisticated adults, most of our comparisons with others are 
not based on physical attributes. For example, I might be consumed by jealousy because, 
from my perspective, my neighbour appears to be richer than me and yet I have no way of 
knowing how much money my neighbour actually has. 
In fact, who we come to know ourselves to be across time emerges on the basis of our 
perspective on others, such that it seems unlikely that there would be an I without a YOU. 
What makes perspective-taking distinct from other types of relational activity is the paradox 
that I vs. YOU relations become a constant reference point for our perceptions, even when 
many aspects of our lives are constantly changing. For example, if I suddenly learn that my 
‘rich’ neighbour has lost his job, I may now believe that we are equal in wealth, but we are 
still different people. That is, aspects of who you are may change constantly, but your 
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perspective from which these changes are observed does not. In short, you always see the 
world from your own perspective.   
HERE versus THERE. There is a long literature on the importance of a sense of 
place in human development and for RFT this is captured by the spatial relations of HERE 
and THERE. In conjunction with development in I vs. YOU relations, we learn to distinguish 
between HERE (not THERE) and THERE (not HERE). For example, when daddy comes 
home, a child might say “I am watching TV (HERE), but mummy is in the kitchen 
(THERE)”. Similar to I-YOU relations, spatial relations become increasingly less based on 
physical locations and become increasingly arbitrary. For instance, if I say “I am here” at this 
moment in time, I am in my office, but if I say “I am here” one hour from now, I will be in 
my kitchen. In other words, the word “HERE” coordinates with where I am at that point in 
time, hence it is constantly changing. Paradoxically, much of the language that we use refers 
to physical space, but in a metaphorical way. Consider Sarah who describes her feelings of 
depression as “bearing down on her” or as a sense of “carrying the weight of the world on her 
shoulders”.   
It is clear from the examples above that I-YOU relations are implicit in HERE-
THERE relations, because it would be impossible to specify a perspective from a particular 
location if there was no perspective from which to operate. As a result, Sarah is talking about 
her feelings, which are part of the way she sees herself at that time. As such, the spatial 
relations are a critical feature of one’s perspective because I is always co-ordinated with 
HERE (and distinct from THERE) and YOU is always co-ordinated with THERE (and 
distinct from HERE).  
NOW versus THEN. Temporal relations are another core feature of perspective-
taking and RFT refers to these as NOW vs. THEN relations. As the name implies, temporal 
relations refer to time and are naturally implicit in many everyday sentences. For example, 
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“At two o’clock I was working but by three, I was at home”. Again, we learn temporal 
relations using physical features, especially when we first learn to tell the time. Once that 
skill is acquired, these relations then become largely arbitrary because you can make 
reference to time without knowing what time it actually is and because temporal relations can 
be extended across, days, weeks, months and even years. Consider an athlete who breaks her 
leg and is unable to participate in competitions. She may become fixated on what she was last 
year and lose sight of her life in the present (e.g. last year (THEN), I was a winner, but this 
year (NOW) I am a loser). Again, I-YOU relations are implicit in temporal relations, because 
one’s perspective is always from NOW and distinct to THEN. Of course, it is important to 
remember that even if you are referring to how you felt in the past (THEN), the temporal 
relation from your current perspective is always NOW. 
 
Integrating RFT and ACT in an Understanding of Self 
  In Figure 2, we have provided an overview of an RFT conceptualisation of the three 
selves. There are a number of key points we would like to emphasise. 1. There are two 
constant aspects to the self – your perspective which is always located HERE-NOW and your 
psychological content, which can be located HERE-NOW or THERE-THEN, depending 
upon which sense of self you are operating in at any point. Hayes (1995) referred to these two 
aspects as the dual functions of self in terms of “functioning both as a doer and as an observer 
of the doing” (p.1). So, there is, in general, no flexibility or change in perspective (observer), 
just changes in the location of content (doer). 2. Switching content always occurs in a partly 
bi-directional manner. Specifically, you can switch bi-directionally between self as process 
and self as content and this happens readily, because in both your content is located HERE-
NOW. Similarly, you can switch between self as process and self as context, but this will 
involve switching content from HERE-NOW to THERE-THEN. However, you cannot switch 
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between self as content and self as context because you would have to be engaging in self as 
process in order to do so. In this way, self as process mediates all changes in the location of 
your content. Each of the three selves is described below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptualisation of ACT’s three selves as RFT’s perspective-taking relations, as taken from Foody et 
al. (2012). 
 
Self as content as deictic relations. In self as content, your psychological content 
(e.g. descriptions, evaluations, etc.) is co-ordinated with the self because both are located 
HERE-NOW (see Figure 2, top right). In other words, there are co-ordination relations 
between who you are and what you think. The self is always HERE-NOW, that is the place 
from which the whole human being observes. Your content may be HERE-NOW, but only if 
it is on-going and experiential (that would be self as process, see below). The instant your 
content is HERE-NOW and this is not on-going and experiential, then the content is rigid and 
conceptualised. As a result, these functions of the content transform to the co-ordinated self 
and this in turn becomes rigid and conceptualised (i.e. you are attached to it). This level of 
cognitive fusion makes it very likely that your content will exert some control over behaviour, 
especially because the self is in relational networks with many other types of content and so 
Perspective/Self 
HERE-NOW 
HERE-NOW 
HERE-NOW 
THERE-THEN 
Psychological 
Content 
Rigid and 
attached 
On-going and 
experiential 
Self as Content 
Self as Process 
Self as Context 
Stable and constant 
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on. The only alternative is to keep your content on-going and experiential (i.e. to stay in self 
as process).  
In our developmental histories, we are trained from a young age to adopt our 
perspectives from HERE-NOW in terms of discriminating and evaluating everything that we 
do. This is likely the way in which our perspective-taking skills develop and for the most part 
early on, that is a good thing. So, even for verbally sophisticated individuals, there will 
always be a certain amount of content that is co-ordinated with HERE-NOW, in a manner 
that is consistent with your history.  
The more verbally sophisticated we become the more solid the self becomes and the 
more fluent we should be in operating in self as process (or even self as context) with regard 
to our psychological content. Ideally, there should be only a minimal amount of content that 
is rigid and conceptualised because your detailed experience and constancy of the self should 
indicate that content is only content and not who you are. However, given that our 
developmental histories are full of discriminating and evaluating everything that we do, we 
would need special training in order to continue to operate in self as process. Indeed, we 
would also need special training to transform the co-ordination relations between content and 
self as HERE-NOW to a relation of distinction or hierarchy in which self is HERE-NOW but 
our content is THERE-THEN (self as context). 
Self as process as deictic relations. Now let us consider how RFT can account for 
what is happening at a relational level in self as process (see Figure 2, centre right). There is 
no relational difference between self as content and self as process, although they are 
significantly different experientially. In both selves, the doer is located HERE-NOW and, as 
always, the observer is HERE-NOW also. In self as process, there is a sense of the movement 
of psychological content from HERE-NOW to THERE-THEN. This means that although 
psychological content is problematic in self as content because it is HERE-NOW, self as 
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process is different in that your content as HERE-NOW is simply the way we learn to talk 
about our thoughts, feelings and behaviour and thus facilitates self-knowledge rather than 
fusion. 
Self as context as deictic relations. Unlike both self as content and self as process, 
your content, when in self as context, is THERE-THEN (see Figure 2, bottom right). In other 
words, in self as context all that is left in HERE-NOW is I. Just as our developmental 
histories require (for communicative and social reasons) that our content is HERE-NOW in 
terms of both self as content and self as process, it is equally important that our histories 
establish the skills required to switch psychological content from HERE-NOW to THERE-
THEN as in self as context. 
 
Psychological Flexibility: Switching Between Selves 
According to the ACT-RFT integrated model of self proposed by Foody et al. (2012) 
and illustrated above, one does not change one’s perspective (observer), but simply changes 
the location of content (doer). It is important, therefore, to clarify the nature of these changes 
with regards to one’s content. Specifically, switching content always occurs in a partly bi-
directional manner. That is, you can switch bi-directionally between self as process and self 
as content and this happens readily because in both your content is located HERE-NOW. 
Similarly, you can switch between self as process and self as context, but this will involve 
switching content from HERE-NOW to THERE-THEN. However, you cannot switch 
between self as content and self as context because you would have to be engaging in self as 
process in order to do so. In this way, self as process mediates all changes in the location of 
your content. 
The primary goal of ACT is to increase psychological flexibility, particularly with 
regard to the self. Specifically, this would involve being able to switch readily between self 
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as process and self as context. However, because your psychological content in self as 
process remains HERE-NOW, you can very easily become attached to aspects of this content 
and thus find yourself quickly back in self as content. What this means for ACT is that clients 
should learn to switch readily from self as content to self as process in order to minimise 
fusion. In short, when operating in self as process you can easily get sucked into self as 
content and when operating in self as content you need to switch quickly to self as process. 
Figure 2 also highlights the importance of switching flexibly between self as process 
and self as context. It seems unlikely that you could operate to a great extent in self as context 
because you would quickly find yourself operating in self as process (because new 
experiences are happening all the time). Hence, these on-going experiences would quickly 
draw you from self as context to self as process. In the other direction, there will be occasions 
in which the risk of slipping from self as process to self as content is great and in this 
situation (involving what we can think of as sticky content) it would be beneficial to switch 
from self as process to self as context. In this way, self as context is the safest place to 
operate with regard to your content and is essential in dealing with content with which you 
have a history of being fused. But, it is highly improbable that you will stay long in self as 
context and will thus return quickly to self as process.  
Implications for the relationship between transcendence and self as context. It 
seems plausible that highly competent meditative practices may allow you to access a place 
that feels non-verbal and it is thus tempting to consider that self as context is non-verbal, 
hence essentially non-relational. Barnes-Holmes, Hayes and Gregg (2001) have summarised 
this issue across the following two excerpts:  
spirituality is an experience of “transcendence” or “oneness” that comes when literal, 
analytic and evaluative functions of relational framing are massively reduced and the 
relational functions of I, HERE and NOW are thereby allowed to predominate” (p.243). 
 
a sense of transcendence results, in large part, from a situation in which the evaluative  
functions attached to HERE and NOW repeatedly transfer to THERE and THEN in these 
two relational frames. More specifically, when an evaluation (located I, HERE and NOW) 
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is discriminated as just an evaluation, it immediately acquires the relational functions of I, 
THERE and THEN. If this form of shifting within the frames keeps repeating itself, a 
person’s “normal” perception of reality may be undermined, leading to a sense of 
transcendence. From an RFT perspective this is exactly what happens during some forms 
of meditation. For example, dispassionate observation of spontaneous thoughts and 
feelings is encouraged in Buddhist forms of meditation and with sufficient practice, 
feelings of tranquillity and transcendence often emerge (see Hayes, 1984). For RFT, the 
“experience” of transcendence occurs because each evaluative function that occurs 
during meditation immediately loses most of its psychological functions when it shifts 
from I, HERE and NOW to I, THERE and THEN” (p.244). 
 
 
According to this view, the on-going defusion that comes with self as context, in 
terms of the massive reductions in the transformations of evaluative and other functions 
through the relations of HERE-NOW, would indeed feel like transcendence. However, this 
behaviour is ultimately verbal because it continues to require that you observe from the 
perspective of I-HERE-NOW. It is important to emphasise, therefore, that self as context is 
unique in terms of the content being located THERE-THEN and this, in turn, provides a more 
stable perspective of I-HERE-NOW.   
 The transcendent experience has another quality that is unique. This is best illustrated 
through examples. Imagine a musician working on a score or an artist working on a canvas. 
In both cases, these individuals are highly absorbed in a single focus. But this focus is always 
in addition to the observer. The focus feels almost entirely automatic in the sense that it is 
highly practiced, and competent individuals have learned to focus on only that endeavour and 
nothing else. After many years of practice, this focus would become highly automatic. 
However, the individual is always observing at the same time. In short, there is always the 
observer and the doer and they always remain distinct. 
 Now consider a Vipassana meditation master. What this individual is focusing 
intensely on is herself (not a canvas or a score, just herself). This is an extremely rare 
situation in which she is focusing solely and entirely on herself and nothing else. In addition, 
across many years of training, she learns to do this with high automaticity, so that she can 
quickly reach a place of almost no content for extended periods of time. In this context, it 
44 
 
would feel like the observer and the doer had collapsed into one because there is little doing 
(i.e. no transformations of stimulus functions either HERE-NOW or THERE-THEN) and all 
observing. In short, there is nothing HERE-NOW, but I on an on-going basis. However, this 
very fact would suggest that even this type of behaviour is verbal because you are still 
operating from the perspective-taking frames.  
Although possible, accessing such a place would require vast practice and would only 
last a considerable length of time if you had developed high levels of automaticity in this 
regard in order for the transformations of stimulus functions to remain at such a low level. 
Hence, the two great challenges to a highly verbal organism attempting to reach such a height 
are: 1. Getting there and 2. Staying there. This would present enormous challenges for 
anyone, let alone an individual who has a history of fusion and experiential avoidance.  
 
The Issue of Middle Level Terms 
The current ACT hexaflex incorporates self as context as one of the six essential and 
interrelated processes, and self as context holds a central place at the heart of the model. 
However, the hexaflex is a heuristic model of processes which to date have not been subject 
to functional analyses and this weakness applies to self as context, as much as to the 
remaining five suggested processes. If one was to start with a bottom-up analysis, there 
would be no hexaflex because such a model is top-down. If one starts with a top-down model, 
then the aim becomes about searching for functional analytic terms which might map onto 
those already present within the model. But this may be neither possible nor useful. For 
example, if existing processes turn out not to be functionally identifiable, then they would 
have to be abandoned. That is difficult to do once a model gets established in a verbal 
community, especially when this occurred in the absence of functional evidence. So, in a 
sense integrating RFT concepts into a top-down heuristic model (especially point-by-point 
45 
 
mapping) is the mixing of two types of analyses. However, if the hexaflex model is widely 
adhered to and understood by a specific verbal community, then perhaps the integration 
presented in this thesis is a good place to start.  
There are obvious merits to reticulated models and indeed it is hard to see how to 
integrate clinical and basic research concepts in any other way without essentially becoming 
solely either top-down or bottom-up. Psychological traditions, on the whole, have not been 
particularly successful in this regard; hence it is hard to look for comparisons elsewhere. But, 
it is also difficult to see in advance what this reticulation of concepts will ultimately look like. 
For example, if ACT-based concepts eventually yield to RFT interpretations (e.g. self as 
context may be operationally defined in terms of a combination of deictic and hierarchical 
frames), this would in practice be bottom-up. It is certainly the case that the reticulated 
approach is appropriate for integrating ACT and RFT at the present time when the two pillars 
rely on distinctly different concepts. However, it may be the case eventually that middle level 
clinical concepts are no longer valuable and that clinicians will be trained to use bottom-up 
concepts from the beginning. In such a scientific ideal, a reticulated model would no longer 
be necessary. 
Although there is sound outcome data to suggest that ACT, when comprising self-
based techniques, is effective in achieving its therapeutic aims (Hayes et al., 2006; Levin, 
Hildebrandt, Lillis & Hayes, 2012), two clear gaps are present in the relevant literature. First, 
there is little or no published evidence demonstrating that these techniques are active 
ingredients in these outcomes. Second, the concept of the three selves is a middle level term 
and thus does not yield readily to functional analysis. Given that self is argued to play such a 
pivotal role in ACT, this is something of a weak scientific position for that therapeutic 
paradigm. The research in the current thesis was specifically designed to address this issue. 
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The Current Research 
The current programme of research had four main aims. First, we hoped to extend 
existing work on experimentally induced distress, with a particular focus on finding an 
appropriate preparation that would lend itself to the exploration of brief therapeutic 
interventions with non-clinical samples. On this path, we returned to one of the earliest and 
simplest methodologies in the literature – the single-sentence preparation. Second, we 
investigated the impact of techniques referred to as self as context in terms of ameliorating 
distress induced by the single-sentence preparation. Third, we compared mindfulness and self 
as context techniques, and subsequently investigated individual components of mindfulness. 
Finally, we explored the potential role of concepts derived from relational frame theory (RFT) 
in enhancing self as context techniques.  
Experiment 1 systematically compared the single-sentence to a multi-sentence distress 
induction procedure. We predicted that the multi-sentence preparation would generate greater 
distress. However, the results demonstrated that the preparations were equally effective in 
inducing emotional distress.  
The single-sentence distress induction procedure was employed again in Experiments 
2-5. These studies also incorporated a number of brief analogue interventions derived from 
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). Put simply, would ACT interventions that 
targeted acceptance, defusion, values and contact with the present moment successfully 
ameliorate experimentally induced distress? We also investigated whether each of these 
individual components would be enhanced by a self as context technique. We hypothesised 
that the combined interventions (e.g., self enhanced acceptance) would reduce distress more 
effectively. However, the results overall demonstrated that all interventions, either stand 
alone or combined with self as context, had little or no effect on levels of induced distress.  
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In Experiments 6-8, we employed an alternative form of distress induction. Similar to 
the design of the previous studies, in Experiment 6 we investigated the impact of mindfulness 
versus self as context techniques in reducing distress. We did not make any specific 
predictions about the outcomes, but were concerned with the possibility of differentiated 
outcomes based on the fact that self as context techniques encourage a focus on psychological 
events, (such as thoughts), while mindfulness techniques encourage a focus on somatic events 
(i.e. the body). Hence, comparing the two would perhaps allow us to determine whether it is 
the self-focus per se or the target of this focus that facilitates distress reduction. However, the 
results overall demonstrated that both interventions were equally effective in reducing 
distress.  
In Experiment 7, we distinguished between two mindfulness-based components, 
physical mindfulness and verbal mindfulness, and thereafter investigated which of these 
would be more effective in reducing distress. Again, we refrained from making specific 
predictions about potentially different outcomes for the two mindfulness-based components 
because there are no such experimental comparisons available in the literature. The results 
demonstrated that both conditions significantly reduced distress.  
In Experiment 8, we turned our attention to an investigation of the sequencing of 
mindfulness exercises and to the possibility that combining physical and verbal mindfulness 
would enhance effects observed with either component individually. We hypothesised that 
the sequence which presented physical mindfulness followed by verbal mindfulness would 
show greater reductions in distress than the reverse because this is the format employed in 
most mindfulness-based therapeutic packages (e.g. MBSR). The results demonstrated that 
this prediction was upheld and although both conditions reduced all measures of distress, the 
physical-verbal sequence was significantly better. 
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In Experiments 9 and 10, we employed the same distress induction procedure to 
investigate the role of distinction and hierarchical relations when targeted specifically in a 
self as context exercise. We hypothesised that the hierarchical self as context intervention 
would show superiority over the distinction self as context condition based on previous 
research by Luciano et al. (2011). The results were consistent with this prediction as the 
hierarchical intervention was the more effective in reducing distress. 
 Experiment 10 attempted to explore this issue further using a different ACT exercise. 
This study also included a practice interval placed between two exposures to the distress 
induction task to determine potentially lasting impacts of the interventions. 
A second aspect of the research examined the extent to which a focus on the self played a 
specific role in the outcomes described above. Accordingly, Experiment 10 compared 
interventions that focused on participants’ thoughts about the self-criticism that comprised 
the distress induction procedure (i.e. self-focused) versus interventions that focused on 
thoughts about an inanimate object (i.e. object-focused). In short, participants in both groups 
were asked to focus on thoughts, but only in the self-focused interventions did they focus on 
thoughts about themselves. We hypothesised that the self-based hierarchical intervention 
would be the most effective in terms of distress reduction because it aimed to target both self-
specific content and hierarchical relations. This prediction was somewhat supported, as both 
hierarchical conditions (self hierarchy and object hierarchy) showed superiority over both 
distinction conditions. Furthermore, both hierarchical conditions were associated with 
significantly less avoidance in the second distress induction. Interestingly, there were little 
differences between the interventions which targeted the self and those which did not. In the 
final chapter the thesis discusses the implications of the work for the existing literature on 
experimental distress induction procedures, ACT, mindfulness and RFT. 
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Experiment 1 
Experimental Comparison of Two Distress Induction Procedures 
 
Clinical researchers have employed an array of experimental procedures for the investigation 
of various aspects of mental suffering, in the hope of improving our understanding and 
treatment of mental health issues (e.g. Hayes, Bisset et al., 1999; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, 
& White, 1987). These include: the CO2 challenge (e.g. Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 
2004); the cold-pressor task (e.g. Keogh, Bond, Hanmer, & Tilston, 2005); brief electric 
shock (e.g. McMullen et al., 2008); and radiant heat induction (e.g. Kehoe et al., in press). 
Although many studies of experimental distress induction involve specific clinical 
populations, an even greater number have been used with non-clinical samples. For example, 
one of the shortest forms of distress induction used with these samples was developed by 
Rachman et al. (1996). In the single-sentence procedure, participants are asked to insert the 
name of a close relative or friend into the sentence “I hope [name] is in a car accident” and 
then say the sentence aloud, while trying to visualise the hypothetical scene. Rachman et al’s 
results demonstrated that the single-sentence manipulation increased anxiety, guilt and 
feelings of moral wrongness, as measured on visual analogue scales (VASs).  
Several recent studies have incorporated brief and therapeutic interventions into 
distress induction procedures to determine if the former can reduce the distress associated 
with the later. For example, Kehoe et al. (in press) investigated the effects of brief 
acceptance- and, distraction-based interventions on tolerance of experimentally induced 
radiant heat pain in a non-clinical sample of undergraduates. Levitt et al. (2004) also 
investigated the effects of acceptance and suppression on distress with a clinical sample of 
individuals with panic disorder when exposed to the CO2 challenge.  
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It is difficult to employ the same experimental procedures with both clinical and non-
clinical samples, especially when therapeutic components are also tested. For example, if the 
typical participant in a psychology experiment is provided with an acceptance-based 
intervention for a randomly generated piece of psychological content (e.g. a self-criticism), 
the outcomes might look very different than if the same situation was presented to a 
participant specifically selected for the presentation of a particular type of psychological 
suffering. However, if the procedures that underpin distress and, as well as those behind its 
alleviation, are to be investigated, an essential starting point is experimental work with non-
clinical samples. Hence, it is important to find a distress induction procedure that is effective 
in non-clinical individuals and which lends itself to distress reduction by brief analogue 
interventions.  
On the path towards selecting a method of experimental distress induction that would 
potentially lend itself to the exploration of different therapeutic interventions with non-
clinical samples, we returned to one of the earliest and simplest methodologies in the 
literature -- Rachman et al.’s (1996) single-sentence procedure. Although extremely simple in 
form, numerous studies have demonstrated the utility of this preparation in inducing 
experimental emotional distress with both clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g. Bocci & 
Gordon, 2007; Marcks & Woods, 2007; van den Hout, Kindt, Weiland, & Peters, 2002; 
Zucker, Crask, Barrios, & Holgium, 2002). However, there appear to be no published studies 
that have attempted any systematic comparisons between this and other procedures. For 
example, ACT clinicians often employ a very similar preparation in the service of facilitating 
defusion. In this procedure, clients are asked to write a short paragraph dictated by the 
therapist describing a hypothetical road crash involving a client’s loved one. The paragraph 
usually contains around five written sentences which the therapist uses to explore how much 
literal belief the client has in the written content and how the content potentially changes 
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during the translation from thought to written word. This procedure is well known for 
inducing considerable distress for clients, especially when literality of thoughts is high. Of 
course, this short defusion exercise bears considerable similarity with Rachman et al.’s 
procedure, but involves five target sentences rather than one. As a result, one might suggest 
that the distress outcomes recorded with Rachman et al.’s procedure might be enhanced by 
including more sentences, similar to the defusion exercise. Experiment 1 was designed to 
explore this methodological issue.  
In short, we systematically compared a single-sentence to a multi-sentence distress 
induction procedure to determine if the latter might generate greater emotional distress. 
Consistent with this simple aim, the current hypothesis predicted that the multi-sentence 
procedure would be associated with larger increases in measures of subjective distress than 
the single-sentence procedure. This hypothesis was based on the view that a longer 
manipulation would likely generate more vividness of the scene and thus increase 
participants’ negative appraisal of the hypothetical accident. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety volunteers (43 male and 47 female) participated in Experiment 1. All were 
aged between 18 and 23 years old, were undergraduates from the National University of 
Ireland Maynooth (NUIM) and held current driving licences. A number of exclusion criteria 
resulted in 26 participants not completing the experiment. Specifically, 11 individuals who 
reported that they had recently lost a loved one in an accident were excluded from 
participation because the experiment involved asking participants to imagine such an event. 
In addition, 15 individuals were excluded on the basis of reporting significant mental health 
issues (e.g. anxiety) that may be adversely affected by participation. This yielded a final 
53 
 
sample of 64 participants (29 males and 35 females, mean age = 19 years and 9 months), who 
were assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: single-sentence distress 
induction (N = 32) and multi-sentence distress induction (N =32).  
 
Setting and Materials  
All aspects of the study were conducted in the Experimental Room in the Department 
of Psychology at NUIM. The Experimental Room and an adjoining Observation Room were 
connected via a one-way mirror that permitted the Experimenter in the Observation Room to 
observe participants in the Experimental Room, but not vice versa. Both rooms were kept free 
from noise and disruption as much as possible.  
The Experimental Room contained: a desk; two chairs; a pen; a sheet of blank paper; 
a Consent Form (see Appendix 1); an Experimental Screening Questionnaire (ESQ, see 
Appendix 2); the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ, see Appendix 3); the 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS, see Appendix 4); three identical copies of Visual 
Analogue Scales (VASs, see Appendix 5); two copies of a Reaction Questionnaire (RQ, see 
Appendix 6) and a Debriefing Form (see Appendix 7).  
The ESQ was designed for exclusion purposes in the current experiment. It contained 
six simple questions that primarily determined whether participants had a current driving 
licence, had ever lost a relative in a car accident, or had suffered from any mental health 
issues that may be adversely affected by participation. Participants responded by selecting 
YES or NO to one or more of five listed categories (e.g. anxiety disorder) and three specific 
questions (e.g. “Have you ever been affected by a car accident?”). Any item ticked with YES 
resulted in immediate exclusion from the experiment.  
The two self-report measures, namely the AAQ and the PHLMS, assessed participant 
levels of avoidance and mindfulness, respectively. As well as determining the potential role 
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of these factors in experimental outcomes, it was useful to balance scores on these measures 
across experimental conditions.  
 The AAQ is a standard self-report measure of experiential avoidance (Bond et al., 
2011). There are seven items (e.g. “I’m afraid of my feelings”), to which participants respond 
by circling a number from 1 (Never True) to 7 (Always True). The responses on each item 
are summed to generate a total score for avoidance (minimum = 7, maximum = 49). The 
mean for a non-clinical sample is low in avoidance and has been reported at 17.34 (SD = 
4.37), with a mean alpha coefficient of .84 (.78 - .88) and 12-month test-retest reliability 
of .79 (Bond et al.).  
The PHLMS is a standard self-report measure of mindfulness capabilities 
(Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). This 20-item measure contains 10 
items that assess mindful awareness (e.g. “I am aware of what thoughts are passing through 
my mind”) and 10 that assess mindful acceptance (e.g. “There are aspects of myself I don’t 
want to think about”). Participants respond by circling a number from 1 (Never) to 5 (Very 
Often) on each item. The responses are summed to generate a separate overall score for each 
sub-scale (minimum = 20, maximum = 100). The mean for a non-clinical sample has been 
reported at 36.65 (SD = 4.93) and 30.19 (SD = 5.84) on the awareness and acceptance sub-
scales, respectively. Internal consistency reliability analyses have yielded a Cronbach’s alpha 
level of 0.75 for awareness and 0.82 for acceptance (Cardaciotto et al.).  
Three VASs served as the dependent measures and assessed participants’ self-
reported levels of discomfort, anxiety and stress. Each VAS comprised of a 16cm line, on 
which participants placed an X from 0% (e.g. No Discomfort) to 100% (e.g. Very Much 
Discomfort).   
The RQ was designed for current purposes. This short self-report measure consisted 
of five questions about willingness, vividness, believability, guilt and moral wrongness (e.g. 
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“Please rate how much guilt you feel after saying and writing the sentence”) regarding the 
distress induction procedure. Participants responded to each question by placing an X on a 
corresponding VAS from 0% (e.g. No Guilt) to 100% (e.g. Very Much Guilt).  
 
Ethical Issues 
This experiment adhered strictly to current guidelines of the British Psychological 
Society (BPS, 2010) and the Psychological Society of Ireland (PSI, 2003). Ethical approval 
was obtained from the Researcher’s supervisor and the National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth. It is important to emphasise a number of key features in this regard, which were 
also highlighted in the consent form. 1. Each participant was briefed as to the nature of the 
study prior to agreement to participant. 2. Participants were advised that none of the materials 
were being used for clinical purposes and in particular, that the intervention was not designed 
to function as a type of treatment. 3. Participants received advance notification that the 
experimental manipulation involved a distress induction procedure that may cause brief 
periods of distress throughout the experiment. 4. Participants with a self-reported history of 
psychological distress, which could have been influenced by experimental distress induction, 
did not participate in the experiment. The researcher and the participants were the only 
parties that had access to this information (which was provided by the participant on the 
ESQ). In addition, the Researcher was responsible for encoding the data so that it provided no 
identifying information 5. Participants could terminate their involvement at any time and 
remove any, or all, aspects of their data. It was stressed prior to the experiment that even 
though they would not be reminded, it was completely acceptable to stop at any point. 6. All 
data would be retained for a period of three years after which it was destroyed by the 
Experimenter. 7. Each participant could view her/his data at any time, but not the data of 
others. 8. All aspects of participation were confidential and the data was encoded by the 
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Researcher so that it, or its representation offered no identifying information. 9. In the 
unlikely event of distress of any form resulting from participation and lasting thereafter, 
participants were advised that they could gain access to a chartered psychologist and therapist 
free of charge to discuss these issues. 10. All participants were fully debriefed before leaving 
the Experimental Room. No participants raised any issues or reported any adverse effects at 
any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of four stages (Stages 1-4), always conducted in the 
same order. These stages are presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
STAGE 1 
Pre-Experimental Measures 
(ESQ, AAQ and PHLMS) 
 
 
 
STAGE 2 
Baseline VAS Ratings 
(discomfort, anxiety and stress) 
 
 
 
STAGE 3 
Distress Induction Procedures 
(single-sentence vs. multi-sentence) 
 
 
 
STAGE 4 
Post-induction VAS Ratings 
and RQ 
 
Figure 3. An overview of the experimental sequence in Experiment 1. 
 
Stage 1: Pre-experimental measures. Prior to commencement, participants 
completed a Consent Form, the ESQ, PHLMS and AAQ (see pages 51 and 52 for 
descriptions). During a short break immediately thereafter, the ESQ was assessed for 
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exclusion purposes. Where exclusion applied, participants were thanked and debriefed. All 
others proceeded immediately to the next stage.  
Stage 2:  Baseline VAS ratings. During Stage 2, participants completed the three 
baseline VAS ratings of discomfort, anxiety and stress. 
Stage 3: Distress induction procedure (single-sentence vs. multi-sentence 
conditions). The distress induction procedure that comprised the single-sentence condition 
was taken from previous research by Rachman et al. (1996). The multi-sentence task was 
developed for current purposes but was derived from defusion-based exercises commonly 
used in ACT (Hayes et al., 1999). Prior to each distress induction, all participants wrote down 
the name of the person they cared about most in the world. 
Single-sentence condition. The single-sentence condition primarily involved 
participants saying aloud and writing a potentially distressing sentence about the involvement 
of the loved one named above in an accident. The instructions were as follows: 
Ok, so when you’re ready we will begin. What is going to happen is that I am going to 
call out a sentence that I want you to repeat word for word. Once I read out the sentence, 
if you can, I want you to take a moment to imagine the scene it describes and then say the 
sentence with as much meaning as you can. Once you have said the sentence aloud, I 
want you to then write it down on the page in front of you. Now remember, if you don’t 
want to say the sentence or you want to stop writing it at any stage, you are completely 
free to do so. Just let me know and we will stop what we are doing and move onto the 
next part of the experiment. Is that ok with you? Do you have any questions at this point?  
 
(Participant affirms) 
 
Ok let’s begin. Here is the sentence: “I hope (name of loved one) dies in a car accident.”   
 
(Participant repeats and writes) 
 
Multi-sentence condition. The difference between the two conditions centred on the 
use of a more extended hypothetical accident story in the multi-sentence condition in an 
attempt to increase the vividness and impact of the exercise. Specifically, participants were 
asked to repeat and write five sentences regarding the accident. To make the story more 
feasible, participants in this condition were initially asked additional questions about the 
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loved one (e.g. “What is she/he doing today?” and “What time will she/he be finished 
work?”). This elaboration ensured that the scenario was relevant and unique to each 
individual. Participants in the multi-sentence condition were instructed along following lines: 
Ok, so when you’re ready we will begin. What is going to happen is that I am going to 
call out five sentences and I will stop after each one. Once I read out each sentence, if 
you can, I want you to take a moment to imagine the scene it describes and then say the 
sentence with as much meaning as you can. Once you have said the sentence aloud, I 
want you to then write it down on the page in front of you. When you have done this, we 
will move onto the next sentence; I will say it and you will repeat it and write it down. 
Now remember, if you don’t want to say any of the sentences or if you want to stop 
writing at any stage, you are completely free to do so. Just let me know and we will stop 
what we are doing and move onto the next part of the experiment. Is that ok with you? 
Do you have any questions at this point?  
 
(Participant affirms).  
 
Ok let’s begin. Here is the first sentence:  
 
Today at X o’ clock (as appropriate), X (name of loved one) is waiting for me to collect 
him/her. 
 
(Participant repeats and writes). 
 
She/he does not know that I am feeling very sleepy at the wheel of my car.  
 
(Participant repeats and writes). 
 
Just as I pull up, my eyes close and I lose control of the car. 
 
(Participant repeats and writes). 
 
My car speeds onto X’s (name of loved one’s) side of the road and I hit him/her head on. 
 
(Participant repeats and writes). 
 
I hope X (name of loved one) dies in the car accident. 
 
(Participant repeats and writes). 
 
Stage 4: Post-induction VAS ratings and RQ. The post-induction VAS ratings were 
identical to Stage 2, but were included at this stage to assess discomfort, anxiety and stress 
after the distress induction procedure. In addition, Stage 4 involved presentation of the RQ to 
assess participant reactions to saying and writing the sentence(s) about the hypothetical 
accident. This marked the end of the experiment and participants were thanked and debriefed. 
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Results 
Two main investigations were central to Experiment 1. The first examined the effect 
of the distress inductions (single- or multi-sentence) on mean scores of discomfort, anxiety 
and stress. The second investigated the hypothesis that the multi-sentence condition would be 
associated with larger increases in measures of distress induction than the single-sentence 
condition.  
 
 
Pre-Experimental Measures 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance and mindfulness are presented in Table 
1. The AAQ means were low for both conditions and ranged from 16-18, thus both were 
within the normal range (i.e. <18). The mean PHLMS scores for the acceptance sub-scale 
were also low (28 and 29) and again within the normal range (<31). Outcomes on the 
awareness sub-scale (33 and 34) were also low and within the normal range (<37). Three 
independent samples t-tests confirmed that the two conditions did not differ significantly on 
either measure (all p’s > .65).  
 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Values by Condition on the Pre-Experimental Measures in 
Experiment 1 
 
Pre-experimental 
Measures 
Single-Sentence 
M (SD) 
Multi-Sentence 
M (SD) 
p values 
AAQ 16 (5.10) 18 (6.20) .65 
PHLMS (acceptance) 29 (4.60) 28 (8.00) .90 
PHLMS (awareness) 33 (5.50) 34 (7.40) .83 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
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Distress Ratings 
Both the single- and multi-sentence conditions increased participants’ self-reported 
levels of discomfort, anxiety and stress. The mean VAS ratings by condition recorded on 
each scale at pre- and post-induction are presented below.  
Discomfort. The VAS ratings of discomfort at baseline were extremely low (i.e. all 
participants scored <11/100). This pattern changed for both conditions at post-induction (see 
Figure 4). A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a statistically significant main 
effect for time [Wilks’ Lambda = .45, F (1, 62) = 74.60, p = .00, partial eta squared 
= .55] that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (55%), however, there was no 
significant effect shown for condition [F (1, 62) = .73, p = .4, partial eta squared = .01]. The 
interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda = 1.0, F (1, 62) = .04, p = .84, 
partial eta squared = .00].  
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Figure 4. Mean discomfort ratings per condition across time in Experiment 1. 
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Anxiety. The VAS ratings of anxiety were also extremely low at baseline (all 
<11/100). Anxiety increased similarly after both types of induction (see Figure 5). A 2x2 
ANOVA again revealed a highly significant main effect for time [Wilks’ Lambda = .58, F (1, 
62) = 44.14, p = .001, partial eta squared = .42] that accounted for a substantial amount of the 
variance (42%) but the effect for condition [F (1, 62) = .17, p = .68, partial eta squared = .00] 
was not significant. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda = 1.0, F 
(1, 62) = .08, p = .77, partial eta squared = .00)]. 
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Figure 5. Mean anxiety ratings per condition across time in Experiment 1. 
 
Stress. The VAS ratings of stress were again extremely low at baseline (all <9/100) 
and increased similarly after both types of induction (see Figure 6). A 2x2 ANOVA revealed 
a highly significant main effect for time [Wilks’ Lambda = .65, F (1, 62) = 33.40, p = .01, 
partial eta squared = .35] that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (35%), but 
the effect for condition was not significant [F (1, 62) = .012, p = 9.15, partial eta squared 
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= .00]. The interaction effect was again non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda = 1.00, F (1, 62) = .1, 
p = .75, partial eta squared = .00]. 
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Figure 6. Mean stress ratings per condition across time in Experiment 1. 
 
 
RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the five reactions to the distress inductions are presented 
separately below. Table 2 presents the data from each of the five reactions by condition.  
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Values by Condition for the RQ in Experiment 1 
Reactions Questionnaire 
Single-
Sentence 
M (SD) 
Multi-
Sentence 
M (SD) 
p values 
Please rate your level of willingness to engage with 
your thoughts of the accident 
27.06  
(26.00) 
53.79 
(26.53) .01 
Please rate how vivid your thoughts and images were 
of the car accident 
30.16 
(28.35) 
52.19 
(26.09) .00 
Please rate how believable the accident scenario was 
to you 
25.03 
(25.40) 
36.37 
(27.15) .09 
Please rate how much guilt you feel right now 
51.45 
(33.19) 
41.45 
(32.73) .23 
Please rate how morally wrong you felt it was to 
write or say the sentence (s) 
59.59 
(35.33) 
48.03 
 (33.9) .19 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
 
Willingness. Participant ratings of their willingness to engage with thoughts about the 
accident scenario were low to moderate (see Table 2), although the multi-sentence ratings 
were almost twice as high as the single-sentence ratings (53.79 compared with 27.06). An 
independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was significant [t (32) = -2.97, p 
= .01]. 
Vividness. Ratings of the vividness of thoughts and images of the accident were also 
low to moderate (see Table 2), but again, multi-sentence ratings were much higher than 
single-sentence (52.19 vs. 30.16). An independent samples t-test indicated that this difference 
was also highly significant [t (62) = -3.23, p = .00]. 
Believability. Believability ratings of the accident were moderate for both conditions 
(see Table 2), but marginally higher again for multi-sentence (36.37 vs. 25.03). An 
independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was not significant [t (62) = -1.73, p 
= .09]. 
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Guilt. Ratings of guilt generated by the accident scenario were moderate (see Table 2), 
although multi-sentence on this occasion was lower (41.45) than single-sentence (51.45). 
However, an independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was not significant [t 
(62) = 1.21, p = .23]. 
Moral wrongness. Ratings of how morally wrong it was to imagine the accident 
scenario were moderate (see Table 2), with multi-sentence again lower (48.03) than single-
sentence (59.59). But again, an independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was 
not significant [t (61) = 1.33, p = .19]. 
 
Results Summary 
The data from the pre-experimental measures indicated that participants in both 
conditions showed normal range scores and did not differ significantly from each other on 
their propensities towards avoidance or mindfulness. At baseline, mean ratings of discomfort, 
anxiety and stress were very low for both conditions, but both groups of participants showed 
significant increases in all three ratings at post-induction. Hence, although both types of 
induction did cause distress, the research prediction that the multi-sentence condition would 
be associated with greater increases in the dependent variables was not confirmed. 
Interestingly, however, results from the RQ indicated some differences between conditions. 
That is, in the multi-sentence condition participants showed significantly higher willingness 
to engage with their thoughts about the accident and significantly higher vividness of these 
thoughts than the single-sentence condition. In addition, believability was also almost 
significantly higher for the multi-sentence condition. Guilt and moral wrongness were higher 
for the single-sentence condition, although this difference was not significant. 
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Discussion 
On the path towards finding a method of experimental distress induction that would 
potentially lend itself to the exploration of the relative impact of different therapeutic 
interventions, we returned to one of the earliest and simplest methodologies in the literature -- 
Rachman et al.’s (1996) single-sentence procedure. Although widely used and with 
considerable reported success, no published studies show any systematic comparisons 
between this and other procedures. Experiment 1 adapted a short defusion-based intervention 
from ACT that bore strong similarity with Rachman et al.’s procedure, but which was longer 
in length. Hence, the simple methodological question addressed by Experiment 1 was 
whether Rachman et al.’s procedure might be enhanced by increasing the number of 
sentences similar to the defusion exercise. Although the experimental hypothesis of 
superiority for the longer induction procedure was not borne out, both procedures did appear 
to provide significantly increased distress on all three subjective dependent variables.  
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Experiments 2-5 
Empirical Investigations of the Role of Self in ACT Techniques 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is distinct from other behavioural therapies because of 
its underlying heuristic model (referred to as the ‘hexaflex’) which articulates middle level 
processes (see Figure 1 in the General Introduction, see also Hayes et al., 2006). The role of 
self is explicit in the hexaflex and is captured by the term ‘self as context’, although (rather 
confusingly) the same term is also used to describe therapeutic exercises that address this 
component. Although designated as an individual component process, self as context is 
deemed to be a core or pivotal feature of ACT because it encompasses all other ACT 
processes. For example, self as context is argued to encompass acceptance, defusion, values 
and contact with the present moment, because all five processes are necessary for the 
construction of a secure sense of self that is distinct from one’s psychological content 
(Fletcher & Hayes, 2005).  
The series of studies reported in the current chapter focused on empirical analyses of 
typical ACT interventions in the context of an experimental distress induction procedure. If, 
as suggested by the hexaflex, self as context is pivotal to other ACT processes, we reasoned 
that potential distress reduction outcomes associated with ACT interventions would likely be 
enhanced by the addition of a self as context component. In simple terms, we asked if ACT 
interventions targeting acceptance, defusion, values and contact with the present moment 
would successfully reduce experimentally induced distress and if so, could these effects be 
enhanced by adding a self as context intervention? The aim was to specifically investigate 
these four processes with the same experimental design. Given that the results from 
Experiment 1 showed no superiority of the longer five-sentence distress induction procedure 
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over Rachman’s single-sentence paradigm, we chose the latter shorter methodology as our 
focus in Experiments 2-5.   
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Experiment 2 
Enhancing Acceptance with Self as Context 
 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the relative utility of an acceptance-based 
intervention vs. a self-enhanced acceptance intervention in reducing experimentally induced 
distress, using the single-sentence distress induction procedure. Specifically, the research 
hypothesis predicted that an acceptance intervention enhanced with self as context would 
show greater effects in the reduction of subjective levels of discomfort, anxiety and stress 
than an acceptance intervention alone. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty volunteers (17 males and 13 females) participated in Experiment 2. All were 
aged between 18 and 24 years old, were undergraduates at NUIM and were able to drive. The 
same exclusion criteria as Experiment 1 applied (6 participants in total were excluded on this 
basis). This yielded a final sample of 24 participants (17 males and 7 female, mean age = 20 
years, 5 months) assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: acceptance (N = 12) 
and self-enhanced acceptance (N =12).  
 
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiment 1, with the 
exception of an extra question regarding distraction added to the original RQ. This referred to 
participants’ reactions to the distress induction procedure (i.e. “Please rate how much you 
tried to distract from the sentence”). This question was included so that we could determine 
70 
 
whether distraction played any role in changes in distress in addition to, or separate from, the 
interventions themselves. Participants responded in a similar manner to the other questions on 
the RQ by placing an X on a corresponding VAS from 0% (No Distraction) to 100% (Very 
Much Distraction).  
 
Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to Experiment 1 applied to the current study and were 
addressed in a similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues 
or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages (see Figure 7). Stages 1 to 4 were 
identical to Experiment 1 and involved: pre-experimental measures (Stage 1); baseline VAS 
ratings (Stage 2); the distress induction procedure (Stage 3); and post-induction VAS ratings 
and the RQ (Stage 4). What differentiated Experiment 2 from the previous study was the 
addition of three new stages (5-7) involving: one of two ACT interventions (Stage 5); a post-
intervention distress induction procedure (Stage 6); and post-intervention VAS ratings and 
the RQ (Stage 7). 
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Figure 7. An overview of the experimental sequence of Experiments 2-5. 
 
Stage 5: Interventions. Participants in the acceptance condition received two 
identical and consecutive exposures to a common ACT exercise designed to promote 
acceptance. Participants in the self-enhanced acceptance condition received one exposure to 
the same acceptance exercise followed by a technique designed to promote self as context. As 
such, the acceptance participants received two exposures to an identical acceptance 
intervention. Alternatively, the self-enhanced acceptance condition comprised of one 
exposure to an acceptance intervention followed by a different intervention which targeted 
self as context.   
STAGE 1 
Pre-Experimental Measures 
(ESQ, AAQ and PHLMS) 
 
 
 
STAGE 2 
Baseline VAS Ratings 
(discomfort, anxiety and stress) 
 
 
 
STAGE 3 
Distress Induction Procedure 
 
 
 
STAGE 4 
Post-induction VAS Ratings 
and RQ 
 
 
 
STAGE 5 
Interventions 
 
 
 
STAGE 6 
Post-intervention Distress 
Induction Procedure 
 
 
 
STAGE 7 
Post-intervention VAS Ratings 
and RQ 
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Acceptance intervention. Participants in the acceptance condition were instructed as 
follows (this intervention was administered twice to these participants to match for length 
across the two conditions): 
I understand that the previous sentence may have generated some unpleasant thoughts and 
feelings for you. The aim of the next part of the experiment is to teach you a coping 
strategy to deal with any negative thoughts or emotions that might have come up for you. 
Try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. When you’re ready, I want you to 
close your eyes and listen to my voice. If you find your mind wandering, just gently come 
back to the sound of my voice. 
 
When very painful thoughts come to mind, they are often accompanied by unpleasant 
sensations. For example, your chest might tighten or you might feel tense. This package 
of painful thoughts and unpleasant sensations often feels like it’s too much to deal with. 
And when we have that very thought “this is just too much”, our level of discomfort goes 
even higher and then we feel like we are in a position where we really don’t know what 
to do. 
 
There are many old wives tales and religious traditions that tell us that acceptance is the 
best medicine. What they really mean is that if you accept your thoughts and feelings 
they can do you no harm. Although most people know that acceptance is a good idea in 
principle, we all find it hard to put it into practice, especially at the times we need it most. 
That’s probably because the thoughts and feelings that we have can seem so terribly 
uncomfortable and painful. So imagine at this point I asked you to consider thinking 
again about the thoughts and sensations that emerged for you when you were writing 
about your loved one. Even though you know that your actions at that time have no 
connection to the future, you probably began to struggle with painful thoughts like “I 
can’t do this” “This is wrong” “What if this came true?” “I can’t make my hand write 
this”. 
 
Take a simple thought that showed up when you were writing the sentence (Pause). 
Isolate the thought in your mind (Pause). Now ask yourself if you would be willing to 
have that thought. Of course no one would want the thought. I am simply asking if in this 
instance you would be willing to have it. And it’s more than that because in a way what 
you are being asked to do, is to be willing to have the thought and at the same time be 
willing to have the feelings that are tied to it. Engaging in this type of acceptance poses a 
challenge for everyone, but there is very sound evidence that when people do it they are 
freed up from the fear that comes with thoughts that we are not willing to have. You see, 
a big part of the burden these thoughts feel like is the weight of the fear of them and the 
instant need to get rid of that fear. In order to help you understand this, I am going to read 
you a short metaphor about acceptance. 
  
Accepting your thoughts and feelings is a bit like trying to cross a muddy swamp. 
Imagine that the swamp is full of dirt, rubbish and leftovers that smell really bad and 
really stink. What kind of thoughts would show up if you were wading through a dirty 
swamp like this? Well there would be: “I can’t stand this” “This is unbearable” “I can’t 
do anything this unpleasant or disgusting” “It’s not worth the effort” “I just can’t push 
my legs through this”. All of these would likely show up. The best way you could 
possibly cross the swamp would be to notice all those thoughts and the distress they carry 
with them and let them be - to notice them and make room for them, while you keep 
crossing the swamp. It’s like gathering them all up, putting them in a rucksack and 
carrying them on your back - rather than what you would be immediately tempted to do 
which is to try to throw them away. It’s about being open to all the thoughts that may 
show up and the distress associated with them. It’s about carrying them with you, while 
you keep doing what you were trying to do in the first place - that is crossing the swamp 
and reaching the other side. In the same way that you can embrace all the horrible 
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thoughts and feelings that show up while crossing the swamp, you could embrace all the 
negative thoughts that show up when you are writing a sentence like the last one. 
  
Self-enhanced acceptance intervention. Participants in the self-enhanced acceptance 
condition received the above acceptance intervention, followed by an intervention with an 
emphasis on self that included a common ACT exercise called the Chessboard Metaphor. 
The instructions for the self-enhanced acceptance component were as follows:     
In this part of the experiment, we are going to play around with thoughts a little. It seems 
like an odd thing to do, but if you are learning to activate acceptance of your thoughts, 
you best know what you’re dealing with. Try to relax yourself in the chair and get 
comfortable. When you’re ready, I want you to close your eyes and listen to my voice. If 
you find your mind wandering, just gently come back to the sound of my voice. For a 
moment now, turn your attention to yourself in this room. Picture yourself in the room 
and exactly where you are now. When you are ready, I want you to get in touch with how 
you felt when you wrote those sentences about the hypothetical accident. I mean just 
think of one single aspect of the scene. For example, try to imagine that X (name of loved 
one) is lying on the ground after the crash. I know this is difficult to do, but I want you to 
try as hard as you can to capture that single thought in your mind. And notice that almost 
immediately this thought pulls in feelings and emotions and they probably feel really bad. 
So what you are having right now is that nasty thought and all the nasty feelings that go 
with it. 
  
Now let’s switch to a happy thought. Imagine that X (name of loved one) didn’t die in the 
car accident and you are having a conversation with her/him on the phone this evening. 
Imagine, as much as you can, where she/he might be when she/he answers the phone. Try 
to capture that single thought in your mind. And notice that almost immediately this 
thought pulls in feelings and emotions that probably feel pretty good. So what you have 
right now is that happy thought and all the happy feelings that go with it. Now if you had 
to choose which of those thoughts to accept, it wouldn’t be hard to know which one 
you’d pick. Because this is a far nicer place to be than the dark, black place that’s full of 
negativity and dread I first asked you to think about. 
  
Ok so what we were just doing in that strange little exercise is noticing how your 
thoughts can come from two different extremes. On one hand, there are dark black 
thoughts and the nasty feelings that accompany them. And these are among the hardest 
things to accept and on the other extreme there are the bright, white thoughts and nice 
feelings that accompany them. And of course they are easy to accept and it would be nice 
to have as many of those as possible. The problem is that we are all happy to accept what 
we do not want and not happy at all in accepting what we don’t want. In the next short 
exercise we are going to show you how acceptance works best when you don’t have to 
pick and choose among different types of thoughts.  
  
I want you now to imagine a chessboard that goes out infinitely in all directions and is 
covered with black pieces and white pieces. These pieces work together in teams, as in 
chess - the white pieces fight against the black pieces. You can think of your thoughts 
and feelings as these pieces, they sort of hang out together in teams too. For example, 
“bad” feelings, like pain or hurt, hang out with “bad” thoughts, like a loved one in an 
accident. Same with the “good” ones. So it seems that the way the game is played is that 
we select the side we want to win. We put the “good” white pieces on one side and the 
“bad” black pieces on the other. Then we get up on the back of the white horse and ride 
to battle, fighting to win the war against the thoughts that bring pain. It’s a war game. But 
there’s a logical problem here and that is that from this position, huge portions of yourself 
are your own enemy. In fact, it is about half of you, half of the board, maybe more at 
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times. And because, you’ve tried to fight the black by taking sides with the white you are 
now down at the same level of all of the pieces and if there are lots of black on the board, 
your side might even be outnumbered. In fact, as you fight the black pieces they become 
more central to your life, more habitual and more dominating. What you have been 
planning is to knock enough of them off the board so that you eventually dominate them 
with white pieces. And so, the battle goes on and on and that’s because we cannot change 
the pieces on the board at any time. You have black pieces and you have white pieces and 
on many occasions you will have more black than white and so it seems you have to fight 
even harder, but you might still lose. Living with yourself as your own enemy is no way 
to live.  
  
So the way forward is to have full acceptance of all your thoughts and feelings, especially 
the black ones. And when you can do this, notice instead of being like a white piece that 
has to defend itself from black, you can adopt the position of the board. And when you 
are completely willing to have the black and the white as a part of you, sometimes even a 
big part, then you realise there is a you that can have these thoughts without needing to 
fight them. In fact, if you are the board you don’t need to take any side with your 
thoughts, you can just be accepting of all types of thoughts.   
  
 Stage 6: Post-intervention distress induction procedure.  This stage was identical 
to Stage 3. 
 Stage 7: Post-intervention VAS ratings and RQ. In the final stage of the 
experiment, participants completed their third exposure to the VASs and their second 
exposure to the RQ. This marked the end of the experiment, and participants were thanked 
and debriefed.  
 
Results 
Three main investigations were central to the current study. The first examined the 
effect of the distress induction procedure on discomfort, anxiety and stress. The second 
determined whether the self-enhanced condition would be associated with greater reductions 
in discomfort, anxiety and stress, relative to the acceptance condition. The third explored 
potential differences between the conditions in terms of participants’ reactions to the 
imaginary accident.  
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Pre-experimental Measures 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance and mindfulness are presented in Table 
3. The AAQ means were low (i.e. 14.83 and 14.13) for both conditions, thus within the 
normal range (i.e. < 18). The mean PHLMS scores for the acceptance sub-scale were also low 
(i.e. 30 and 28.25) and again within the normal range (< 31). Outcomes on the awareness 
sub-scale (i.e. 33.38 and 36.38) were also low and within the normal range (< 37). Three 
independent samples t-tests confirmed that the conditions did not differ significantly on any 
measure (all ps > .79).  
 
Table 3  
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Values by Condition on the Pre-Experimental Measures in 
Experiment 2 
Pre-experimental 
Measures 
Acceptance 
M (SD) 
Self-enhanced 
M (SD) p values 
AAQ 14.83 (5.44) 
14.12 
(6.73) .84 
PHLMS (acceptance) 30 (4.81) 
28.25 
(7.13) .57 
PHLMS (awareness) 33.38 (4.78) 
36.38 
(3.78) .19 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
 
 
Distress Ratings 
The mean VAS ratings by condition at baseline, post-induction and post-intervention 
are presented below.  
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of discomfort (< 18/100) 
at baseline (see Figure 8). The acceptance condition showed a considerable increase in 
discomfort after the distress induction (+22), while the increase for the self-enhanced 
condition was more modest (+11). Thereafter, both conditions recorded almost no decrease in 
discomfort after the interventions (acceptance: -1.2; self-enhanced acceptance: -.05). 
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Figure 8. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 2. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .55, F (2, 21) = 8.72, p = .002, partial eta squared = .45], 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (45 %), but not for condition [F (1, 22) 
= 0 p = .99, partial eta squared = .00]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .91, [F (2, 21) = 1.1, p = .35, partial eta squared = .1]. Two dependent t-tests 
investigated which time point was influencing the significant effect. The results showed a 
significant increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .002), but not from 
post-induction to post-intervention (p = .85). 
Anxiety. Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of anxiety (< 15/100) at 
baseline, which increased similarly and modestly at post-induction (acceptance: +16.88; self-
enhanced: +17.13; see Figure 9). Thereafter, there appeared to be no decrease in anxiety for 
acceptance and only a small decrease for self-enhanced acceptance (acceptance: -.06 and self-
enhanced acceptance: -4.9). 
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Figure 9. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 2. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .57, F (2, 21) = 8, p = .003, partial eta squared = .43] that accounted 
for a substantial amount of the variance (43%), but not for condition [F (1, 22) = .24, p = .63, 
partial eta squared = .01]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .99, [F (2, 21) = 1.2, p = .89, partial eta squared = .09]. Two dependent t-tests showed a 
significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p = .0001), but not from post-
induction to post-intervention (p = .62). 
Stress. Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of stress (< 15/100) at baseline, 
which increased similarly and modestly after distress induction (acceptance: +10.32 and self-
enhanced acceptance: +9.12; see Figure 10). After the intervention, the acceptance condition 
showed a small increase in stress (+.37), while the self-enhanced condition decreased stress 
marginally (-2.34). 
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gure 10. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 2. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .62, F (2, 21) = 6.56, p = .006, partial eta squared = .39] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (39%), but not for condition [F (1, 22) 
= .1.63, p = .22, partial eta squared = .07]. The interaction effect was also non-significant 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .99, [F (2, 21) = .1, p = .90, partial eta squared = .01]. Two dependent t-
tests showed a significant increase in stress from baseline to post-induction (p = .001), but not 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .80). 
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RQ Results 
The mean RQ ratings on each of the six reactions to the distress induction at Stage 4 
(post-induction) and at Stage 7 (post-intervention) are presented separately below. Table 4 
presents the data from each of the six reactions by time point and by condition.  
 
Table 4 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 2 
 
Reactions Questionnaire Time 
Acceptance 
 
M (SD) 
Self- 
enhanced 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the accident 
Post-induction 48.12 (31.71) 
38.59 
(29.78) 
Post-
intervention 
 
55.2 
(27.96) 
 
40 
(34) 
 
Please rate how believable the 
accident scenario was to you 
 
Post-induction 
47.19 
(30.55) 
 
34.38 
(29.74) 
 
Post-
intervention 
 
36.98 
(29) 
 
27.34 
(23.77) 
 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images were of the 
car accident 
Post-induction 
51.35 
(32.42) 
 
43.46 
(29.47) 
 
Post-
intervention 
 
50.26 
(28.59) 
 
35.57 
(30.53) 
 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
 
Post-induction 37.76 (31.24) 
50.55 
(25.76) 
Post-
intervention 
28.9 
(20.43) 
 
 
32.5 
(28.69) 
 
Please rate how morally wrong 
you felt it was to write or say the 
sentence 
Post-induction 35.98 (30.39) 
46.02 
(36.34) 
Post-
intervention 
 
36.15 
(25.61) 
38.35 
(34.97) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
 
Post-induction 
47.53 
(16.26) 
 
43.72 
(22.17) 
 
Post-
intervention 
 
40.75 
(18.44) 
 
29.86 
(14.06) 
 
 
 
Willingness. Ratings of willingness to engage with thoughts about the accident were 
low-moderate for both conditions (38.59-48.12/100; see Table 4) at post-induction and an 
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independent t-test revealed a non-significant difference between the conditions at this point (p 
= .24). Willingness increased marginally after the acceptance intervention (+7.08), but there 
was almost no change recorded in the self-enhanced condition (+1.41). Furthermore, a mixed 
between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed non-significant main effects for time, condition and 
the interaction effect (all ps > .28). 
Believability. Ratings of believability of the accident were low-moderate for both 
conditions (34.38-47.19/100; see Table 4) and an independent t-test revealed a non-
significant difference between the conditions at this point (p = .38). Believability decreased 
moderately for both groups after exposure to the interventions (acceptance: -10.21 and self-
enhanced acceptance: -7.04). A mixed between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed non-significant 
main effects for time, condition and the interaction effect (all ps > .12). 
Vividness. Vividness ratings of the accident were moderate (43.46/100) for the self-
enhanced condition and moderate-high for acceptance (51.35/100) after the first distress 
induction (see Table 4). An independent t-test revealed a non-significant difference between 
the conditions at this point (p = .26). Vividness decreased at post-intervention for both groups, 
with the larger (albeit small) decrease recorded in the self-enhanced condition (-7.89) and a 
very marginal decrease in acceptance (-1.09). A mixed between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed 
non-significant main effects for time, condition and the interaction effect (all ps > .31). 
Guilt. Ratings of guilt generated by the accident were moderate for the acceptance 
condition (37.76/100) and moderate-high for self-enhanced acceptance (50.55/100) after the 
first distress induction (see Table 4). An independent t-test revealed a non-significant 
difference between the conditions at this point (p = .29). Guilt decreased for both groups at 
post-intervention with a considerable decrease observed in the self-enhanced condition (-
18.05) and a small decrease in acceptance (-8.86). While, a mixed between within 2x2 
ANOVA revealed non-significant effects for condition and the interaction (both ps > .38), 
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time was significant [Wilks’ Lambda = .8, F (1, 22) = 5.32, p = .03, partial eta squared = .20] 
and represented 20% of the variance. A paired sample t-test indicated that the significant 
effect for time was attributed to the self-enhanced condition (p = .04), while guilt reported by 
the acceptance condition did not change significantly across time (p > .34). 
Moral Wrongness. Ratings of moral wrongness were low-moderate for acceptance 
(35.98/100) and moderate for the self-enhanced condition at post-induction (46.02/100; see 
Table 4). An independent t-test revealed a non-significant difference between the conditions 
at this point (p = .48). Moral wrongness increased (but only marginally) for acceptance (+.16), 
but decreased for self-enhanced acceptance (-7.66) after the interventions. A mixed between 
within 2x2 ANOVA indicated that the effects for time, condition and the interaction were not 
significant (all ps > .5).  
Distraction. Distraction was moderate for both conditions at post-induction (43.72-
47.53/100, see Table 4) and an independent t-test revealed a non-significant difference 
between the conditions at post-induction (p = .65). Distraction decreased for both groups at 
post-intervention, with the larger decrease recorded in the self-enhanced condition (-13.86), 
relative to acceptance (-6.78). However, a mixed between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for time [Wilks’ Lambda = .81, F (1, 22) = 5.13, p = .03, partial eta 
squared = .19] that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (19%), but not for 
condition or the interaction (both ps > .26). A paired sample t-test indicated that the 
significant effect for time was attributed to the self-enhanced condition (p = .08), while 
distraction reported by the acceptance condition did not change significantly across time 
(p > .23). 
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Results Summary 
The data from the pre-experimental measures indicated that participants in both 
conditions showed within normal range scores for avoidance and mindfulness and did not 
differ significantly in this regard. At baseline, discomfort, anxiety and stress were very low 
for both conditions, but all increased significantly at post-induction. After the interventions 
and the second distress induction, both anxiety and discomfort decreased marginally in both 
conditions. In contrast, stress decreased marginally in self-enhanced acceptance, but 
increased in acceptance, although the conditions did not differ significantly in this regard. 
Between the first distress induction and the interventions, both conditions generated increased 
willingness, as well as decreased: believability; vividness; guilt; and distraction. Moral 
wrongness increased for acceptance and decreased for self-enhanced acceptance. 
 
 
Discussion 
 The primary aim of the current study was to investigate the utility of acceptance and 
self-enhanced acceptance interventions on subjective distress induced by the single-sentence 
paradigm. The key research prediction was that the self-enhanced acceptance intervention 
would show greater efficacy relative to acceptance alone in reducing discomfort, anxiety and 
stress. However, limited evidence for this key research prediction was uncovered. 
The results did demonstrate consistencies with Experiment 1, in which the distress 
induction procedure significantly increased discomfort, anxiety and stress for both conditions. 
This again confirms the utility of the Rachman et al. (1996)’s paradigm in experimental 
distress induction. However, both interventions showed limited effects on reducing the 
dependent variables once distress was induced. Indeed, discomfort, anxiety and stress 
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remained higher than baseline at post-intervention in the self-enhanced acceptance condition 
and higher still in the acceptance condition. 
The RQ showed some results consistent with ACT, such as an increase in willingness 
for both conditions after exposure to the interventions. Furthermore, although believability, 
vividness, guilt and distraction all decreased, this reduction was only significant for guilt and 
distraction in the self-enhanced acceptance condition only. 
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Experiment 3 
Enhancing Defusion with Self as Context 
 
Using an identical experimental design to the previous study, Experiment 3 investigated the 
relative utility of a defusion-based intervention vs. a self-enhanced defusion intervention in 
reducing experimentally induced distress. Once again, the research hypothesis predicted that 
the defusion intervention enhanced with self as context would show greater effects in the 
reduction of discomfort, anxiety and stress than the defusion intervention alone. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Thirty-two volunteers participated in the current study. All were aged between 18 and 
45 years old, were undergraduates from NUIM and were able to drive. The same exclusion 
criteria as Experiments 1 and 2 applied (2 participants were excluded on this basis). This 
yielded a final sample of 30 participants (16 males and 14 females; mean age = 24 years and 
2 months) assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: defusion (N = 15) and self-
enhanced defusion (N = 15).  
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiment 2, except for the 
omission of the question referring to distraction in the RQ (due to experimenter error).  
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Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to Experiments 1 and 2 (see pp. 52-53) applied to the 
current study and were addressed in a similar manner. Once again, no participants raised any 
issues or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages. These were identical to Experiment 2 
(see Figure 7, p.68), except that the two interventions presented in Stage 5 comprised of a 
defusion exercise vs. a self-enhanced defusion exercise. 
Stage 5: Interventions. Stage 5 involved a defusion intervention for half of the 
participants and a self-enhanced defusion intervention for the other half. The defusion 
intervention involved a common ACT exercise called the Physicalising Exercise, designed to 
create some distance between an individual and his/her physical feeling or sensation. 
Participants in the self-enhanced condition received one exposure to the defusion intervention, 
followed by an intervention designed to target self as context that was identical to Experiment 
2. 
Defusion intervention. Participants in the defusion condition received two identical 
and consecutive exposures to a defusion intervention (again to match for length between the 
conditions). Participants were instructed as follows:  
I understand that the previous story may have generated some unpleasant thoughts and 
feelings for you. The aim of the next part of the experiment is to teach you a coping 
strategy to deal with any negative thoughts or emotions that might have risen during the 
task.  
 
Try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. When you’re ready, I want you to 
close your eyes and listen to my voice. If you find your mind wandering, just gently come 
back to the sound of my voice. When very painful thoughts come to mind, they are often 
accompanied by unpleasant sensations. For example, your chest may tighten or you might 
feel tense. This package of painful thoughts and unpleasant sensations often feels like it’s 
too much to deal with. And when we have that very thought “this is too much”, our level 
of discomfort goes even higher and then we feel like we are in a position where we really 
don’t know what to do.  
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So imagine at this point in the experiment we asked you to consider thinking again about 
the thoughts and sensations that emerged for you when you were writing and saying the 
made-up sentence. Even though you know that your actions at that time have no 
connection to the future, you probably began to struggle with painful thoughts like “I 
can’t do this” “This is wrong” “What if this came true” “I can’t make my hand write 
this”.  
 
What I want you to do is take a negative thought that you showed up when you were 
writing the sentence. Isolate the thought in your mind. Now I want you to imagine 
yourself setting this thought outside of you, putting it out here on the table in front of 
you. Later we will take it back, so if it objects, let it know that. See if you can set it out in 
front of you on this table and let me know when you have it out there. 
 
Now that you have set it in front of you, you are able to look at it and describe it for me. 
For example, can you tell me what colour this thought would be? Participant answers. 
Thank you. And if this thought had a size, can you tell me how big it would be? 
Participant answers. OK, now I am going to ask you to take the thought back off the 
table and back into you. And as you do this, notice any physical reaction to the thought as 
it arises. Notice that you were probably more willing to take the thought out and a little 
less willing to take it back.  
 
It is natural to have some physical reactions to the negative thought. For example, your 
chest might tighten or your palms may become sweaty. So what I am going to ask you to 
do next is to take that reaction and also put it out in front of you. Now that it’s out in front 
of you, you have a better perspective for describing it. Like before, can you tell me what 
colour this reaction would be if it had one? Participant answers. And if it had a size, how 
big would it be? Participant answers. OK, now I am going to ask you to take the reaction 
back off the table and back into you. And notice how you feel when you do this. Notice 
that you were probably more willing to take the reaction out and a little less willing to 
take it back. 
 
OK, now we are going to repeat the same exercise again, but this time I want you to think 
of a different negative thought that came up when I asked you to write down the 
sentence.  Isolate the thought in your mind. Like before, I want you to imagine yourself 
setting this thought outside of you, putting it out here on the table in front of you. Later 
we will take this back. Set it out in front of you on this table and let me know when you 
have it out there. 
 
Now that you have it set in front of you, you are able to look at it and describe it for me. 
For example, can you tell me what colour this thought would be? Participant answers. 
Thank you. And if this thought had a size, can you tell me how big it would be? 
Participant answers. OK, now like before, I am going to ask you to take the thought back 
off the table and back into you. And notice as you do this, any physical reaction to the 
thought that arises for you. Notice that you were probably more willing to take the 
thought out and a little less willing to take it back in.  
 
Now as we know, it is natural to have a reaction to a negative thought. So what I am 
going to ask you to do next is to take that reaction and also put it in front of you. Move 
the thought that’s already on the table to one side and place the reaction to this thought 
beside it. Now that it’s out in front of you, you have a better perspective for describing it. 
Like before, can you tell me what colour this reaction would be if it had one? Participant 
answers. And if it had a size, how big would it be? Participant answers. OK, now I am 
going to ask you to take the reaction back off the table and back into you. And notice 
how you feel when you do this. Notice that you were probably more willing to take the 
reaction out and a little less willing to take it back.  
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Self-enhanced defusion intervention. Participants in the self-enhanced defusion 
condition received one exposure to the defusion intervention, followed by the self as context 
intervention from Experiment 2 (see pp. 70-71).    
 
Results 
Again, three main investigations were central to the study: to assess the effect of the 
distress induction procedure on discomfort, anxiety and stress; to determine whether self-
enhanced defusion would be associated with greater reductions in the dependent variables 
than defusion; and to explore potential differences between the conditions in terms of 
participant reactions to the imaginary accident.  
 
Pre-experimental Measures 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance and mindfulness are presented in Table 
5. The AAQ means for both conditions were at the reported mean for a non-clinical sample 
(i.e. 18.73). The PHLMS means on the acceptance sub-scale were low (27.6 and 28.6) and 
within the normal range (< 31). Outcomes on the awareness sub-scale (34.47 and 35.73) were 
also low and within the normal range (< 37). Three independent samples t-tests confirmed 
that the conditions did not differ significantly on any measure (all p’s > .62).  
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Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Values by Condition on the Pre-Experimental Measures in 
Experiment 3 
Pre-experimental 
Measures 
Defusion 
M (SD) 
Self-enhanced 
M (SD) p values 
AAQ 18.73 (7.23) 
19.73 
(7.01) .71 
PHLMS (acceptance) 27.6 (7.99) 
28.6 
(6) .7 
PHLMS (awareness) 34.47 (7.92) 
35.73 
(5.75) .62 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
 
Distress Ratings 
The mean VAS ratings by condition recorded at baseline, post-induction and post-
intervention are presented below.  
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of discomfort (<14/100) at 
baseline, which increased substantially after the distress induction procedure (defusion: 
+26.95; self-enhanced defusion: +34.83; see Figure 11). Thereafter, both conditions showed 
marginal increases in discomfort (defusion: +.73; self-enhanced defusion: +5.76) at post-
intervention.  
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Figure 11. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 3. 
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A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .402 F (2, 27) = 20.09, p = .000, partial eta squared = .6] 
that represented a large (60%) amount of the variance, but not for condition [F (1, 28) = .38, p 
= .54, partial eta squared = .01]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .98, [F (2, 27) = .26, p = .77, partial eta squared = .02]. Two dependent t-tests 
showed a significant increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .00), but not 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .34). 
Anxiety Ratings. Both conditions recorded low anxiety (<13/100) at baseline, which 
increased substantially at post-induction (defusion: +30.1; self-enhanced defusion: +20.58; 
see Figure 12). Thereafter, the defusion condition showed a negligible decrease in anxiety (-
.01), while the self-enhanced condition showed considerably increased anxiety (+10.21) at 
post-intervention.  
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Figure 12. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 3. 
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A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .51 (2, 27) = 12.87, p = .000, partial eta squared = .49] that accounted 
for a substantial amount of the variance (49%), but not for condition [F (1, 28) = .15, p = .7, 
partial eta squared = .05]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .9, [F (2, 27) = 1.4, p = .26, partial eta squared = .1]. Two dependent t-tests showed a 
significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p =.00). The change from 
post-induction to post-intervention was not significant (p = .08).  
Stress. Both conditions recorded low stress (< 12/100) at baseline, which increased 
substantially at post-induction (defusion: +15.1 and self-enhanced defusion: +13.37; see 
Figure 13). Thereafter, both conditions showed small increases in stress (defusion: +6.87 and 
self-enhanced defusion: +4.65) at post-intervention.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Baseline Post-induction Post-intervention
M
ea
n
 
St
re
ss
 
R
a
tin
gs
Defusion
Self-enhanced
Defusion
 
Figure 13. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 3. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .53 (2, 27) = 12.16, p = .000, partial eta squared = .47] that 
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represented a substantial amount of the variance (47%), but not for condition [F (1, 28) = .11, 
p = .74, partial eta squared = .00]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .99, [F (2, 27) = .1, p = .91, partial eta squared = .00]. Two dependent t-tests 
showed a significant increase in stress from baseline to post-induction (p = .004) and from 
post-induction to post-intervention (p = .001). 
 
RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the six reactions to the distress induction at Stages 4 and 
7 as measured on the RQ are presented separately below. Table 6 presents the data from each 
reaction by time point and condition.  
Table 6 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 3 
Reactions Questionnaire Time 
Defusion 
 
M (SD) 
Self- 
enhanced 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the accident 
Post-induction 47.13 (28.25) 
49.98 
(25.72) 
Post-
intervention 
 
38.33 
(24.76) 
51.13 
(21.63) 
Please rate how believable the 
accident scenario was to you 
 
Post-induction 19.9 (20.81) 
17 
(23.88) 
Post-
intervention 
 
47.37 
(29.84) 
35.99 
(30.23) 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images were of the 
car accident 
Post-induction 57.23 (29.44) 
47.29 
(29.34) 
Post-
intervention 
 
56.01 
(24.66) 
50 
(31.01) 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
 
Post-induction 45.96 (34.31) 
37.49 
(32.75) 
Post-
intervention 
 
48.83 
(31.08) 
39.94 
(30.73) 
Please rate how morally wrong 
you felt it was to write or say the 
sentence 
Post-induction 41.28 (34.05) 
54.83 
(36.57) 
Post-
intervention 
 
47.55 
(33.55) 
43.58 
(27.89) 
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At post-induction, levels of willingness and believability were similar for both 
conditions (see Table 6). However, participants in self-enhanced defusion showed less 
vividness and guilt than the acceptance condition, but more moral wrongness. A series of 
independent t-tests revealed that none of these differences between the conditions were 
significant (all ps > .33). At post-intervention, the defusion condition decreased willingness 
and vividness, while self-enhanced defusion increased both. Both conditions increased guilt 
and believability. Defusion increased moral wrongness while self-enhanced defusion 
decreased it. A series of 2x2 mixed between within ANOVAs revealed that the effect for time 
was significant for believability [Wilks’ Lambda = .6 F(1, 28) = 18.96, p = .000, partial eta 
squared = .4] and that it represented a substantial amount of the variance (40%). Furthermore, 
the interaction effect was significant for moral wrongness [Wilks’ Lambda = .82, F (1, 25) = 
5.5, p = .03, partial eta squared = .18] and it accounted for a medium amount of the variance 
(18%) only (all other ps > .5). 
 
Results Summary 
The data from the screening measures indicated that the two groups did not differ pre-
experimentally on their propensities towards acceptance or mindfulness. At baseline, both 
conditions were low in discomfort, anxiety and stress and these increased for both conditions 
at post-induction. A small difference emerged at post-intervention in the discomfort and 
anxiety ratings, where the self-enhanced defusion intervention increased both moderately and 
defusion increased both only marginally. Both conditions increased stress significantly at 
post-intervention. The RQ indicated some differences between conditions. Defusion 
decreased willingness and vividness, while the self-enhanced condition increased in both. 
Both conditions increased guilt and believability. Moral wrongness increased in defusion and 
decreased in self-enhanced defusion. 
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Discussion 
 As the second experiment in a series of four comparing key ACT hexaflex processes, 
the primary aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the utility of a defusion vs. a self-
enhanced defusion intervention on distress induced by the single-sentence paradigm. Once 
again, the key research prediction was that the self-enhanced defusion condition would show 
greater efficacy relative to defusion alone in reducing subjective ratings of discomfort, 
anxiety and stress. Similar to Experiment 2, however, this key research prediction was not 
upheld. In Experiment 4, we turned our attention to the third target ACT process, namely 
values, and employed the same design to explore the potential benefits of enhancing a 
standard values intervention with self as context to the reduction of distress. 
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Experiment 4 
Enhancing Values with Self as Context 
 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to investigate the relative utility of a values-based intervention 
vs. a self-enhanced values intervention in reducing experimentally induced distress, using the 
single-sentence paradigm. As before, the research hypothesis was that a values intervention 
enhanced with self as context would show greater effects in the reduction of subjective levels 
of discomfort, anxiety and stress compared to a values intervention alone. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Twenty volunteers participated in Experiment 4. All were aged between 19 and 23 
years old, were undergraduates at NUIM and were able to drive. The same exclusion criteria 
as previous experiments applied (4 participants were excluded on this basis). This yielded a 
final sample of 16 participants (6 male and 10 female, mean age = 20 years, 3 months) 
assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: values (N = 8) and self-enhanced 
values (N = 8).  
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiments 2 and 3 (notably 
the distraction question previously omitted from the RQ as a result of experimenter error was 
now re-introduced). 
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Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to the previous experiments applied here and were 
addressed in a similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues 
or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages. These were identical to Experiment 2 
(see Figure 7, p.68), except that the two interventions presented in Stage 5 comprised of a 
values exercise and a self-enhanced values exercise. 
Stage 5: Interventions. Stage 5 involved a values intervention for half of the 
participants and a self-enhanced values intervention for the other half. Participants in the 
values condition received two identical and consecutive exposures to the values intervention 
(again this was to match for length between conditions). Participants in the self-enhanced 
value condition received one exposure to the values intervention followed by the same self as 
context intervention used in previous experiments. 
Values intervention. Participants in the values intervention were instructed as follows: 
I understand that the previous sentence may have generated some unpleasant thoughts 
and feelings for you. The aim of the next part of this experiment is to discuss the 
importance of your participation in this research. This may have the bonus of helping you 
deal with any negative thoughts or emotions that came up as a result of the sentence. OK, 
so if you can, try to relax yourself in your chair and get comfortable. When you’re ready, 
I want you to close your eyes and listen to the sound of my voice. If you find your mind 
wandering, just gently come back to the sound of my voice.  
 
As you may know, many people suffer with mental health issues and the number of cases 
of issues like depression and anxiety in Ireland are on the increase. However many 
people with mental health issues learn to persist in their lives or keep working in their 
jobs, even when they are experiencing very high levels of discomfort. For example, going 
to work may be the only way they can afford to feed their children. In the same way, 
someone who is afraid of flying might be willing to put themselves in the uncomfortable 
position of being on an airplane so they can go on holidays with their family. Bearing 
these two examples in mind, do you think you could you tell me something that you 
value? For example, as this experiment is dealing with mental health, would it be fair to 
say that you value your mental health?  
 
Participant answers. 
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OK, now thinking again about the previous examples, I just want to bring your attention 
to the fact that these people keep living their lives even when they are faced with 
distressing problems or uncomfortable circumstances. We know that your participation in 
the previous part of this experiment was uncomfortable and distressing but, in actual fact, 
being able to carry out this experiment could be beneficial to your mental health. This is 
based on research that has shown that avoiding negative emotions can be bad for one’s 
mental health, whereas being able to make contact with and accept distressing thoughts 
and feelings can have positive outcomes for one’s mental health.  
 
Now, at this point in the experiment we want you to ask yourself if you would be willing 
to make contact with your own feelings of distress, if doing so could allow you to move 
in the direction of something you value. In this case, that is your positive mental health. 
So what we are asking you to consider is if you would be willing to experience a brief 
period of distress when it is in the service of something you value, that is, the 
strengthening of your ability to be out of your comfort zone and subsequently, 
strengthening your mental health.  
 
Self-enhanced values intervention. Participants in the self-enhanced values condition 
were first presented with the values intervention outlined above and subsequently presented 
with the self as context intervention, identical to Experiments 2 and 3 (see pp. 70-71). 
 
Results 
Again, three investigations were central to Experiment 4: to assess the effect of the 
distress induction procedure on discomfort, anxiety and stress; to determine whether self-
enhanced values would be associated with greater reductions than values alone in these 
dependent variables; and to explore potential differences between the conditions in terms of 
participant reactions to the imaginary accident.  
 
Pre-Experimental Measures 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance and mindfulness are presented in Table 
7. The AAQ means for both conditions were low and within the normal range for a non-
clinical sample (i.e. < 18). The PHLMS scores on the acceptance sub-scale were low (i.e. 27 
and 25.5) and again within the normal range (< 31). Outcomes on the awareness sub-scale (i.e. 
33.75 and 34.75) were also low and within the normal range (< 37). Three independent 
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samples t-tests confirmed that the conditions did not differ significantly on any measure (all 
p’s > .3).  
 
Table 7 
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Values by Condition on the Pre-Experimental Measures in 
Experiment 4 
Pre-experimental 
Measures 
Values 
M (SD) 
Self-enhanced 
M (SD) p values 
AAQ 12.75 (4.33) 
14 
(2.98) .33 
PHLMS (acceptance) 27 (5.8) 
25.5 
(5.04) .6 
PHLMS (awareness) 33.75 (5.42) 
34.75 
(7.32) .76 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
 
 
Distress Ratings 
The mean VAS ratings by condition recorded at baseline, post-induction and post-
intervention are presented below.  
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of discomfort (<13/100) at 
baseline, which increased substantially at post-induction (values: +19 and self-enhanced 
values: +20.12; see Figure 14). Thereafter, both conditions increased discomfort (values: 
+.5.88 and self-enhanced values: +9.38) at post-intervention.  
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Figure 14. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 4. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .405, F (2, 13) = 9.56, p = .003, partial eta squared = .6] 
that accounted for a large amount of the variance (60%), but not for condition [F (1, 14) 
= .031, p = .86, partial eta squared = .00]. The interaction effect was also non-significant 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F (2, 13) = .08, p = .92, partial eta squared = .01]. Two dependent t-
tests showed a significant increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .00), 
but not from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .16). 
Anxiety. Both conditions recorded low levels of anxiety (< 9/100) at baseline, which 
increased substantially at post-induction (values: +15.75 and self-enhanced values: +16.28; 
see Figure 15). Thereafter, both conditions increased anxiety further (values: +2.75 and self-
enhanced values: +11.87) at post-intervention.  
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Figure 15. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 4. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .59 F (2, 13) = 4.58, p = .03, partial eta squared = .41] that accounted for a 
substantial amount of the variance (41%), but not for condition [F (1, 14) = .05, p = .83, 
partial eta squared = .00]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .94, F (2, 13) = .43, p = .66, partial eta squared = .06]. Two dependent t-tests showed a 
significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p = .02), but not from post-
induction to post-intervention (p = .15). 
Stress. Both conditions recorded low levels of stress (< 12/100) at baseline, which 
increased after the distress induction procedure (values: +6.12; self-enhanced values: +19.25; 
see Figure 16). Thereafter, the values condition decreased stress marginally (-4.75) while the 
self-enhanced condition increased stress (+6.25). A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA 
revealed non-significant effects for time, condition and the interaction effect (all ps > .2). No 
dependent t-tests were performed due to the non-significant effect for time. 
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Figure 16. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 4. 
 
 
RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the six reactions to the distress induction at Stages 4 and 
7 are presented separately below. Table 8 presents the data from each of the six reactions by 
time point and condition.  
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Table 8 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 4  
Reactions Questionnaire Time 
Values 
 
M (SD) 
Self- 
enhanced 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the accident 
Post-induction 26.33 (38.59) 
37.13 
(27.12) 
Post-
intervention 
36.5 
(36.93) 
35.13 
(27.54) 
 
Please rate how believable the 
accident scenario was to you 
 
Post-induction 21.25 (22.87) 
38.28 
(26.83) 
Post-
intervention 
 
17.25 
(17.48) 
54 
(31.81) 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images were of the 
car accident 
Post-induction 
28.25 
(32.73) 
 
47.38 
(38.46) 
Post-
intervention 
 
26.75 
(29.51) 
54.75 
(33.08) 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
 
Post-induction 43.5 (36.97) 
58.38 
(30.9) 
Post-
intervention 
 
26.75 
(31.07) 
56.88 
(38.24) 
Please rate how morally wrong 
you felt it was to write or say the 
sentence 
Post-induction 62.13 (22.34) 
73.25 
(26.91) 
Post-
intervention 
 
46.25 
(39.05 
56.13 
(31.27) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
 
Post-induction 
25.75 
(23.27) 
 
47.37 
(32.40) 
Post-
intervention 
 
60.13 
(22.34) 
59.5 
(16.67) 
 
 
At post-induction, levels of willingness, believability, vividness, guilt, moral 
wrongness and distraction were higher for the self-enhanced condition relative to the values 
condition. A series of independent t-tests revealed that none of these differences were 
significant (all ps > .14). At post-intervention, the values condition increased willingness, 
while self-enhanced values decreased it. Believability and vividness decreased for contact 
and increased for self-enhanced contact. Guilt and moral wrongness decreased in both 
conditions and distraction increased in both conditions. A series of 2x2 mixed between within 
ANOVAs revealed a significant effect for time for distraction was significant [Wilks’ 
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Lambda = .71 F (1, 14) = 5.7, p = .03, partial eta squared = .29] which represented a medium 
amount of variance (29%). In addition, the effect for moral wrongness was significant 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .62 F (1, 14) = 8.7, p = .01, partial eta squared = .38] and represented a 
medium amount of variance (38%) (all other ps > .17). 
 
 
Results Summary 
The data from the pre-experimental measures indicated that the two groups showed 
within normal range scores of avoidance or mindfulness and did not differ significantly in 
this regard. At baseline, both conditions were low on discomfort, anxiety and stress and both 
increased significantly on all three ratings at post-induction. After the interventions and the 
second distress induction, both anxiety and discomfort increased in both conditions. In 
contrast, stress decreased to near baseline for thee values condition and increased in the self-
enhanced values condition. At post-intervention, the values condition increased willingness, 
while self-enhanced values decreased it. Believability and vividness decreased for values and 
increased for self-enhanced values. Guilt and moral wrongness decreased in both conditions 
and distraction increased in both conditions. 
 
Discussion 
 As the third experiment in a series of four comparing ACT hexaflex processes, the 
primary aim of Experiment 4 was to investigate the utility of a values vs. a self-enhanced 
values intervention on distress induced by the single-sentence paradigm, using an 
experimental design identical to previous experiments. Once again, the key research 
prediction was that the self-enhanced values condition would show greater efficacy relative to 
values alone in reducing subjective ratings of discomfort, anxiety and stress. Similar to 
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Experiments 2 and 3, however, this research prediction was not upheld. In Experiment 5, we 
turned our attention to the fourth target ACT process, namely contact with the present 
moment and employed the same design to explore the potential benefits of enhancing a 
standard contact with the present moment intervention with self as context.  
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Experiment 5 
Enhancing Contact with the Present Moment with Self as Context 
 
In Experiment 5, we turned our attention to the fourth target ACT process, namely contact 
with the present moment, and employed the same design to explore the potential benefits of 
enhancing a standard contact with the present moment intervention with self as context, using 
Rachman et al. (1996)’s single-sentence paradigm. The research hypothesis predicted that the 
contact with the present moment intervention enhanced with self as context would show 
greater effects in the reduction of subjective discomfort, anxiety and stress than contact with 
the present moment alone. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Twenty-three volunteers participated in Experiment 5. All were aged between 18 and 
22 years old, were undergraduates at NUIM and were able to drive. The same exclusion 
criteria as previous experiments applied (3 participants were excluded on this basis). This 
yielded a final sample of 20 participants (7 males and 13 females, mean age: 19 years, 8 
months) assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: contact with the present 
moment (N =10) and self-enhanced contact with the present moment (N =10). In the interests 
of brevity, the term ‘contact with the present moment’ will be shortened hereafter to simply 
‘contact’.  
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to previous experiments. 
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Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to previous studies applied here and were addressed in a 
similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues or reported any 
adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages. These were identical to Experiments 2, 
3 and 4 (see Figure 7, p.68), except that the two interventions presented in Stage 5 comprised 
of a contact exercise vs. a self-enhanced contact exercise. 
Stage 5: Interventions. Stage 5 involved a contact intervention for half of the 
participants and a self-enhanced contact intervention for the other half.  
Contact with the present moment intervention.  There are no exercises listed in the 
original full-length book on ACT (Hayes et al., 1999) that explicitly target contact with the 
present moment, because this term is a relatively recent addition to ACT protocols and is 
borrowed directly from mindfulness practices. Indeed, ACT therapists who choose to target 
contact with the present moment invariably use a mindfulness technique and often the Body 
Scan (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). In line with this practice, we used the Body Scan technique here to 
target contact with the present moment, but have retained the term contact in order to stay 
close to ACT language and practices. We will discuss the benefits and disadvantages of this 
type of labelling in the General Discussion.  
In line with Experiments 2-4, we also investigated the extent to which a contact 
exercise might be enhanced with a self as context technique in terms of distress reduction. 
Participants in this latter condition received two identical and consecutive exposures to a 
contact intervention. Participants were instructed as follows: 
I understand that the previous sentence may have generated some unpleasant thoughts 
and feelings for you. The aim of the next part of the experiment is to teach you a coping 
strategy to deal with any negative sensations that might have risen when you were asked 
106 
 
to say and write the sentence. Try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. 
When you're ready, I want you to close your eyes and listen to my voice. 
 
When very painful thoughts come to mind they are often accompanied by unpleasant 
sensations. For example, your chest might tighten or you might feel tense. This package 
of painful thoughts and unpleasant sensations often feels like it's too much to deal with. 
And when we have that very thought "this is just too much", our level of discomfort goes 
even higher and then we feel like we are in a position where we really don't know what to 
do. 
 
Powerful feelings such as anxiety or sadness can often be expressed as effects in the body. 
For example, tightness in the chest may signal the presence of strong feelings like in the 
last part of this experiment. As a result, some believe that learning about the body will be 
helpful in learning how better to deal with feelings and emotions. 
 
For the next part of the experiment, focus your attention on your breathing. Try to feel the 
rising and falling of your belly with each in-breath and out-breath you take. Take a few 
moments to feel your body as a whole, from head to toe. For example, try to feel the 
sensations of your back touching the chair or the feeling of your feet on the ground. 
 
For now, try to bring your attention to the toes of your left foot. As you direct your 
attention to them, see if you can direct, or channel, your breathing to them as well, so that 
it feels as if you are breathing to them as well, so that it feels as if you are breathing into 
your toes and out from your toes. It may take a while for you to get the hang of this. It 
may help to just imagine your breath traveling down the body from your nose into the 
lungs and then continuing through the abdomen and down the left leg all the way to the 
toes...and then back again and out through your nose. 
 
Allow yourself to feel any and all sensations from your toes, perhaps distinguishing 
between them and watching the flux of sensations in this region. If you don't feel 
anything at the moment, that is fine too. Just allow yourself to feel "not feeling anything". 
 
When you are ready to leave the toes and move on, take a deeper, more intentional breath 
in all the way down to the toes and on the outbreath, allow them to dissolve in your 
mind's eye. Stay with your breathing for a few breaths and then move on in turn to the 
sole of your foot... the heel... the top of your foot... and then the ankle....all the time 
continuing to breathe into and out of the foot, continuing to breathe into and from each 
region as you observe the sensations that you are experiencing and then letting go of it 
and moving on. If your attention wanders off, it is important that you bring your mind 
back to the breath and to the region you are focusing on. 
 
In this way, continue to move slowly up your left leg and through the rest of your body as 
you maintain the focus on the breath and on the feeling of the particular regions as you 
come to them, breathe with them and let go of them. Go to the stomach....all the way up 
to your shoulders...down to your elbows... and all the way to your finger tips. In the same 
way, start at the base of your neck... move to your chin... to your nose... all the way to our 
forehead. When you have reached the top of your head, let me know. However, as you 
move through the body try to remember the basic instructions of the exercise; that is to 
bring your awareness to a particular region of the body, to hold it in awareness for a short 
time and finally to release and "let go" of that region before moving your attention to the 
next region. 
 
 
Self-enhanced contact with the present moment intervention. Participants in the self-
enhanced condition received one exposure to the contact intervention followed by the self as 
context exercise which used in Experiments 1-4 (see pp. 70-71). 
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Results 
Again, three investigations were central to Experiment 5: to assess the effect of the 
distress induction procedure on discomfort, anxiety and stress; to determine whether self-
enhanced contact would be associated with greater reductions in discomfort, anxiety and 
stress than contact alone; and to explore potential differences between the conditions in terms 
of participant reactions to the imaginary accident.  
 
Pre-experimental Measures 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance and mindfulness are presented in Table 
9. The AAQ means for both conditions were low and within the normal range for a non-
clinical sample (i.e. < 18). The PHLMS means on the acceptance sub-scale were low (27.6 
and 26.9) and again within the normal range (< 31). Outcomes on the awareness sub-scale 
(35.2 and 33.2) were also low and within the normal range (< 37). Three independent 
samples t-tests confirmed that the conditions did not differ significantly on any measure (all 
p’s > .2).  
 
 
 
 
Table 9  
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Values by Condition on the Pre-Experimental Measures in 
Experiment 5 
Pre-experimental 
Measures 
Contact 
M (SD) 
Self-enhanced 
M (SD) p values 
AAQ 14.9 (3.9) 
17.6 
(8.3) .2 
PHLMS (acceptance) 27.6 (5.56) 
26.9 
(4.36) .76 
PHLMS (awareness) 35.2 (7.18) 
33.2 
(3.33) .44 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Distress Ratings 
The mean VAS ratings by condition recorded at baseline, post-induction and post-
intervention are presented below.  
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded low discomfort (< 10/100) at baseline, which 
increased substantially at post-induction (contact: +28.3; self-enhanced contact: +29.8; see 
Figure 17). Thereafter, both conditions decreased discomfort marginally (contact: -1.7; self-
enhanced contact: -.01) at post-intervention.  
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Figure 17. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 5. 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .32, F (2, 17) = 17.75, p = .000, partial eta squared = .68] 
that accounted for a large amount of the variance (68%), but not for condition [F (1, 18) = .07, 
p = .79, partial eta squared = .004]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .99, F (2, 17) = .03, p = .97, partial eta squared = .00]. Two dependent t-tests 
showed a significant increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .00), but not 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .87). 
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Anxiety. Both conditions recorded low anxiety (< 11/100) at baseline, which 
increased substantially at post-induction (contact: +29.2; self-enhanced: +21.1; see Figure 18). 
Thereafter, contact decreased anxiety slightly (-2.1) and self-enhanced contact increased 
anxiety marginally (+.3) at post-intervention.  
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Figure 18. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 5. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .39, F (2, 17) = 13.46, p = .000, partial eta squared = .61] 
that accounted for a large amount of the variance (61%), but not for condition [F (1, 18) = .55, 
p = .47, partial eta squared = .03]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .96, F (2, 17) = .35, p = .7, partial eta squared = .00]. Two dependent t-tests 
showed a significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p = .00), but not 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .83). 
Stress. Both conditions recorded low stress (< 15/100) at baseline, which increased 
substantially at post-induction (contact: +18.2; self-enhanced contact: +14.6; see Figure 19). 
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Thereafter, contact increased stress at post-intervention (+5), while self-enhanced contact 
decreased stress marginally (- 4.1).  
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Figure 19. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 5. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .54, F (2, 17) = 7.37, p = .005, partial eta squared = .46] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (46%), but not for condition [F (1, 18) 
= .08, p = .78, partial eta squared = .01]. The interaction effect was also non-significant 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .94, F (2, 17) = .51, p = .61, partial eta squared = .06]. Two dependent t-
tests showed a significant increase in stress from baseline to post-induction (p = .001), but not 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .93). 
 
RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the six reactions to the distress induction at Stages 4 and 
7 are presented separately below (see Table 10).  
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Table 10 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 5 
 
Reactions Questionnaire Time Contact M (SD) 
Self- 
enhanced 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the accident 
Post-induction 35.2 (20.82) 
30.8 
(28.87) 
Post-
intervention 
20.9 
(20.99) 
 
43.9 
(30.19) 
 
Please rate how believable the 
accident scenario was to you 
 
Post-induction 58 (28.03) 
38 
(34.71) 
Post-
intervention 
42 
(33.09) 
45.3 
(36.01) 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images were of the 
car accident 
Post-induction 56.8 (33.3) 
29 
(23.17) 
Post-
intervention 
37.3 
(34.82) 
31.8 
(26.59) 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
 
Post-induction 64 (26.71) 
41.7 
(20.92) 
Post-
intervention 
48.5 
(21.75) 
41.1 
(32.6) 
Please rate how morally wrong 
you felt it was to write or say the 
sentence 
Post-induction 87.7 (12.86) 
48.2 
(41.22) 
Post-
intervention 
68.9 
(23.21) 
47.5 
(31.73) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
 
Post-induction 54.6 (30.58) 
40.8 
(33.29) 
Post-
intervention 
53.7 
(29.43) 
37.2 
(29.28) 
 
At post-induction, levels of willingness were similar for both conditions. In contrast, 
believability, vividness, guilt, moral wrongness and distraction were higher for the contact 
condition, relative to the self-enhanced condition. However, a series of independent t-tests 
revealed that these differences were only significant for vividness (p = .04), guilt (p = .05) 
and moral wrongness (p = .01). At post-intervention, guilt, moral wrongness and distraction 
decreased for both conditions (although the decrease was generally bigger for contact). In 
contrast, the self-enhanced contact condition increased willingness, vividness and 
believability while the contact condition decreased these. A series of 2x2 ANOVA revealed a 
significant interaction effect for willingness [Wilks’ Lambda = .74, F (1, 18) = 6.3, p = .02, 
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partial eta squared = .26] that accounted for a medium amount of the variance (26%), 
believability [Wilks’ Lambda = .74, F (1, 18) = 6.31, p = .02, partial eta squared = .26] 
that accounted for a medium amount of the variance (26%) and vividness [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .8, F (1, 18) = 4.6, p = .05, partial eta squared = .2] that also accounted for a medium 
amount of the variance (20%) only (all other ps > .12).  
 
 
Results Summary 
The data from the pre-experimental measures indicated that the conditions did not 
differ on propensities towards avoidance or mindfulness at baseline. Both conditions were 
low on discomfort, anxiety and stress at baseline and all three sets of ratings increased 
significantly at post-induction for both conditions. Varying results emerged at post-
intervention. Both conditions showed small decreases in discomfort. The contact condition 
decreased anxiety and increased stress, while the self-enhanced condition increased anxiety 
and decreased stress (although these differences were not significant). As such, the research 
prediction that the self-enhanced condition would be associated with significantly greater 
increases in the dependent variables was not confirmed. Results from the RQ that guilt, moral 
wrongness and distraction decreased for both conditions (although the decrease was generally 
bigger for contact). In contrast, the self-enhanced contact condition increased willingness, 
vividness and believability while the contact condition decreased these. 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 5 was the final in a series of four exploring ACT hexaflex processes 
(acceptance, defusion, values and contact with the present moment) and their potential 
relationship with self as context. In all four studies, none of the conditions successfully 
reduced discomfort, anxiety or stress to near baseline levels. Furthermore, none of the 
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predictions that the self-enhanced conditions would show superiority in this regard were 
upheld.  
The surprising consistency across the findings from the four studies had two main 
implications. Although there are only a few similar studies that have subjected the current 
self-report measures to analogue interventions in the context of experimentally induced 
distress, those findings do not accord with the current ones. 2. It is possible that although the 
current method of distress induction reliably increased discomfort, anxiety and stress, it may 
not have been appropriate in some way for the inclusion of analogue components. Indeed, the 
existing studies that have combined Rachman et al.’s (1996) procedure with analogue 
interventions have overall reported mixed success for distress reduction (e.g. Marcks & 
Woods, 2007). In the next series of studies, we explored both of these issues with a modified 
distress induction procedure and an alternative, but related, set of analogue therapeutic 
interventions.  
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Chapter 4 
Experiments 6-8 
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Experiments 6-8 
An Empirical Investigation of Self as Context and Mindfulness 
 
Mindfulness exercises have received increasing attention in behavioural psychology because 
of their positive implications for clinical (e.g. Speca, Carlson, Goodey, & Angen, 2000) and 
non-clinical populations (e.g. Jain et al., 2007). Mindfulness has been defined as a state of 
“awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and 
nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 2004, p. 4). As a result, mindfulness techniques aim to 
facilitate a sense of present moment acceptance and awareness, such that a potentially 
problematic pattern of thinking is disrupted and subsequently allowed little intrinsic power 
over behaviour. Numerous studies have provided empirical support for the beneficial effects 
of these techniques when presented within specific therapeutic packages (e.g. MBSR). 
  
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) 
A critical feature of training in MBSR is its intensity (e.g. sessions may last around 
eight hours). A target skill for initial training comprises the body scan, in which attention is 
directed sequentially to areas of the body through careful observation. In appearance and aim, 
this feature is almost identical to Vipassana Meditation. Specifically, participants are 
instructed to maintain a wakeful posture and direct their attention to the sensations of 
breathing. Hatha Yoga postures are then used to teach mindfulness of other bodily sensations 
during gentle movement and stretching. For all mindfulness exercises, participants are 
instructed to focus attention on the target of observation (e.g. breathing or walking) and to be 
aware of this in each moment. When emotions, sensations, or cognitions arise, they are to be 
observed non-judgementally (Baer, 2003). If the mind wanders, the content is noted briefly 
and participants are encouraged to gently and non-judgementally return their attention to the 
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target sensations and the present moment. In short, a central message is to notice thoughts 
and feelings without becoming absorbed in their content (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). At a broader 
level, the target ‘realisation’ is that sensations, thoughts and emotions fluctuate across time.  
Some empirical evidence attests to the utility of MBSR in a range of health contexts. 
These include: enhanced self-regulation of chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney, 
1985); psoriasis management (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1998); stress reduction in cancer (Speca et 
al., 2000); and fibromyalgia (Kaplan, Goldenberg, & Galvin-Nadeau, 1993). Outcomes also 
show reductions in: stress (Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995); anxiety (Shapiro, Schwartz, 
& Bonner, 1998); depression (Teasdale et al., 2000); and binge eating (Kristeller & Hallett, 
1999). Data also support improvements in psychological well-being and quality of life issues 
(Nyklícek & Kuijpers, 2008). 
In spite of a wealth of empirical evidence in support of MBSR techniques (and 
mindfulness in general), Bishop et al. (2004) have argued that the core concept of 
mindfulness has not been fully articulated. Specifically, they have argued that mindfulness is 
fundamentally a twin-component process of gaining insight into the nature of one’s mind and 
adopting a de-centred perspective on its content in a manner that facilitates the experiencing 
of content as subjective and transient. The first component involves the self-regulation of 
attention on immediate experience that allows for instant recognition of physical and 
psychological events. The second component thereafter involves adopting an orientation of 
curiosity, openness and acceptance towards one’s experiences in the present moment. 
 
Mindfulness in ACT 
 Behavioural researchers have also attempted to identify the core processes that 
underpin mindfulness. For example, Baer et al. (2004) have suggested that mindfulness 
comprises of four key behavioural components: observing; describing; acting with awareness; 
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and accepting without judgement. In a similar vein, Hayes et al. (2006) have proposed that 
mindfulness is comprised of four of the six hexaflex processes, namely contact with the 
present moment, self as context, acceptance and defusion. As a result, it is not surprising that 
ACT clinicians have begun to place increasing emphasis on the use of mindfulness-based 
techniques in ACT protocols.  
The recent move of ACT clinicians towards mindfulness components has been driven 
more by clinical than scientific concerns. That is, there is little or no published evidence to 
indicate that traditional ACT outcomes are enhanced by the inclusion of mindfulness 
techniques. What ACT clinicians often argue, however, is that there is considerable overlap 
between mindfulness and ACT techniques because the core underlying processes are 
essentially the same. Some authors have postulated a direct link between mindfulness and 
contact with the present moment in particular. For example, Fletcher and Hayes (2005) 
defined contact with the present moment as shifting attention to what is happening in the 
here-and-now and “contacting both internal stimuli, such as bodily sensations, thoughts and 
feelings and external stimuli, such as sounds, sights, smells and touch” (pp. 320-21).  
As outlined in Experiment 5, there are no exercises in ACT that are formally created 
to target contact with the present moment. And as such, the exercise in Experiment 5 used to 
target this component of the hexaflex was a mindfulness exercise adapted from Kabat-Zinn 
(1994). For this reason, we decided to take the contact with the present moment exercise from 
Experiment 5 and rename it as mindfulness for Experiments 6-8 in order to ensure that in the 
current series of studies we remained consistent with practices that represent mindfulness 
fairly. 
As a starting point towards determining whether mindfulness and existing hexaflex 
concepts overlap at the level of basic process, the current research began by exploring the 
relative utility of self as context exercises with a matched mindfulness exercise. Consider the 
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potential differences between the two. Self as context exercises (e.g. the Observer Exercise) 
are designed to move clients away from self as content and towards self as context, thereby 
reducing the hold that psychological content exerts over a client’s sense of self. In a similar 
manner, mindfulness exercises (e.g. the Body Scan) are designed to directly increase 
awareness of physical sensations with the ultimate aim of separating these from one’s sense 
of self. In short, mindfulness explicitly promotes awareness of one’s content, while self as 
context promotes a broader separation of content from the self. Given these differences, one 
might make a number of propositions. 1. Mindfulness might be more effective initially than 
self as context because the latter can only achieve the target cognitive distancing if 
participants first employ awareness with regard to their to-be-distanced content. Or 2. 
Alternatively, self as context might be more effective because distancing from content is 
likely to be a more effective place from which to operate than simply being aware of content.  
These issues were central to the following experiments conducted in the current chapter. 
Experiments 6-8. The current set of studies (Experiments 6-8) comprise of empirical 
analyses of the role of mindfulness in ACT interventions using an experimental distress 
induction procedure. If, as suggested by the hexaflex, self as context is pivotal in ACT 
outcomes, we reasoned that a self as context intervention (which emphasised a distinction 
between the individual and his/her content) would likely demonstrate larger reductions in 
distress relative to a mindfulness intervention (which merely instructed the individual to be 
aware of his/her on-going psychological content). In simple terms, Experiment 6 asked if an 
ACT intervention specifically targeting self as context would successfully reduce 
experimentally induced distress and if so, would these effects be different to a mindfulness 
intervention. Furthermore, Experiment 7 separated mindfulness into two interventions 
targeting either physical or verbal awareness and investigated their relative utility. Finally, 
Experiment 8 investigated further the role of mindfulness in distress reduction with regards to 
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the sequencing of its various components. A new and more ACT-related experimental 
preparation was employed in this chapter as a means of distress induction. This simply asked 
participants to present a self-criticism which caused them distress (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, 
& Twohig, 2004). The use of this alternative procedure was in part designed to rectify the 
high drop-out rates (approx 10% of overall participants) of the previous experiments 
(primarily due to the large numbers of participants with previous experience of motor 
accidents). However, it also served to provide a distress induction procedure that might yield 
better to brief ACT-based analogue interventions given the poor outcomes recorded in 
Experiments 2-5. 
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Experiment 6 
An Empirical Investigation of Self as Context vs. Mindfulness 
 
The aim of Experiment 6 was to investigate potential differences between self as context and 
mindfulness techniques. We did not make any specific predictions about the outcomes, but 
were concerned with the possibility of differentiated outcomes based on the fact that self as 
context techniques encourage a focus on psychological events, (such as thoughts), while 
mindfulness techniques encourage a focus on somatic events (i.e. the body). Hence, 
comparing the two would perhaps allow us to determine whether it is the self-focus per se or 
the target of this focus that facilitates distress reduction. A third condition acted as a control 
condition and included a self-focus exercise which was also designed to determine whether 
any effects recorded for the interventions were attributed to the act of self-focusing alone and 
not specifically to focusing on thoughts or physical sensations. A new distress induction 
procedure called the self-criticism task was employed to avoid the high drop-out rates of 
previous experiments (primarily due to the large numbers of participants with previous 
experience of motor accidents) and to provide a distress induction procedure that might yield 
better to brief analogue interventions. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-four volunteers (27 males and 7 females) participated in Experiment 6. All 
were aged between 19 and 25 years old and were undergraduates at NUIM. Any participant 
who reported significant mental health issues (e.g. anxiety) that may be adversely affected by 
participation was excluded (4 were removed on this basis). Given the new distress induction 
task, there was no longer a need to determine in participants could drive or had any previous 
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experiences with car accidents. Therefore, 30 individuals participated fully in the research (12 
males and 18 females, mean age: 22 years, 1 month). Each participant was assigned to one of 
three experimental conditions: mindfulness (N = 10), self as context (N = 10) or self-focus (N 
= 10). 
 
Materials and Setting 
Experiment 6 included some materials from the previous studies: a desk; two chairs; a 
pen; a sheet of blank paper; a Consent Form; a modified version of the ESQ for exclusion 
purposes (the adaptation did not include questions about road accidents because a different 
distress induction procedure was employed here; see Appendix 8); the AAQ; the same VASs; 
two copies of a new RQ (because of the new distress induction task; see Appendix 9); and a 
Debriefing Form. The PHLMS was omitted because it had not yielded any useful findings 
and the moral wrongness question was removed from the RQ because this question did not 
apply to the new distress induction procedure. Some additional materials were also employed. 
These included a tape player and a Demographic Questionnaire (DQ; see Appendix 10) 
which comprised of eight questions that related to age, occupation, etc. (e.g. “How old are 
you?” and “How many siblings do you have?”).  
 
Ethical Issues 
Although the current distress induction procedure differed from that used in 
Experiments 1- 5, the same ethical guidelines were upheld for the current experiment (see pp. 
52-53) and the same consent form was employed (see Appendix 1). Once again, no 
participants raised any issues or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
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Procedure 
The experimental sequence employed in Experiment 6 was identical to the previous 
studies. For convenience, Figure 20 illustrates this sequence. Again, the sequence involved: 
pre-experimental measures (Stage 1); baseline VAS ratings (Stage 2); the (new) distress 
induction procedure (Stage 3); post-induction VAS ratings and the RQ (Stage 4); one of three 
possible exercises (Stage 5); post-intervention distress induction procedure (Stage 6); and 
post-intervention VAS ratings and the RQ (Stage 7). It is important to note that the word 
“intervention” is no longer used to refer to the manipulations in Stage 5 because only two of 
the conditions (mindfulness and self as context) involved interventions, while the self-focus 
condition was employed for the purposes of experimental control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. An overview of the experimental sequence in Experiments 6-8. 
 
 
STAGE 1 
Pre-Experimental Measures 
 
 
STAGE 2 
Baseline VAS Ratings 
 
 
STAGE 3 
Distress Induction Procedure 
 
 
STAGE 4 
Post-induction VAS Ratings 
and RQ 
 
 
STAGE 5 
Exercises 
 
 
STAGE 6 
Post-intervention Distress 
Induction Procedure 
 
 
STAGE 7 
Post-intervention VAS Ratings 
and RQ 
123 
 
Stage 2: Distress induction procedure (self-criticism). There was considerable 
overlap in structure between Rachman et al. (1996)’s distress induction procedure involving 
the car accident used in the previous experiments and the new procedure employed here. That 
is, the single-sentence about the accident was simply replaced by a single-sentence involving 
what participants disliked about themselves (i.e. a self-criticism). Indeed, the presentation of 
the target sentence was identical in that participants once again wrote it down. This was then 
read aloud by the Experimenter and thereafter repeated aloud by the participant. To illustrate 
the new procedure, consider the following example. If a participant called Ann disliked her 
figure, she might write “Ann is fat”. All participants were presented with the following 
instructions: 
Before we begin, I want to explain to you that some of what I will ask you to do in this 
experiment could be difficult for you. I am not going to ask you to disclose any personal 
information, but this task could present you with a considerable emotional challenge. At 
this point, I am not able to tell you what that will be because that would defeat the 
purpose, but I do want to assure you that you will not be made to do anything you do not 
want to do. If, at any point, you feel that you have reached your level of discomfort and 
want to stop what we are doing, please let me know and we will stop immediately. Is that 
ok with you?   
 
Participant responds 
 
Ok, so what I want you to do is try to think of one negative thing about yourself. I know 
this is difficult to do, but I want you to try as hard as you can to think of the one thing 
you really hate about yourself. When you have this in mind, I want you to write it down 
on that page in front of you. However, I want you to write it from someone else’s point of 
view or in someone else’s words. For example, I am afraid that I am not smart enough so 
I might write down “Mairead is not smart enough to be doing a PhD”. Do you understand 
what I am asking you to do? Participant answers. OK, now in case you have any worries 
at this stage, I want to assure you that as soon as this experiment is over, I will be 
dumping that page in front of you. So you have no need to worry about anything you 
write on it, is that ok?  
 
Participant answers. 
 
OK, so when you’re ready go ahead and write it down there. Participant writes the 
sentence down. Ok thank you for doing that. I appreciate that it is probably difficult for 
you to do. Now for the next part I will call out the sentence and I want you to repeat it. 
Now remember, if you want to stop at any stage, you are completely free to do so. If you 
decide that you don’t want to say the sentence, then that’s OK. Just let me know and we 
will stop what we are doing and move onto the next stage of the experiment. Is that ok 
with you? Do you have any questions at this point? Ok let’s begin.  
 
Experimenter says the sentence aloud. 
 
Participant repeats the sentence aloud. 
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Stage 3: Interventions/Exercise. Similar to the previous studies, two of the three 
conditions (self as context and mindfulness) involved a brief therapeutic strategy. Indeed, the 
self as context intervention was largely identical to that employed in Experiments 2-5 (the 
only changes involved minor modifications in order to co-ordinate better with the new 
distress induction procedure). The mindfulness intervention was an entirely new addition to 
the research programme, but was similar in format to self as context. In contrast, the self-
focus condition was employed as an experimental control. 
Self as context. The self as context intervention was largely identical to that employed 
in Experiments 2-5 (see pp. 70-71).  
Mindfulness. The mindfulness intervention comprised a modified version of a very 
standard technique employed in mindfulness-based therapies, known as the Body Scan which 
is explicitly designed to promote awareness of bodily sensations. Participants in this 
condition were presented with the following instructions: 
I understand that the previous self-criticism may have generated some unpleasant 
thoughts and feelings for you. The aim of the next part of the experiment is to teach you a 
coping strategy to deal with any negative sensations that might have risen during the last 
part of the experiment.  
 
Try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. When you’re ready I want you to 
close your eyes and listen to my voice. If you find your mind wandering, just gently come 
back to the sound of my voice. 
 
When very painful thoughts come to mind they are often accompanied by unpleasant 
sensations. For example, your chest might tighten or you might feel tense. This package 
of painful thoughts and unpleasant sensations often feels like it’s too much to deal with. 
And when we have that very thought “this is just too much”, our level of discomfort goes 
even higher. Then we feel like we are in a position where we really don’t know what to 
do (pause). Powerful feelings such as anxiety or sadness can often be expressed as effects 
in the body. For example, tightness in the chest may signal the presence of strong feelings 
like in the last part of the experiment. As a result, some believe that learning about the 
body will be helpful in learning how better to deal with feelings and emotions. 
 
For the next part of the experiment, try to focus your attention on your breath and try to 
feel the rising and falling of our belly with each in-breath and out-breath you take. Take a 
few moments to feel your body as a whole, from head to toe. For example, try to feel the 
sensation of your back touching the chair or the feeling of your feet on the ground. For 
now, try to bring your attention to the toes of your left foot. As you direct your attention 
to them, see if you can direct, or channel, your breathing to them as well, so that it feels 
as if you are breathing into your toes and out from your toes. It may take a while for you 
to get the hang of this. It may help to just imagine your breath travelling down the body 
from your nose into the lungs and then continuing through the abdomen and down the left 
leg all the way to the toes…. And then back again and out through your nose. Allow 
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yourself to feel any and all sensations from your toes, perhaps distinguishing between 
them and watching the flux of sensations in this region. If you don’t feel anything at the 
moment, that is fine too. Just allow yourself to feel “not feeling anything”. When you are 
ready to leave the toes and move on, take a deeper, more intentional breath in all the way 
down to the toes and on the out-breath, allow them to dissolve in your mind’s eye. Stay 
with your breathing for a few breaths and then move on in turn to the sole of your 
foot…the heel....the top of our foot…..and then the ankle….all the time continuing to 
breathe into and out of the foot, continuing to breathe into and out from each region as 
you observe the sensations that you are experiencing and then letting go of it and moving 
on. If your attention wanders off, it is important that you bring your mind back to the 
breath and to the region you are focusing on. 
 
In this way continue to move slowly up your left leg and through the rest of your body as 
you maintain the focus on your breath and on the feeling of the particular regions as you 
come to them, breathe with them and let go of them. Go to the stomach…all the way up 
to the shoulders…down to your elbows…and all the way to your fingertips. In the same 
way, start at the base of your neck…move up to your chin…your nose… and all the way 
to your forehead. When you have reached the top of your head, let me know. However, as 
you move through the body try to remember the basic instructions of this exercise; that is 
to bring awareness to a particular region of the body, to hold it in awareness for a short 
time and finally to release and “let go” of that region before moving your attention to the 
next region. 
 
Self-focus. The self-focus exercise acted as a control condition. Because elements of 
both the self as context and mindfulness interventions required participants to focus on 
aspects of themselves and specifically to focus on thoughts (self as context) or the body 
(mindfulness), the self-focus condition was designed to determine whether any effects 
recorded for the interventions could be attributed to the act of self-focusing alone and not 
specifically to focusing on thoughts or physical sensations. In other words, would the self-
focus condition without any intervention yield similar outcomes to the two other 
interventions?  
The self-focus condition primarily involved presenting participants with a series of 
eight questions about themselves (referred to as the Demographic Questionnaire, DQ). 
Participant responses to each question were spoken aloud to the Experimenter, while being 
audio-taped and participants then listened to their own voice as the audio-recording was 
replayed. These participants were instructed as follows: 
Ok, before we go onto the next part of the experiment I was hoping you wouldn’t mind if 
I recorded your demographic information. I have a list of questions here that I’d like you 
to answer into this voice recorder.  
 
Participants were handed the DQ and spoke each of the eight answers aloud. 
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Thank you. Now I am going to play back the recording of your answers and I would like 
you to focus as much as possible on the sound of your own voice and hearing your own 
information.  
 
Participants listen to the recording. 
 
 
Results 
AAQ Data 
Participants in the three conditions did not differ significantly on pre-experimental 
avoidance as measured by the AAQ (see Table 11). The means were modest (i.e. 18.8-20.8) 
for all three conditions (i.e. just above the normal range of 18). However, a one-way ANOVA 
revealed a non-significant difference across conditions (p = .74). 
 
Table 11   
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Value by Condition on the AAQ in Experiment 6 
 
Self as Context 
M (SD) 
Mindfulness 
M (SD) 
Self-Focus 
M (SD) p value 
AAQ 20.8 (6.86) 
20.4 
(6.24) 
18.8 
(4.76) .74 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p values = Statistical Significance 
 
 
 
Distress Ratings 
Once again, the data from the three types of distress ratings were analysed separately 
and are presented below.  
Discomfort. All conditions recorded similarly low levels of discomfort (< 14/100) at 
baseline, which increased strongly after the distress induction procedure (mindfulness: 
+29.68; self as context: +17.87; self-focus: +23.14; see Figure 21). Thereafter, all conditions 
showed a decrease in discomfort at post-intervention, but this was largest in the mindfulness 
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condition (-23.99). In contrast, the decrease was moderate in self as context (-12.1) and small 
in self-focus (-6.76). 
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Figure 21. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 6. 
 
A mixed between within 3x3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time 
[Wilks Lambda = .37, F (2, 26) = 21.83, p = .00, partial eta squared = .63] that accounted for 
a large amount of the variance (63%), but not for condition [F (2, 27) = .77, p = .47, partial 
eta squared = .05]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks Lambda = .83, F (4, 
52) = 1.31, p = .33, partial eta squared = .09]. Two dependent t-tests showed a significant 
increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .000) and a significant decrease 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .001).  
Anxiety. All three conditions recorded similarly low anxiety (< 19/100) at baseline, 
which increased strongly at post-induction (mindfulness: +18.16; self as context: +16.25; 
self-focus: +17.29; see Figure 22). At post-intervention, mindfulness and self as context 
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resulted in large decreases in anxiety (mindfulness: -15.79; self as context: -16.18), while 
there was virtually no change recorded in the self-focus condition (-.72). 
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Figure 22. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 6. 
  
A mixed between within 3x3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time 
[Wilks Lambda = .53, F (2, 26) = 11.45, p = .000, partial eta squared = .47] that accounted for 
a substantial amount of the variance (47%), but not for condition [F (2, 27) = .53, p = .59, 
partial eta squared = .04]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks Lambda 
= .84, F (4, 52) = 1.17, p = .34, partial eta squared = .08]. Two dependent t-tests showed a 
significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p = .00) and a significant 
reduction from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .009).  
Stress. All conditions recorded similarly moderate stress (<29/100) at baseline which 
increased modestly at post-induction (mindfulness: +7.67; self as context: +7.87; self-focus: 
+9.08; see Figure 23). Thereafter, all conditions showed a decrease in stress at post-
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intervention, but this was much larger in the mindfulness (-16.68) and self as context (-13.86) 
conditions, relative to self-focus (-2.75). 
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Figure 23. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 6. 
 
A mixed between within 3x3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time 
[Wilks Lambda = .73, F (2, 26) = 4.81, p = .02, partial eta squared = .27] that accounted for a 
medium amount of the variance (27%), but not for condition [F (2, 27) = .63, p = .54, partial 
eta squared = .04]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks Lambda = .84, F (4, 
52) = 1.19, p = .33, partial eta squared = .084]. Two dependent t-tests showed a significant 
increase in stress from baseline to post-induction (p = .02) and a significant reduction from 
post-induction to post-intervention (p = .005).  
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RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the five reactions to the distress induction at Stages 4 and 
7 are presented separately below. Table 12 presents the data from each of the five reactions 
by time point and condition.  
 
 
Table 12 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 6 
Reactions Questionnaire Time 
Self  as 
Context 
M (SD) 
 
Mindfulness 
M (SD) 
 
Self-focus 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of willingness 
to engage with your thoughts of the 
sentence 
Post-
induction 
76.3 
(23.86) 
59.83 
(21.64 
62.6 
(11.17) 
Post-
intervention 
77.6 
(24.94) 
48.55 
(27.15) 
61.5 
(22.85) 
Please rate how believable the 
sentence was to you 
Post-
induction 
74.7 
(17.05) 
66.8 
(23.74) 
75.6 
(18.45) 
Post-
intervention 
66.9 
(23) 
52.5 
(27.90) 
71 
(20.74) 
Please rate how vivid your thoughts 
and images were of the sentence 
Post-
induction 
60.1 
(36.53) 
59.9 
(13.17) 
63.5 
(22.3) 
Post-
intervention 
60.4 
(23.44) 
39.7 
(19.36) 
61.7 
(24.63) 
Please rate how much guilt you feel 
right now 
Post-
induction 
33.83 
(26.41) 
39.4 
(25.08) 
28.6 
(32.89) 
Post-
intervention 
25.6 
(25.72) 
21.55 
(19.77) 
33.9 
(31.21) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
Post-
induction 
26.83 
(20.31) 
36.9 
(16.43) 
25.6 
(17.71) 
Post-
intervention 
32.8 
(26.36) 
28.33 
(24.39) 
22.9 
(22.51) 
 
At post-induction, believability, vividness and guilt were similar for all three 
conditions. In contrast, self as context was higher than mindfulness and self focus in 
willingness, while mindfulness was higher in distraction than the other two conditions. A 
series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that none of these differences were significant (all 
ps > .11). At post-intervention willingness decreased in mindfulness, while self-focus and self 
as context showed little change. Believability decreased in all three conditions, with the 
biggest decrease in mindfulness. Vividness remained stable for self as context and self-focus 
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while there was a strong decrease for mindfulness. Distraction decreased for mindfulness and 
self-focus but increased for self as context. Guilt decreased in self as context and mindfulness 
(although it was moderately bigger in the latter), but increased marginally in self-focus. A 
series of a 2x2 mixed between within ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect for 
condition in willingness [F (2, 27) = 4.43, p = .022, partial eta squared = .25] that represented 
a medium amount of the variance (25%). In addition, for guilt, there was a significant effect 
for time [Wilks Lambda = .82, F (1, 27) = 5.77, p = .024, partial eta squared = .18] that also 
represented a medium amount of the variance (18%) and the interaction [Wilks Lambda = .71, 
F (2, 27) = 5.42, p = .011, partial eta squared = .29] that accounted for a medium amount of 
the variance (29%) (all other ps > .08).   
 
Results Summary 
The data from the screening measures indicated that the three conditions did not differ 
pre-experimentally on propensities towards avoidance. At baseline, all conditions were low in 
discomfort, anxiety and stress and these increased for all conditions at post-induction. In 
general all conditions reduced distress at post-intervention. Results from the RQ indicated 
some differences among conditions. Most notably, mindfulness resulted in the largest 
decrease in willingness, believability, vividness, guilt and distraction, while self-focus 
resulted in the least change across all five questions. 
 
Discussion 
The results demonstrated a significant increase in all three distress ratings across all 
conditions, thus suggesting that the new experimental task is a viable means of inducing 
distress in this non-clinical sample. Furthermore, the results showed little differences among 
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conditions in their utility to reduce this distress. However, the mindfulness technique did 
show some superiority in terms of reducing vividness, believability and distraction. 
The parity between, and minor superiority of mindfulness and self as context raised 
further questions about why the outcomes were as recorded. At the very least, they suggested 
that there is perhaps more to mindfulness than awareness. For example, while the Body Scan 
explicitly encourages participants to focus on physical sensations, perhaps this initial focus 
readily facilitates subsequent or parallel awareness of psychological content. In short, maybe 
awareness of your psychological content in turn promotes cognitive distance between you 
and this content (similar to self as context). Experiment 7 attempted to address this issue by 
parsing out a physical vs. psychological or verbal focus within mindfulness techniques. 
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Experiment 7 
Comparing Physical vs. Verbal Mindfulness Techniques 
 
The MBSR programme developed by Kabat-Zinn (2004) specifically employs techniques to 
foster acceptance and awareness of physical sensations and presumably to permit 
generalisation to verbal content. The latter has been targeted more directly by cognitive 
researchers such as in Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT, Segal, Williams & 
Teasdale, 2002). That is, this approach has incorporated mindfulness techniques in order to 
change an individual’s relationship to his/her thoughts, such that the focus is on noticing the 
thought and letting it go, as opposed to focusing on its specific content. In this way, 
attachment to (and rumination over) certain thoughts is reduced and a more experiential sense 
of thinking and behaving is encouraged. 
In general, the term mindfulness operates as an umbrella term within therapeutic 
traditions for any technique that promotes awareness and presumed acceptance of a present 
moment experience. While awareness of physical sensation and of thoughts are assumed to 
share the same underlying processes (awareness and acceptance), the object of an 
individual’s focus is different. However, no research to date has tried to decipher which 
object of awareness (physical or verbal) is more beneficial. The goal of Experiment 7 was to 
systematically compare the utility of a physical vs. verbal mindfulness technique in a non-
clinical sample presented with experimentally induced distress induction.  
 
. 
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty volunteers (9 males and 21 females) participated in Experiment 7. All were 
aged between 17 and 31 years old and were undergraduates at NUIM. The same exclusion 
criteria as the previous experiment applied (4 participants were excluded on this basis). This 
yielded a final sample of 26 participants (5 males and 21 females, mean age = 24 years, 7 
months) assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: physical mindfulness (N = 
13) and verbal mindfulness (N = 13).  
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiment 6.  
 
Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to previous experiments applied to here and were 
addressed in a similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues 
or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages. These were identical to Experiment 6 
(see Figure 20, p.119) and involved: pre-experimental measures (Stage 1); baseline VAS 
ratings (Stage 2); the distress induction procedure (Stage 3); post-induction VAS ratings and 
the RQ (Stage 4); one of two mindfulness interventions (Stage 5); a post-intervention distress 
induction procedure (Stage 6); and post-intervention VAS ratings and the RQ (Stage 7). 
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Stage 5: Mindfulness Interventions. Stage 5 systematically compared a physical 
mindfulness intervention with a verbal mindfulness intervention in order to determine 
whether one would yield a superior outcome in the current context. 
Physical mindfulness. The physical mindfulness intervention was explicitly designed 
to promote awareness of bodily sensations. Hence, the Body Scan from Experiment 6 was 
employed again (although what was then referred to as ‘mindfulness’ is now more 
specifically denoted as ‘physical mindfulness’). Participants in the physical mindfulness 
condition received identical instructions to the mindfulness condition from Experiment 6 (see 
pp. 121-122). 
Verbal mindfulness. Participants in this condition were presented with a modified 
version of a mindfulness technique commonly used in MBCT. The verbal mindfulness 
intervention was explicitly designed to promote awareness of thoughts and memories. 
Participants in this condition were instructed as follows:    
For this part of the experiment we are going to do an exercise to help you get in touch 
with the thoughts going through your head in this very instance. If you can, try to relax 
yourself in the chair. When you're ready, close your eyes and listen to the sound of my 
voice. If you feel your mind wandering, gently come back to the sound of my voice. 
Keeping your eyes closed, I want you to become aware of the thoughts and images that 
are passing through your mind at this very moment. If you can, I want you to focus your 
attention on one particular thought (pause). Isolate that thought in your mind (pause). 
Now just watch as the thought pops into your mind and just as importantly, watch the 
thought as it leaves your mind. Once you acknowledge that you have had the thought, it 
is important that you try to let go of this thought again. 
 
Try as much as you can to just watch the thought as it comes in and leaves, without 
feeling that you have to follow it. Try to view your thought as a mental event that is 
always changing, rather than as a fact that has no room to change. It may be the case that 
this thought usually occurs for you with other feelings or sensations and as a result it is 
tempting to think of it as being true. But it is still up to you to decide whether it is true 
and how you want to deal with it. 
 
Now, do the exact same thing with another thought you are having at this very moment. 
Try as much as you can to isolate the thought in your mind (pause). Watch the thought as 
it comes into your mind, notice it for a moment or two and then let it go again. Try this 
with all of your thoughts. As one thought comes up, simply observe it and let it go again. 
Do the same with the next thought. By becoming aware, over and over again, of the 
thoughts and images that pass through our minds and letting go of them as we return our 
attention to the moment, it is possible to get some distance and perspective on them. This 
can allow us to see that there may be other ways to think about situations, freeing us from 
the tyranny of the old thought patterns that automatically “pop” into “mind”. 
 
You could allow yourself to think any and all of your thoughts at this moment, perhaps 
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distinguishing between them and watching them continuously coming and going as they 
pass through your mind. The important thing to remember is not to hang onto any one 
thought at any time. Instead, as soon as the thought is acknowledged and observed, try to 
let it go again with as little judgement as possible. Even a thought like “this is a foolish 
waste of time” should not be judged, but instead watched as it comes into your mind and 
passes away again. 
   
 
Results 
In line with the previous experiments, three investigations were central to Experiment 
7. The first examined the effect of the distress induction procedure on discomfort, anxiety and 
stress. The second investigated the difference between the physical and verbal mindfulness 
interventions in terms of reductions in the dependent measures. The third explored potential 
differences between the conditions with regard to participants’ reactions to the distress 
induction procedure.  
 
AAQ Data 
The pre-experimental means for avoidance on the AAQ are presented in Table 13. 
The means were moderate (i.e. 15.62-16.08) for both conditions, thus within the normal range 
(i.e. < 18). An independent t-test confirmed that the conditions did not differ significantly in 
this regard (p = .1).  
 
Table 13 
 Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Value by Condition on the AAQ in Experiment 7 
 
Physical 
M (SD) 
Verbal 
M (SD) p value 
AAQ 15.62 (9.65) 
16.08 
(6. 79) .1 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p value = Statistical Significance 
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Distress Ratings 
The mean VAS ratings by condition recorded at baseline, post-induction and post-
intervention are presented below.  
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded similarly low discomfort (< 19/100) at baseline 
(see Figure 24) and showed moderate increases in discomfort after the distress induction 
(physical: +13.64 and verbal: +12.53). After exposure to the interventions, the physical 
condition reduced discomfort considerably (-20.42), while the verbal condition showed a 
more modest decrease (-7.29).  
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Figure 24. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 7. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .56, F (2, 23) = 9.01, p = .001, partial eta squared = .44] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (44%), but not for condition [F (1, 24) 
=1.25 p = .28, partial eta squared = .05]. The interaction effect was also non-significant 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .92, F (2, 23) = .99, p = .39, partial eta squared = .08]. Two dependent t-
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tests showed a significant increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .000) 
and a significant decrease from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .009). 
Anxiety. Both conditions recorded similarly low anxiety (< 14/100) at baseline, 
which increased similarly and modestly at post-induction (physical: +12.04 and verbal: 13.04; 
see Figure 25). Thereafter, both interventions appeared to result in modest decreases in 
anxiety (physical: -14.14 and verbal: -9.55). 
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Figure 25. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 7. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .55, F (2, 23) = 9.5, p = .001, partial eta squared = .45] that accounted 
for a substantial amount of the variance (45%), but not for condition [F (1, 24) = .51, p = .48, 
partial eta squared = .02]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .98, F (2, 23) = .29, p = .89, partial eta squared = .06]. Two dependent t-tests showed a 
significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p = .000) and a significant 
decrease from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .009). 
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Stress. Both conditions recorded similarly moderate levels of stress (< 28/100) at 
baseline, which increased only marginally after the distress induction (physical: +5.01 and 
verbal: +3.76; see Figure 26). After the intervention, the physical condition recorded a 
considerable reduction in stress (-21.74), while the verbal condition showed a more modest 
decrease (-11.64). 
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Figure 26. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 7. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .59, F (2, 23) = 8.13, p = .002, partial eta squared = .45] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (45%), but not for condition [F (1, 24) 
= .25, p = .65, partial eta squared = .01]. The interaction effect was also non-significant 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .94, F (2, 23) = .79, p = .47, partial eta squared = .06]. Two dependent t-
tests showed that the increase from baseline to post-induction was not significant (p = .12), 
while the decrease from post-induction to post-intervention was (p = .00). 
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RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the five reactions to the distress induction at Stages 4 and 
7 are presented separately below. Table 14 presents the data from each of the five reactions 
by time point and by condition.  
 
Table 14 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 7. 
Reactions Questionnaire Time Physical M (SD) 
Verbal 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the sentence 
Post-induction 56.02 (32.92) 
62.21 
(27.58) 
Post-
intervention 
52.5 
(38.59) 
63.17 
(31.49) 
Please rate how believable the 
sentence was to you 
Post-induction 60.42 (22.19) 
44.47 
(35.27) 
Post-
intervention 
 
36.09 
(26.09) 
34.61 
(32.43) 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images are of the 
sentence 
Post-induction 57.83 (29.36) 
46.59 
(27.27) 
Post-
intervention 
 
27.68 
(26.23) 
41.82 
(27.75) 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
Post-induction 43.38 (37.22) 
32.26 
(27.04) 
Post-
intervention 
14.86 
(21.3) 
28.36 
(31.17) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
Post-induction 24.73 (25.02) 
45.96 
(28.6) 
Post-
intervention 
 
12.31 
(14.43) 
23.46 
(24.85) 
 
 
At post-induction, participants in the physical condition were higher on all five of the 
reactions ratings. A series of independent t-tests revealed that this difference was not 
significant for willingness, believability, vividness or guilt (all ps > .19), but did approach 
significance for distraction (p = .06). At post-intervention both conditions decreased 
believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. Willingness decreased for physical mindfulness 
and increased for verbal mindfulness. A series of 2x2 mixed between ANOVAs revealed that 
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the effects for time was significant for believability [Wilks’ Lambda = .57, F (1, 23) = 17.1, p 
= .00, partial eta squared = .43] and accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (43%), 
for vividness [Wilks’ Lambda = .69, F (1, 24) = 10.78, p = .003, partial eta squared = .31] 
and accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (31%), for guilt [Wilks’ Lambda = .77, 
F (1, 24) = 7.1, p = .014, partial eta squared = .23] and accounted for a medium amount of the 
variance (23%), and for distraction [Wilks’ Lambda = .56, F (1, 24) = 18.57, p = .000, partial 
eta squared = .44] that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (44%). The 
interaction effect was significant for vividness [Wilks’ Lambda = .81, F (1, 24) = 5.7, p = .03, 
partial eta squared = .19] and represented 19% of the variance, and guilt [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .85, F (1, 24) = 4.1, p = .05, partial eta squared = .15] which accounted for 15% of the 
variance, (all other ps > .09). 
 
 
 
Results Summary 
 
Similar to previous experiments, the conditions did not differ pre-experimentally on 
propensities towards avoidance. At baseline, both conditions scored similar on discomfort, 
anxiety and stress; however there was a significant increase on discomfort and anxiety for 
both conditions at post-induction. While stress increased for both conditions at this time point, 
this was not significant. There was a significant reduction in discomfort, anxiety and stress 
for both conditions at post-intervention. Results from the RQ demonstrated that both 
conditions decreased believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. Willingness decreased for 
physical mindfulness and increased for verbal mindfulness. 
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether the object of focus in 
mindfulness techniques influenced changes in distress. Specifically, we asked if awareness of 
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physical sensations was more or less beneficial than awareness of thoughts. Of course, this 
separation is rarely made in contemporary mindfulness therapies which generally combine 
both types of techniques with the assumption of a common outcome. However, Experiment 7 
demonstrated that this common outcome may be questionable as the results indicated better 
outcomes (although not always significant) for physical mindfulness relative to verbal 
mindfulness.  
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Experiment 8 
An Empirical Investigation of the Sequence of Mindfulness Components 
 
While the physical and verbal mindfulness interventions from Experiment 7 appeared to be 
equally effective at reducing subjective distress, we considered the possibility that combining 
both elements would enhance the effects. As a result, in Experiment 8, we turned our 
attention to an investigation of the sequencing of mindfulness exercises.  We employed the 
same design as before to explore the potential benefits of altering the sequence of the two 
previous mindfulness techniques. Specifically, the current study investigated whether a 
physical mindfulness technique followed by a verbal mindfulness technique (i.e. physical-
verbal) would be more effective in decreasing distress than a sequence in which these two 
interventions were reversed (i.e. verbal-physical). We hypothesised that the sequence which 
presented the physical mindfulness exercise followed by the verbal mindfulness exercise 
would show the greatest reductions in distress this is the format employed in most 
mindfulness-based therapeutic packages (e.g. MBSR). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty eight volunteers (10 males and 18 females) participated in Experiment 8. All 
were aged between 20 and 34 years old and were undergraduates at NUIM. The same 
exclusion criteria as the previous experiment applied (4 participants were excluded on this 
basis). This yielded a final sample of 24 participants (7 males and 17 female, mean age = 30 
years, 4 months) assigned randomly across two experimental conditions: physical-verbal 
mindfulness (N = 12) and verbal-physical mindfulness (N = 12). Please note that the hyphens 
indicate the sequencing of the two intervention components.  
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Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiment 7. 
 
Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to previous experiments applied here and were addressed 
in a similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues or reported 
any adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages. These were identical to Experiment 6 
(see Figure 20, see p.119) and involved: pre-experimental measures (Stage 1); baseline VAS 
ratings (Stage 2); the distress induction procedure (Stage 3); post-induction VAS ratings and 
the RQ (Stage 4); one of two mindfulness interventions (Stage 5); the post-intervention 
distress induction procedure (Stage 6); and post-intervention VAS ratings and the RQ (Stage 
7). 
Stage 5: Mindfulness Interventions. Stage 5 involved the same two mindfulness 
intervention components (physical and verbal) as Experiment 7. The two conditions were 
now distinguishable only on the basis of the sequencing of these components. That is, half of 
the participants were exposed to physical mindfulness followed by verbal mindfulness 
(physical-verbal), while this sequence was reversed for the other half (i.e. verbal-physical). 
Both the physical and verbal interventions were identical to those used in Experiment 7 (see 
pp. 121-122 and pp. 132-133 respectively).   
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Results 
In line with previous studies, three investigations were central to Experiment 8. The 
first examined the effect of the distress induction procedure on discomfort, anxiety and stress. 
The second investigated whether the sequence of mindfulness components played a role in 
reductions in the dependent measures. The third explored potential differences between 
conditions with regard to participants’ reactions to the distress induction procedure.  
 
AAQ Data 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance are presented in Table 15. The AAQ 
means were moderate (i.e. 14-18.1) for both conditions and within the normal range (i.e. < 
18). An independent t-test confirmed that the conditions did not differ significantly in this 
regard (p = .09). 
 
Table 15 
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Value by Condition on the AAQ in Experiment 8 
 
Physical- 
Verbal 
M (SD) 
Verbal- 
Physical 
M (SD) 
p value 
AAQ 18.1 (7.04) 
14 
(3.19) .09 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p value = Statistical Significance 
 
 
Distress Ratings 
Once again, the mean VAS ratings by condition at baseline, post-induction and post-
intervention are presented below.  
 
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded very low discomfort (< 4/100) at baseline (see 
Figure 27) and showed a considerable increase after the distress induction (physical-verbal: 
+16.77; verbal-physical: +14.33). Thereafter, the physical-verbal condition reduced 
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discomfort considerably (-13.44), while verbal-physical showed only a marginal decrease (-
5.18).  
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Figure 27. Mean discomfort ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 8. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .41, F (2, 21) = 15.43, p = .000, partial eta squared = .6] 
that accounted for a large amount of the variance (60%), but not for condition [F (1, 22) = .46 
p = .51, partial eta squared = .02]. The interaction effect was also significant [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .72, F (2, 21) = 4.14, p = .031, partial eta squared = .28] that accounted for a medium 
amount of the variance (28%). Two dependent t-tests showed a significant increase in 
discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .000) and a significant decrease from post-
induction to post-intervention (p = .000). 
Anxiety. Both conditions recorded very low anxiety (< 4/100) at baseline and 
increased similarly at post-induction (physical-verbal: +13.65; verbal-physical: +14.4; see 
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Figure 28). Thereafter, the interventions resulted in a considerable decrease in anxiety for 
physical-verbal mindfulness (-11.41) and a smaller decrease for verbal-physical (-5.1). 
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Figure 28. Mean anxiety ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 8. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .39, F (2, 21) = 5.12, p = .000, partial eta squared = .61] 
that accounted for a large amount of the variance (61%), but not for condition [F (1, 22) = 
1.56, p = .23, partial eta squared = .07]. The interaction effect was also significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .67, F (2, 21) = 5.12, p = .015, partial eta squared = .33] and represented a medium 
amount (33%) of the variance. Two dependent t-tests showed a significant increase in anxiety 
from baseline to post-induction (p = .000) and a significant decrease from post-induction to 
post-intervention (p = .000). 
Stress. Both conditions recorded very low stress (< 4/100) at baseline, which 
increased considerably after the distress induction (physical-verbal: +11.75; verbal-physical: 
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+13.23; see Figure 29). After the intervention, both conditions decreased stress moderately 
(physical-verbal: - 8.91; verbal-physical: - 4.11). 
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Figure 29. Mean stress ratings for each condition across time in Experiment 8. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilks’ Lambda = .39, F (2, 21) = 16.18, p = .000, partial eta squared = .61] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (61%), but not for condition [F (1, 22) 
= 1.97, p = .17, partial eta squared = .08]. The interaction effect was also significant [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .69, F (2, 21) = 4.78, p = .019, partial eta squared = .31] and accounted for a 
medium amount of the variance (31%). Two dependent t-tests showed a significant increase 
in stress from baseline to post-induction (p = .000) and a significant decrease from post-
induction to post-intervention (p = .003). 
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RQ Results 
The mean ratings on each of the five reactions to the distress induction at Stages 4 and 
7 are presented separately below. Table 16 presents the data from each of the five reactions 
by time point and by condition.  
 
Table 16 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 8 
Reactions Questionnaire Time 
Physical- 
Verbal 
M (SD) 
Verbal- 
Physical 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the sentence 
Post-induction 37.81 (32.78) 
29.89 
(25.34) 
Post-
intervention 
32.08 
(29.2) 
23.12 
(26.58) 
Please rate how believable the 
sentence was to you 
Post-induction 34.17 (26.28) 
36.77 
(27.02) 
Post-
intervention 
 
26.04 
(25.43) 
23.44 
(28.86) 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images are of the 
sentence 
Post-induction 36.09 (25.91) 
29.69 
(35.17) 
Post-
intervention 
 
21.72 
(29.47) 
18.73 
(25.32) 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
Post-induction 29.89 (27.82) 
31.82 
(30.25) 
Post-
intervention 
23.38 
(29.73) 
25.68 
(26.28) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
Post-induction 42.18 (29.88) 
45.42 
(29.37) 
Post-
intervention 
 
40 
(39.72) 
49.01 
(34.98) 
 
 
At post-induction, participants in the physical-verbal condition were higher on their 
ratings of willingness, vividness and distraction, while the verbal-physical condition was 
higher on believability and guilt. However, a series of independent t-tests confirmed that 
these differences were not significant (all ps > .56). At post-intervention both conditions 
decreased willingness, believability, vividness and guilt. The physical-verbal condition 
decreased distraction while the verbal-physical increased. A series of 2x2 mixed between 
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ANOVAs revealed that time was significant for believability [Wilks’ Lambda = .62, F (1, 22) 
= 10.28, p = .004, partial eta squared = .32] which accounted for a medium amount of the 
variance (32%) and vividness [Wilks’ Lambda = .74, F (1, 22) = .74, p = .01, partial eta 
squared = .26] which also accounted for a medium amount of the variance, only (all other 
ps > .13). 
  
Results Summary 
 
In line with previous experiments, the conditions did not differ pre-experimentally on 
propensities towards avoidance. At baseline, both conditions were low on discomfort, anxiety 
and stress and all increased significantly at post-induction. Furthermore, the results 
demonstrated that the physical-verbal condition was the more effective in terms of distress 
reduction at post-intervention. Furthermore, both conditions decreased willingness, 
believability, vividness and guilt. The physical-verbal condition decreased distraction while 
the verbal-physical increased. 
 
Discussion 
Experiments 6 to 8 explored an alternative distress induction procedure to 
Experiments 1-5. Although the findings from all five initial studies showed that some version 
of Rachman et al.’s (1996) procedure reliably increased discomfort, anxiety and stress, the 
findings from Experiments 2-5 also suggested that the methodology did not lend itself well to 
incorporating several ACT-based brief analogue interventions. Indeed, it was difficult to 
determine whether this lack of effects pertained to the procedure itself or to the specific 
interventions selected.  
Experiments 6-8 attempted to explore these issues using an alternative distress 
induction procedure. We also used this experimental change to investigate the potential 
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impact of mindfulness techniques which have attracted strong interest from ACT clinicians. 
Specifically, we investigated potential differences between physical and verbal mindfulness 
components in terms of the actual focus of the techniques.  
Across all three studies, the outcomes were generally more positive than the previous 
experiments and in all cases the mindfulness components did reduce discomfort, anxiety and 
stress. Furthermore, the data also indicated specifically that the physical mindfulness 
technique showed some superiority over verbal mindfulness. Irrespective of these observed 
differences between ACT processes and mindfulness, the current findings showed that the 
revised procedure did integrate more effectively with the brief analogue components. Indeed, 
the fact that the self as context intervention in Experiment 6 was indecipherably as effective 
as mindfulness suggests that the previous lack of effects likely related to the procedure and 
not specifically to the interventions. This situation then begged the obvious question about 
the extent to which brief analogue ACT interventions would perform in a different distress 
induction procedure. This was a key concern in the two remaining experiments. Furthermore, 
we began to explore whether parsing out the basic processes in self as context components, as 
we had successfully done with the two mindfulness components, might generate more 
positive outcomes.  
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Chapter 5 
Experiments 9 & 10 
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Experiments 9 & 10 
Investigating Hierarchical vs. Distinction Relations in 
Self-based ACT Techniques 
 
The integration of RFT and ACT is central to the CBS reticulated model and the programme 
of research it promotes and relies upon. In the General Introduction, we argued that the third 
generation of RFT research contained the beginnings of the integration of RFT and ACT 
through componential analyses and the application of RFT protocols to clinical samples (e.g. 
Keogh, 2008; Villatte et al., 2008). We also proposed that we are on the cusp of a fourth 
generation of RFT research that attempts to define concepts that are central to ACT in RFT 
terms. Experiments 9 and 10 are derived from this latter research endeavour and specifically 
explored ways in which RFT’s perspective-taking and other relations may underpin ACT’s 
self as context techniques. 
Only one published study has investigated the way in which deictic relations may be 
altered using ACT-based techniques, such as defusion and self as context (i.e. Luciano et al., 
2011). In their ‘defusion I’ condition, these researchers attempted to facilitate defusion or 
separation between the self and content with adolescents at high or low risk of conduct 
difficulties. For example, participants in the defusion I intervention were instructed to “Just 
contemplate your thought as if you were contemplating a painting”. With a similar but naïve 
sample, their ‘defusion II’ condition employed a more extensive protocol of ACT-based 
techniques that specifically attempted to establish hierarchical relations between the self and 
the content (e.g. “Imagine yourself so big as to have room for all of the thoughts you have 
had today”). The findings indicated superiority on a range of measures of clinical 
improvement (including reductions in problem behaviour) for defusion II over defusion I. In 
short, it was more beneficial for the participants to learn to adopt a hierarchical perspective 
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with regard to their content, rather than a simply distinct perspective. These outcomes 
illustrated the potential conceptual and practical overlap between the deictic relations and self 
as context/defusion.  
Because both are middle level terms, it is very difficult in ACT to distinguish 
defusion from self as context, both conceptually and technically. For example, Luciano et 
al.’s (2011) defusion research protocols I and II could readily be described as containing self 
as context techniques and both place heavy emphasis on the deictic relations. More 
specifically however, one might describe their defusion I protocol as distinction deictics and 
their defusion II protocol as hierarchical deictics.  
The current research attempted to extend the original research by Luciano et al. (2011) 
and to explore further the potential role of the deictic relations in self as context techniques. 
Experiment 9 attempted to modify Luciano et al.’s (2011) interventions by specifically 
targeting distinction vs. hierarchical deictic relations. As before, we investigated the relative 
impact of these two manipulations on discomfort, anxiety and stress associated with the self-
criticism task used in the previous experiments.  
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Experiment 9 
An Empirical Investigation of Hierarchical vs. Distinction Relations in 
Self-based ACT Techniques 
 
The present study attempted to modify Luciano et al.’s (2011) interventions by specifically 
targeting distinction vs. hierarchical deictic relations. The term preferred for the brief 
protocols employed here is self as context rather than defusion in order to emphasise that the 
interventions in fact were heavily focused on the self. The following examples illustrate the 
difference between deictic distinction and deictic hierarchical relations. Consider the 
common ACT Leaves on a Stream exercise in which clients are instructed to: “Notice that 
you are here and your thoughts are there on a leaf floating down the stream”. The deictic 
relations of YOU and HERE-THERE are explicitly stated, but the distinction relation 
between you and your thoughts via the HERE-THERE relation is implicit (i.e. YOU are here 
is distinct from your thoughts there). Now consider an instruction from the Observer Exercise: 
“You are not just your body, your roles, your emotions, your thoughts. These things are the 
content of your life, while you are the arena, the context, the space in which they unfold”. 
Again, the deictic YOU is explicitly stated, but in this case the relation between you and your 
content is clearly hierarchical (i.e. you are the context in which your thoughts exist). 
The current study employed two brief self as context interventions with a non-clinical 
sample of undergraduates, asked to generate a negative self-criticism (i.e. the same distress 
induction procedure as Experiment 6-8). It is worth noting that we did not use the self as 
context intervention employed in Experiments 2-6. This is because we wanted to target 
specific relational frames in a similar way to Luciano et al (2011). A such, the interventions 
were abbreviations of those developed by Luciano et al., and one more explicitly emphasised 
the distinction between self and content, while the other emphasised a hierarchical relation 
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between these. Specifically, we investigated the relative impact of these two manipulations 
on discomfort, anxiety and stress associated with the self-criticism. We hypothesised that we 
would find similar results to Luciano et al. in that that the hierarchical self as context 
intervention would show superiority to the distinction self as context intervention. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four adults participated in Experiment 9. All were undergraduate or 
postgraduate students at NUIM. The same exclusion criteria as Experiment 8 were employed.  
This yielded a final sample of 36 participants (14 males and 22 females), aged between 18 
and 21 (M = 19.78 years). Participants were allocated randomly across two conditions, 
denoted as distinction self as context (N = 18) and hierarchical self as context (N = 18). 
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiment 8. 
 
Ethical Issues 
All ethical issues pertaining to the previous experiments applied here and were 
addressed in a similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues 
or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of seven stages. These were identical to Experiments 6-8 
(see Figure 20, p. 119), except that the two interventions were modifications of self as context 
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exercises used in Luciano et al. (2011) with a specific focus on hierarchical versus distinction 
relations. 
Stage 5: Interventions. The aim of the two self-based interventions (distinction self 
as context and hierarchical self as context) was to explore the comparative utility of each in 
reducing experimentally induced distress. Both interventions were brief adaptations of those 
reported by Luciano et al. (2011), in which defusion techniques assisted participants in 
identifying target thoughts and feelings and then shifting their perspective on these. The 
condition referred to by those researchers as defusion I manipulated the deictic relations 
primarily as distinction relations. In contrast, the condition referred to as defusion II 
manipulated the deictic relations as hierarchical relations. In their focus, both conditions 
appeared to encourage self as context, although each explicitly manipulated different 
relations. Hence, for current purposes, adaptations of these interventions are referred to as 
distinction self as context and hierarchical self as context.  
Distinction self as context. In this condition, participants were presented with an 
intervention similar to Luciano et al’s. (2011) defusion I. The deictic relations of I-YOU and 
HERE-THERE were explicitly targeted in order to facilitate the distinction between self and 
content. Participants were instructed as follows: 
For this part of the experiment, try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. 
When you’re ready, I want you to close your eyes and just listen to the sound of my voice. 
For now, focus your attention on your breath. Try to feel the rise and fall of your stomach 
with each in-breath and out-breath you take.  Now... just nod if you can notice your 
breathing. Inhale and exhale again and nod if you can notice that you are the one who is 
noticing your breathing. When you are ready, bring your attention to the thoughts going 
through your head in this very instance. Let the thoughts show up, whatever kind they are 
and let them go again. For example, you might be thinking of what you did yesterday. 
Try, if you can, to just notice that you are having this thought, observe it and then let it go 
again. 
 
Now, pick any one of these thoughts….any thought at all, good or bad will do. When you 
have one, try to imagine that you are taking this thought out of you and writing is down 
on an imaginary piece of paper in front of you. Imagine now that it's in front of you and 
just watch it…contemplate it as if you were contemplating a painting… just try to 
observe it.  
 
Now try to think of something that happened last week…notice what is coming into your 
mind. Ask yourself, who is having that memory? Now think of a word that is related to 
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the memory… and with this word, do the same thing again…imagine yourself taking the 
word and writing it down. Put it out in front of you and just observe it… contemplate it as 
if you were contemplating a painting. Remember that this is just a thought or just a 
memory…you do not need to do anything with it, just observe it.  Try to notice that you 
are here and the thought that you are contemplating is there, written in front of you. 
Again, just notice that it is you who is watching that thought.  
 
Now imagine how you would feel if you had nothing to eat all day. What feeling or 
sensation would you have? Now imagine that you can see that sensation or feeling of 
emptiness in your stomach. Imagine in your mind’s eye that you can take a picture of the 
emptiness in your stomach and put this picture out in front of you. Do as before, just 
notice this feeling out in front of you, just contemplate it like a painting and when you’re 
ready let it go again. 
 
Now try if you can to focus your attention on the negative thought you wrote down 
earlier in the experiment. Try to write down one word which describes how you feel 
when you have this thought. Maybe it is sadness…maybe it is anger… any feeling that 
comes to mind. Then when you are ready, open your eyes and write down that word on 
this piece of paper. Now put the word in the envelope and hand it to me. Closing your 
eyes again, focus your attention once more on that feeling that is in the 
envelope...imagine that you can take a picture of this feeling or emotion which is 
showing up for you and imagine placing the picture out in front of you. Now, look at this 
picture in front of you and notice who is looking at this feeling of (word that describes 
reaction).  
 
 
Hierarchical self as context. In this condition, participants were presented with an 
intervention similar to Luciano et al’s. (2011) defusion II. This intervention varied from the 
distinction self as context condition in that hierarchical relations were targeted to provide an 
even greater distance between self and content. Specifically, participants were instructed to 
see themselves as above their psychological content.  
Participants in this group were instructed as follows: 
For this part of the experiment, try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. 
When you’re ready, I want you to close your eyes and just listen to the sound of my voice. 
For now, focus your attention on your breath. Try to feel the rise and fall of your stomach 
with each in-breath and out-breath you take.  Now... just nod if you can notice your 
breathing. Inhale and exhale again and nod if you can notice that you are the one who is 
noticing your breathing. When you are ready, bring your attention to the thoughts going 
through your head in this very instance. Let the thoughts show up, whatever kind they are 
and let them go again. For example, you might be thinking of what you did yesterday. 
Try, if you can, to just notice that you are having this thought, observe it and then let it go 
again. 
 
Now, pick any one of these thoughts….any thought at all, good or bad will do. When you 
have one, try to imagine that you are taking this thought out of you and writing it down 
on an imaginary piece of paper in front of you. Imagine now that it's in front of you and 
just watch it…contemplate it as if you were contemplating a painting… just try to 
observe it. Nod if you can realize that it is you who is contemplating this thought? Can 
you realize that it is you who is watching this thought? 
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Now try to think of something that happened last week…notice what is coming into your 
mind. Ask yourself, who is having that memory? Now think of a word that is related to 
the memory… and with this word, do the same thing again…imagine yourself taking the 
word and writing it down. Put it out in front of you and just observe it… contemplate it as 
if you were contemplating a painting. Remember that this is just a thought or just a 
memory…you do not need to do anything with it, just observe it.  Try to notice that you 
are here and the thought that you are contemplating is there, written in front of you. 
Again, just notice that it is you who is watching that thought. Now, try to imagine 
yourself so big that you can have room for all the thoughts that you have had today, for 
all the sensations, feelings and memories. Now, try to imagine yourself as being the 
captain of a boat and your thoughts and feelings as being the passengers. Again, imagine 
yourself so big that you have room for all of these thoughts and feelings. Imagine that 
your thoughts and feelings are like moles or freckles on your body. We all have moles or 
freckles and we can all walk wherever we want with them on our bodies. Imagine that 
your thoughts and feelings are like moles or freckles on your body.  Now nod if you can 
notice that it is you who is imagining yourself with your thoughts and feelings like moles 
or freckles on your body. Can you see that you are more than your moles or freckles? Can 
you see that you are more than your thoughts and feelings? 
 
Now try if you can to focus your attention on the negative thought you wrote down 
earlier in the experiment. Try to write down one word which describes how you feel 
when you have this thought. Maybe it is sadness… maybe it is anger… any feeling that 
comes to mind. Then when you are ready, open your eyes and write down that word on 
this piece of paper. Now put the word in the envelope and hand it to me. Closing your 
eyes again, focus your attention once more on that feeling that is in the 
envelope...imagine that you can take a picture of this feeling or emotion which is 
showing up for you and imagine placing the picture out in front of you. Now, look at this 
picture in front of you and notice who is looking at this feeling of (word that describes 
reaction). Try to imagine yourself when this (word that describes reaction) is in charge 
of what you do. Take a picture in your mind’s eye of what you do when you let this 
feeling be in charge. Ask yourself who is in charge when you do that? Do you think it is 
you or your feelings? Now, imagine that you are who is in charge, instead of your (word). 
Imagine, now, that you place yourself over and above your (word). Take a photo of what 
comes to your mind when you see yourself over and above your (word). Try to see 
yourself as being in charge of what you do, instead of your feelings being in charge. Now, 
can you see that you are big enough to have room for any feeling, for any (word) and see 
that they are like moles or freckles and that you are the one in charge?  
 
 
Results 
The primary aim of Experiment 9 was to compare the relative utility of the two self as 
context interventions which differentially targeted distinction vs. hierarchical relations in 
reducing discomfort, anxiety and stress after exposure to the distress induction task.  
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AAQ Data 
The pre-experimental outcomes for avoidance are presented in Table 17. Participants 
in both conditions scored within the normal range (i.e. < 18) and did not display any pre-
experimental differences with regard to propensities towards avoidance. This was supported 
by an independent t-test which indicated no significant main effect for condition (p = .37). 
 
Table 17  
Means, Standard Deviations and Significance Value by Condition on the AAQ in Experiment 9 
 
 
Distinction Self as 
Context 
M (SD) 
Hierarchical Self 
as Context 
M (SD) 
p value 
AAQ 16.2 (6.3) 
18.2 
(6.4) .37 
M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; p value = Statistical Significance 
 
 
Distress Ratings 
The data from the three types of distress ratings was analysed separately and are 
presented below.  
Discomfort. Both conditions recorded similarly low discomfort (<11/100) at baseline 
and increased modestly the distress induction (distinction self as context: +12.7; hierarchical 
self as context: +16.3; see Figure 30). Thereafter, distinction resulted in a very marginal 
increase in discomfort (+.76), while hierarchy resulted in a decrease (-7.57).  
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Figure 30. Mean VAS discomfort ratings per condition across time in Experiment 9. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda = .53, F (2, 33) = 14.58, p = .000, partial eta squared = .47] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (47%), but not for condition [F (1, 34) 
= 1, p = .32, partial eta squared = .03]. The interaction effect was also non-significant [Wilkes 
Lambda = .95, F (2, 33) = .81, p = .45, partial eta squared = .05]. Two dependent t-tests 
showed a significant increase in discomfort from baseline to post-induction (p = .001), but 
not from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .31). 
Anxiety. Both conditions recorded similarly low anxiety (<10/100) at baseline and 
both increased anxiety modestly at post-induction (distinction: +8.06; hierarchy: +13.57; see 
Figure 31). Anxiety subsequently decreased for both conditions, although the larger change 
was recorded for the hierarchical intervention (distinction: -.029; hierarchy: -3.86).  
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Figure 31. Mean VAS anxiety ratings per condition across time in Experiment 9. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda = .54, F (2, 33) = 14.12, p = .000, partial eta squared = .46] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (46%), but not for condition [F (1, 34) 
= .02, p = .89, partial eta squared = .001]. The interaction effect was non-significant [Wilkes 
Lambda = .94, F (2, 33) = .1.14, p = .33, partial eta squared = .07]. Two dependent t-tests 
showed a significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-induction (p = .000), but not 
from post-induction to post-intervention (p = .46). 
Stress. Both conditions recorded low stress (<11/100) at baseline and both increased 
stress moderately at post-induction (distinction: +7.43; hierarchy: +9.48; see Figure 32). 
Distinction resulted in an increase in stress (+4.71), while hierarchy reduced stress thereafter 
(-8.82).  
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Figure 32. Mean VAS stress ratings per condition across time in Experiment 9. 
 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda = .654, F (2, 33) = 8.74, p = .001, partial eta squared = .35] 
that accounted for a medium amount of the variance (35%), but not for condition [F (1, 34) 
= .1, p = .76, partial eta squared = .003]. However, the interaction was significant [Wilkes 
Lambda = .83, F (2, 33) = 3.46, p = 04, partial eta squared = .17] and accounted for a small 
amount of the variance (17%). Two dependent t-tests showed a significant increase in stress 
from baseline to post-induction for both conditions (both ps < .05). The increase in 
distinction from post-induction to post-intervention was not significant (p = .23), but the 
decrease for hierarchy at the same time point was significant (p = .02). 
 
RQ Results 
The four reaction questions were collated by condition and time and the means for 
each are presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18  
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 9 
Reaction 
Questionnaire Time 
Distinction 
self as context 
M (SD) 
Hierarchical 
self as context 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the sentence 
Post- 
Induction 
49.93 
(27.34) 
56.97 
(28.93) 
Post-
intervention 
 
56.97 
(24.65) 
60.7 
(32.34) 
Please rate how believable the 
sentence was to you 
Post- 
induction 
55.04 
(37.44) 
73.26 
(28.56) 
Post-
intervention 
 
48.4 
(36.3) 
60.97 
(31.24) 
Please rate how vivid your 
thoughts and images are of the 
sentence 
Post- 
induction 
53.25 
(27.07) 
66.56 
(21.7) 
Post-
intervention 
 
48.6 
(29.9) 
63.5 
(27.18) 
Please rate how much guilt you 
feel right now 
Post- 
induction 
29.02 
(30.13) 
22.78 
(26.23) 
Post-
intervention 
26.73 
(29.3) 
 
16.81 
(24.75) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence 
Post- 
induction 
29.15 
(26) 
23.23 
(20.3) 
Post-
intervention 
 
20.36 
(22.12) 
17.52 
(15.45) 
 
At post-induction, participants in the hierarchical condition were higher in 
believability, vividness and distraction, while the distinction participants were higher in 
willingness and guilt. However, a series of independent t-tests confirmed that these 
differences were not significant (all ps > .11).  
At post-intervention both conditions increased willingness but decreased believability, 
vividness, guilt and distraction. A series of 2x2 mixed between ANOVAs revealed that time 
was significant for believability [Wilkes Lambda = .61, F (1, 34) = 21.55, p = .001, partial eta 
squared = .39] which accounted for a medium amount of the variance (39%) and distraction 
[Wilkes Lambda = .88, F (1, 34) = 4.82, p = .04, partial eta squared = .13] which accounted 
for a small amount of the variance (13%), (all other ps >.13) 
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Results Summary 
The results demonstrated that the self-criticism task significantly increased discomfort, 
anxiety and stress. Some differences were recorded between the two interventions in terms of 
their efficacy in reducing the dependent measures. Although, there was no decrease in 
discomfort after the distinction intervention, a non-significant reduction was recorded for the 
hierarchical intervention. The same pattern was recorded with anxiety. In contrast, there was 
an increase in stress after the distinction intervention, but a significant reduction after the 
hierarchical intervention. Outcomes on the RQ demonstrated that both conditions increased 
willingness and decreased believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. 
 
Discussion 
The current study attempted to parse out the effects of distinction vs. hierarchical 
relations in a self as context ACT exercise. On the whole, the research was a replication of a 
previous study by Luciano et al. (2011), except that we were able to use less intensive 
interventions with our non-clinical sample. Nonetheless, the superiority observed for the 
hierarchical intervention, relative to distinction, bore some overlap with the findings from the 
original study.  
The hierarchical intervention only resulted in a reduction in all three dependent 
measures, including a significant reduction in stress. This is consistent with Luciano et al.’s 
data (2011), in which the hierarchical intervention (defusion II) resulted in a significant 
reduction in problematic behaviours, along with a significant increase in mindfulness and 
psychological flexibility for the high-risk adolescents. The lack of effect for the distinction 
intervention is also similar to the findings from the original, in which Luciano et al. found 
only limited effects for the defusion I intervention. Experiment 10 explored this issue further 
by including a practice interval where participants were required to practice their assigned 
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intervention. We reasoned that this would potentially demonstrate the stability and 
generalization of outcomes across time and would be a better analogue of what happens in a 
therapeutic context. 
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Experiment 10 
An Empirical Investigation of 
Self-focused vs. Object-focused Techniques in ACT 
 
Experiment 10 attempted to further explore the relative utility of distinction versus 
hierarchical interventions, using the same distress induction procedure as previous 
experiments. However, in an effort to extend the investigation presented in Experiment 9, the 
current study included a practice interval where participants were allowed a period of up to 
seven days to practice his/her assigned intervention after which they were presented with a 
second exposure to the distress induction task in order to investigate the long lasting effects 
of the interventions (i.e. hierarchical versus distinction). 
A second aspect of the research examined the extent to which a focus on the self plays 
a key role in the outcomes described above. Specifically, this study compared interventions 
that focused on participants’ thoughts about the self-criticism that comprised the distress 
induction procedure (i.e. self-focused) versus interventions that focused on thoughts about an 
inanimate object (i.e. object-focused). In short, participants in both groups were asked to 
focus on thoughts, but only in the self-focused interventions did they focus on thoughts about 
themselves. We hypothesised that the self hierarchical condition would be the most effective 
in terms of distress induction because it aimed to target both self specific content and 
hierarchical relations. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 59 adults were recruited for Experiment 10. All were undergraduate or 
postgraduate students at NUIM. The same exclusion criteria as the previous experiment 
applied (11 participants were excluded on this basis). This yielded a final sample of 48 
participants (22 males and 28 females), aged between 17 and 41 years old (mean age = 20 
years, 5 months). Participants were allocated randomly to one of four conditions, referred to 
as: self distinction (N = 12); self hierarchy (N = 12); object distinction (N = 12); and object 
hierarchy (N = 12). 
 
Setting and Materials 
All aspects of the setting and materials were identical to Experiment 9. 
 
Ethical Issues 
 All ethical issues pertaining to all previous experiments applied here and were 
addressed in a similar manner (see pp. 52-53). Once again, no participants raised any issues 
or reported any adverse effects at any point. 
 
Procedure 
The current study comprised of two stages. Participants completed the first stage and 
then returned for the second stage after a practice period that ranged from two to seven days 
in length. Each stage comprised of seven phases which were identical in format to 
Experiment 9 (see Figure 33). The phases involved: pre-experimental measures (Phase 1); 
baseline VAS ratings (Phase 2); the distress induction procedure (Phase 3); post-induction 
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VAS ratings and RQ (Phase 4); one of four interventions (Phase 5); post-intervention distress 
induction (Phase 6); and post-intervention VAS ratings and RQ (Phase 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                         
 
 
                                  
                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. An overview of the experimental sequence in Experiment 10. 
 
Stage 1: Phase 5: Interventions. The aim of all four interventions (self distinction, 
self hierarchy, object distinction and object hierarchy) was to explore the comparative utility 
of each in reducing experimentally induced distress. Both self-focused interventions (self 
distinction and self hierarchy) attempted to distance participants from his/her stated self-
criticism. In contrast, the two object-focused conditions attempted to distance participants 
from a non self-related object (a rose). Within each of these two pairs of conditions, the 
Stage 1 
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Pre-Experimental Measures 
 
 
Phase 2 
Baseline VAS Ratings 
 
 
Phase 3 
Distress Induction 
Procedure 
 
 
Phase 4 
Post-induction VAS Ratings 
and RQ 
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 Interventions 
 
 
Phase 6 
Post-intervention Distress 
Induction Procedure 
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Post-intervention VAS 
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Stage 2 
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experimental design also sought to manipulate the relational nature of this distancing, through 
which distinction or hierarchy relations were specifically targeted. Hence, this created four 
conditions in total, two self-focused (self hierarchy and self distinction) and two object-
focused (object hierarchy and object distinction). 
Self distinction. Participants assigned to the self distinction condition were presented 
with a common ACT exercise called the Leaves on the Stream in which they were instructed 
to close their eyes and notice the on-going emergence of their own thoughts. In ACT, this 
exercise commonly involves placing one’s own psychological content (thoughts and feelings) 
on leaves and this self-focus was also the target in the intervention, as employed here. 
Specifically, participants were instructed to take the stated self-criticism and their reactions to 
this and to place each one on a leaf and allow each leaf to float downstream. The distinction 
focus of this exercise was manipulated through an emphasis on noticing the distinction 
between having thoughts HERE and placing them THERE in the stream. Participants in this 
condition were instructed as follows: 
 
Imagine a beautiful slow-moving stream. The water flows over rocks, around trees, 
descends down hill and travels through a valley. Once in a while, a big leaf drops into the 
stream and floats away down the river. Imagine you are sitting beside that stream on a 
warm sunny day, watching the leaves float by. 
  
Now direct your attention to the thoughts and images that are passing through your mind 
in this very instance. Let all of the thoughts come into your mind whatever they are, good 
or bad, it doesn’t matter. Just try to become conscious of your thoughts. Each time a 
thought pops into your head, imagine putting it on one of those leaves. Some people have 
a hard time putting thoughts into words and they see thoughts as images.  If that applies 
to you, put each image on a leaf floating down the stream. The goal is to stay beside the 
stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep floating by. Don’t try to make the 
stream go faster or slower; don’t try to change what shows up on the leaves in any way. 
Just place any thought on a leaf and simply watch it float down the stream. 
 
Just for now, focus your attention on one specific thought. Any single thought will do, 
good or bad, it doesn’t matter. Just try to isolate that thought in your mind. Try this 
exercise with that thought. Put it on a leaf and let it float down the stream. Just imagine 
yourself on the side of the bank watching this thought float away down the stream. 
 
Try the exact same thing again, but this time use the specific thought that you wrote 
down earlier on in the experiment. Put this negative thought on a leaf and let it float down 
the stream. If you can notice any reaction you have to this, maybe like another thought, or 
a feeling, put that on a leaf as well and let it float down the stream. Remember that the 
goal is to stay beside the stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep floating by.  
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Self hierarchy. Participants assigned to the self hierarchy condition were also 
presented with the Leaves on the Stream exercise in order to notice the on-going emergence 
of their thoughts. Hence a self-focus was again the target in this intervention. However, the 
exercise was now given a hierarchical (rather than distinction) focus through an emphasis on 
noticing that one can contain one’s own thoughts HERE and from that perspective these 
thoughts can be placed THERE in the stream. Participants in this condition were instructed as 
follows: 
 
Imagine a beautiful slow-moving stream. The water flows over rocks, around trees, 
descends down hill and travels through a valley. Once in a while, a big leaf drops into the 
stream and floats away down the river. Imagine you are sitting beside that stream on a 
warm sunny day, watching the leaves float by. 
  
Now direct your attention to the thoughts and images that are passing through your mind 
in this very instance. Let all of the thoughts come into your mind whatever they are, good 
or bad, it doesn’t matter. Just try to become conscious of your thoughts. Each time a 
thought pops into your head, imagine putting it on one of those leaves. Some people have 
a hard time putting thoughts into words and they see thoughts as images.  If that applies 
to you, put each image on a leaf floating down the stream. The goal is to stay beside the 
stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep floating by. Don’t try to make the 
stream go faster or slower; don’t try to change what shows up on the leaves in any way. 
Just place any thought on a leaf and simply watch it float down the stream. 
 
Just for now, focus your attention on one specific thought. Any single thought will do, 
good or bad, it doesn’t matter. Just try to isolate that thought in your mind. Try this 
exercise with that thought. Put it on a leaf and let it float down the stream. Just imagine 
yourself on the side of the bank watching this thought float away down the stream. And 
just notice that it is you who is noticing your thoughts. Be aware that you are here and 
your thoughts and images are there on a leaf floating down the stream. 
 
Try the exact same thing again, but this time use the specific thought that you wrote 
down earlier on in the experiment. Put this negative thought on a leaf and let it float down 
the stream. If you can notice any reaction you have to this, maybe like another thought, or 
a feeling, put that on a leaf as well and let it float down the stream. Remember that the 
goal is to stay beside the stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep floating by.  
 
Remember that your task is to let your stream flow. It is unlikely, however, that you will 
be able to do this without interruption. And this is the key part of this exercise. At some 
point you will have the sense that the stream has stopped, or that you have lost the point 
of the exercise, or that you are down in the stream instead of being up on the bank. When 
that happens, try to back up a few seconds and see whether you can catch what you were 
doing right before the stream stopped or you fell in. Then go ahead and put your thoughts 
on the leaves again until the stream stops for a second time and so on. The main thing is 
to notice when it stops for any reason and see whether you can catch what happened right 
before it stopped. It is also important to notice that you are the one noticing all of your 
thoughts floating down the stream. Remember that you are here and all of those thoughts 
are there, on the leaves floating down the stream. 
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One more thing. If the stream never gets going at all and you start thinking “It’s not 
working” or “I’m not doing it right” then let that thought be placed on a leaf and send it 
down the stream as well. 
 
Object distinction. Participants assigned to the object distinction condition were also 
presented with the Leaves on the Stream exercise, but rather than encouraging them to notice 
the on-going emergence of their own thoughts, the exercise now instructed them to generate 
thoughts and images of a red rose (as an inanimate object). Specifically, participants were 
instructed to take individual and on-going thoughts or images of the rose and place each on a 
leaf. As a result, this intervention was denoted as object-focused, rather than self-focused. As 
before, the distinction focus of this exercise was maintained by highlighting the distinction 
between having thoughts about the rose HERE and placing then THERE in the stream. 
Participants in this condition were instructed as follows: 
Imagine a beautiful slow-moving stream. The water flows over rocks, around trees, 
descends down hill and travels through a valley. Once in a while, a big leaf drops into the 
stream and floats away down the water. Imagine you are sitting beside that stream on a 
warm sunny day, watching the leaves float by. 
  
Now direct your attention to the image of a red rose. Let all of the thoughts and images 
about a red rose come into your mind whatever they are, good or bad, it doesn’t matter. 
Just try to become conscious of your thoughts about this flower. Each time a thought or 
image about the rose pops into your head imagine putting it on one of those leaves. Some 
people have a hard time putting thoughts into words and they see thoughts as images.  If 
that applies to you, put each image of the flower on a leaf and let it float down the stream. 
The goal is to stay beside the stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep floating 
by. Don’t try to make the stream go faster or slower; don’t try to change what shows up 
on the leaves in any way. Just place any thought about the flower on a leaf and simply 
watch it float down the stream. 
 
It may help to focus your attention on one specific petal on the rose. Any single petal will 
do, it doesn’t matter. Just try to isolate the thought or the image of one rose petal in your 
mind. Try this exercise with this image of the rose petal. Put it on a leaf and let it float 
down the stream. Just imagine yourself on the side of the bank watching this thought or 
image float away down the stream.  
 
Try the exact same thing again, with another rose petal or another part of the rose, 
perhaps even the stem. Put this thought or image you are having on a leaf and let it float 
down the stream. Remember that the goal is to stay beside the stream and allow the 
leaves on the stream to keep floating by.  
 
 
Object hierarchy. Participants assigned to the object hierarchy condition were also 
presented with the Leaves on the Stream exercise to notice the on-going emergence of 
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thoughts and images of a red rose. As before, the exercise was given a hierarchical focus 
through an emphasis on noticing that one can contain one’s own thoughts about the rose 
HERE and from that perspective these thoughts can be placed THERE in the stream. 
Participants in this condition were instructed as follows: 
Imagine a beautiful slow-moving stream. The water flows over rocks, around trees, 
descends down hill and travels through a valley. Once in a while, a big leaf drops into the 
stream and floats away down the river. Imagine you are sitting beside that stream on a 
warm sunny day, watching the leaves float by. 
  
Now direct your attention to the image of a red rose. Let all of the thoughts and images 
about a red rose come into your mind whatever they are, good or bad, it doesn’t matter. 
Just try to become conscious of your thoughts about this flower. Each time a thought or 
image about the rose pops into your head imagine putting it on one of those leaves. Some 
people have a hard time putting thoughts into words and they see thoughts as images.  If 
that applies to you, put each image of the flower on a leaf and let it float down the stream. 
The goal is to stay beside the stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep floating 
by. Don’t try to make the stream go faster or slower; don’t try to change what shows up 
on the leaves in any way. Just place any thought about the flower on a leaf and simply 
watch it float down the stream. 
 
It may help to focus your attention on one specific petal on the rose. Any single petal will 
do, it doesn’t matter. Just try to isolate the thought or the image of one rose petal in your 
mind. Try this exercise with this image of the rose petal. Put it on a leaf and let it float 
down the stream. Just imagine yourself on the side of the bank watching this thought or 
image float away down the stream. And just notice that it is you who is noticing your 
thoughts about the rose. Be aware that you are here and your thoughts and images about 
the flower are there on a leaf floating down the stream. 
 
Try the exact same thing again, with another rose petal or another part of the rose, 
perhaps even the stem. Put this thought or image you are having on a leaf and let it float 
down the stream. If you can notice any reaction you have to this, maybe like another 
thought, or a feeling, put that on a leaf as well and let it float down the stream. Remember 
that the goal is to stay beside the stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep 
floating by.  
  
Remember that your task is to let your stream flow. It is unlikely, however, that you will 
be able to do this without interruption. And this is the key part of this exercise. At some 
point you will have the sense that the stream has stopped, or that you have lost the point 
of the exercise, or that you are down in the stream instead of being up on the bank. When 
that happens, try to back up a few seconds and see whether you can catch what you were 
doing right before the stream stopped or you fell in. Then go ahead and put the thoughts 
you were having about the rose on the leaves again until the stream stops for a second 
time and so on. The main thing is to notice when it stops for any reason and see whether 
you can catch what thought or image about the rose you were having right before it 
stopped. It is also important to notice that you are the one noticing all of your thoughts 
about the flower floating down the stream. Remember that you are here and all of those 
thoughts and images about the rose are there, on the leaves floating down the stream. 
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Phase 6: Distress induction task II. Phase 6 involved a second exposure to the 
distress induction task which was identical to Phase 3. 
Phase 7: Post-intervention VASs and RQ. Phase 7 was identical to Phase 4 and 
assessed the potential impact of the self-criticism on discomfort, anxiety and stress, as well as 
participant reactions to the experimental task. 
Practice Period. Stages 1 and 2 were separated by a practice period that ranged from 
2-7 days, during which participants were instructed to practice the intervention they had been 
given in Phase 5, using a written script. The number of practice days was decided by 
participants’ own schedules and could not be manipulated systematically.  
Stage 2: Phases 1 to 7. Stage 2 was identical to Stage 1. 
 
Results 
The central aim of the current experiment was to compare the relative utility of the 
four interventions on reducing discomfort, anxiety and stress after the distress induction task. 
A secondary aim was to investigate the utility of interventions which targeted self-specific 
content compared to interventions which did not. A third aim was to determine the role of the 
practice period and its relationship to the interventions on the distress ratings.  
 
AAQ Data 
At the outset of the experiment in Stage 1, all conditions scored within or just above 
the normal range on the AAQ for a non-clinical sample and did not display any pre-
experimental differences at baseline with regard to propensities towards avoidance (self 
distinction = 17.33; self hierarchy = 17.42; object distinction = 19.42; and object hierarchy = 
18.42; see Figure 34). A one-way between groups ANOVA confirmed that there was no 
significant effect for condition (p = .86). The AAQ data is presented in a graph here (instead 
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of a table like previous experiments) so the change in scores at Stage 2 can be better 
represented. 
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Figure 34. Mean AAQ scores per condition at Stages 1 and 2 in Experiment 10. 
 
At the beginning of Stage 2 and immediately after the practice period, all participants 
were re-exposed to the AAQ and all four conditions showed a small decrease in scores 
relative to baseline (self distinction: - .25; self hierarchy: - 2.09; object distinction: - 1.24; 
object hierarchy: - 3.42; see Figure 34). Interestingly, a paired-samples t-test showed a 
significant main effect for time (p = .004) between Stages 1 and 2. Furthermore, four paired 
samples t-tests (one per condition) revealed that the decreases in AAQ scores in the self 
hierarchy and object hierarchy conditions were significant (p = .05 and .03, respectively), 
while the changes in the distinction self and distinction object conditions were not (both 
ps > .18).  
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Distress Ratings 
The data from the three types of distress ratings were analysed separately and are 
presented below.  
Discomfort. All four conditions recorded low to moderate discomfort (all > 30/100) 
at baseline I (Stage 1) and all increased (self distinction: +15.67; self hierarchy: +13.42; 
object distinction: +2.08; object hierarchy: +18.51; see Figure 35) after the first exposure to 
the distress induction task. Thereafter, the first exposure to the intervention resulted in a 
decrease in discomfort in all four conditions. The largest of these occurred in the two self 
conditions and the smallest in the object distinction condition (self distinction: - 16.12; self 
hierarchy: -16.34; object distinction: - 9.72; object hierarchy: - 13.1). All four conditions had 
decreased further by baseline II in Stage 2 (self distinction: - 14.14; self hierarchy: - 4; object 
distinction: - 10.37; object hierarchy: - 11.23) and were lower at this point than at baseline I. 
Similar to Stage 1, discomfort increased for all conditions after post-induction II (self 
distinction: +15.19; self hierarchy: +14.52; object distinction: +13.29; object hierarchy: 
+11.97). Finally, in all four conditions discomfort decreased again to lowest levels at post-
intervention II (self distinction: - 11.28; self hierarchy: - 18.48; object distinction: - 15.94; 
object hierarchy: - 10). 
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Figure 35. Mean discomfort ratings per condition across time in Experiment 10. 
 
A mixed between within 6x4 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda = .34, F (5, 40) = 15.24, p = .000, partial eta squared = .66] 
that accounted for a large amount of the variance (66%), but not for condition [F (3, 44) = .54, 
p = .66, partial eta squared = .04]. In addition, the interaction effect was not significant 
[Wilkes Lambda = .88, F (5, 42) = .58, p = .88, partial eta squared = .07]. 
Five dependent t-tests compared each time point with the subsequent time point (e.g. 
baseline I vs. post-induction I) and demonstrated a significant effect for time at all five time 
points. That is, discomfort increased significantly after the two distress inductions and 
decreased significantly after the interventions and the practice period (all ps < .05). 
Anxiety. All four conditions recorded low to moderate anxiety (all > 24/100) at 
baseline I and all increased modestly (self distinction: +14.14; self hierarchy: +7.33; object 
distinction: +11.7; object hierarchy: +18.12; see Figure 35) at post-induction I. In all four 
conditions, the first exposure to the intervention resulted in decreased anxiety, with the 
largest in self distinction (- 17.41) and the smallest in object distinction (- 10.46; self 
hierarchy: - 12.91; object hierarchy: - 16.87). All four conditions decreased anxiety further by 
Practice Period 
178 
 
baseline II (self distinction: - 6.08; self hierarchy: - 3.67; object distinction: - 2.91; object 
hierarchy: - 4.73). Similar to Stage 1, anxiety increased for all conditions at post-induction II 
(self distinction: +12.18; self hierarchy: +10.58; object distinction: +13.49; object hierarchy: 
+8.39) and in all four conditions anxiety decreased to lowest levels at post-intervention II 
(self distinction: - 10.59; self hierarchy: - 10.83; object distinction: - 19.88; object hierarchy: 
- 7.8).  
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Figure 35. Mean anxiety ratings per condition across time in Experiment 10. 
 
A mixed between within 6x4 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda = .43, F (5, 40) = 10.44, p = .000, partial eta squared = .57] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (57%), but not for condition [F (3, 44) 
= .77, p = .52, partial eta squared = .05] or the interaction effect [Wilkes Lambda = .71, F (5, 
42) = 1, p = .47, partial eta squared = .11].  
Five dependent t-tests compared each time point with the subsequent one and 
demonstrated a significant effect for time in four of these five comparisons (except between 
post-intervention I and baseline II, p = .23). That is, anxiety increased significantly after the 
two distress inductions and decreased significantly after the interventions (all ps < .001).  
Practice Period 
179 
 
Stress. All four conditions recorded low to moderate stress (all > 19/100) at baseline I 
and all increased (self distinction: +8.84; self hierarchy: +9.42; object distinction: +14.8; 
object hierarchy: +8.63; see Figure 36) at post-induction I. All four conditions showed a 
similar modest decrease in stress at post-intervention I (self distinction: - 9.82; self hierarchy: 
- 13.82; object distinction: - 11.87; object hierarchy: -14.68). Stress levels had changed 
differentially by baseline II. That is, self distinction and self hierarchy decreased marginally 
(-.29 and -1.84, respectively), while object hierarchy increased marginally (+4.59) and 
distinction object increased moderately (+11.17). Similar to Stage 1, stress increased for all 
four conditions at post-induction II (distinction self: +8.79; self hierarchy: +6.92; object 
distinction: +2.01; object hierarchy: +5.94). Finally, in all four conditions stress decreased to 
lowest levels at post-intervention II (self distinction: - 7.75; self hierarchy: - 9.67; object 
distinction: -21.8; object hierarchy: - 10.02). 
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Figure 36. Mean stress ratings per condition across time in Experiment 10. 
A mixed between within 6x4 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda = .52, F (5, 40) = 7.5, p = .000, partial eta squared = .48] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (48%), but not for condition [F (3, 43) 
Practice Period 
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= 2.14, p = .11, partial eta squared = .12]. The interaction effect was not significant [Wilkes 
Lambda = .56, F (5, 42) = 1.71, p = .059, partial eta squared = .17]. The five dependent t-tests 
comparing subsequent time points demonstrated a significant effect for time at four of these, 
except between post-intervention I and baseline II (p = .41). That is, stress increased 
significantly after the two distress inductions and decreased significantly after the 
interventions (all ps < .001).  
Due to the near significant effect for the interaction and the strong effect for time, the 
data were split for condition and five dependent t-tests were performed again using the same 
five time point comparisons. This would enable us to determine which specific conditions 
and time points were significant. Self distinction showed a significant increase in stress at 
post-induction II (p = .034) and a near significant decrease at post-intervention II (p = .058). 
Self hierarchy showed a significant decrease at post-intervention I (p = .05) and at post-
intervention II (p = .051). Object distinction showed a significant decrease at post-
intervention II (p = .003). Finally, object hierarchy showed a significant decrease at post-
intervention I (p = .009), a significant increase at post-induction II (p = .05) and a significant 
decrease at post-intervention II (p = .005), all other ps > .09. 
 
Practice Period Data  
The means and standard deviations for the length of the practice period in days and 
the number of times participants practiced their assigned intervention are presented in Table 
19. 
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Table 19  
Means and Standard Deviations for the Length of the Practice Period and Amount Participants Practiced per 
Condition in Experiment 10 
 
 Self Distinction 
 
M (SD) 
Object 
Distinction 
M (SD) 
Self Hierarchy 
 
M (SD) 
Object 
Hierarchy 
M (SD) 
Length of 
Practice Period 
6.2 
(1.6) 
5.8 
(1.59) 
6.8 
(1.42) 
6.33 
(2.31) 
Amount of 
Practice 
3.2 
(1.75) 
2.33 
(1.72) 
1.67 
(1.67) 
3.17 
(1.4) 
 
A series of bi-variate correlations (for each condition) were conducted using the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to investigate whether discomfort, anxiety, 
stress and AAQ scores (in Stage 2) correlated with either the length of the practice period or 
the number of times participants practiced (see Table 20). 
 
Table 20 
Correlations between Length of Practice Period, Practice Amount and Distress during Stage 2 in Experiment 10 
 
 Baseline II Post-Induction II Post-Intervention II 
AAQ 
II 
Dis. Anx. Stress Dis. Anx. Stress Dis. Anx. Stress 
Self 
Distinction 
 
Length of 
Practice 
Period 
-.26 -.23 -.49 -3.8 -.27 -4.19 -.27 -.29 -.18 -.25 
Practice 
amount 
-.47 -.02 -.14 -.1 .04 .01 .04 .11 .06 .08 
 
Self 
Hierarchy 
Length of 
Practice 
Period 
.07 -.13 -5.7 -.41 -.02 -45 -.43 -.54 -.79*** -.69** 
Practice 
amount 
-.08 .08 -.14 .41 .25 .17 .29 -.32 -.4 -.11 
Object 
Distinction 
 
Length of 
Practice 
Period 
.47 .48 .24 .46 .42 .3 .5 .45 .46 .46 
Practice 
amount 
-.23 -.18 -.18 .28 -.22 -.23 .12 -.12 -.22 .09 
Object 
Hierarchy 
 
Length of 
Practice 
Period 
-.7** -.53 -.58* -.37 -.58* -.43 -.34 -54 -48 -36 
Practice 
amount 
-.28 -.3 -.34 -.33 -.38 -.34 -.17 -.4 -.36 -.31 
* p > .05     **  p > .01  *** p > .001 
 
Results for the self distinction condition demonstrated small to medium correlations 
(although they were not significant), suggesting that the longer the practice period, the lower 
AAQ, discomfort, anxiety and stress ratings at each time point. In addition, the more often 
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participants practiced their assigned intervention, the lower they scored on the AAQ, 
discomfort and anxiety ratings at baseline II. However, the results also suggested that the 
more they practiced the self distinction intervention, the higher their stress ratings at each 
time point throughout Stage 2. For the object distinction condition, strong (but non significant) 
correlations suggested that a longer practice period was correlated with more discomfort, 
anxiety and stress at all time points in Stage 2. Small (and non significant) correlations 
suggested that the more participants practiced this intervention the lower they rated their 
discomfort and anxiety during Stage 2. Alternatively, higher rates of practice were correlated 
with more stress throughout this stage. 
For the self hierarchy intervention, a longer practice period was also associated with 
lower scores on the AAQ and in all distress ratings throughout Stage 2. These correlations 
were particularly strong and significant for anxiety at baseline II and for discomfort, anxiety 
and stress at post-intervention II. The object hierarchy condition demonstrated a strong and 
significant (on most occasions) correlation between the length of the practice period, the 
AAQ and distress levels, such that a longer practice period was correlated with lower scores 
on the AAQ and less discomfort, anxiety and stress at every time point in Stage 2. In addition, 
strong (but non-significant) correlations suggested that the more participants practiced this 
intervention, the lower they scored on the AAQ, discomfort, anxiety and stress ratings at 
every time point in this stage.  
A series of bi-variate correlations were also conducted using the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient to investigate whether AAQ scores at both baselines (Stage 1 
and Stage 2; see Table 21) correlated with ratings of discomfort, anxiety and stress 
throughout the experiment. The results demonstrated strong and significant correlations 
between the AAQ and the distress ratings at almost every time point, excluding the 
correlation between the AAQ, anxiety and stress ratings at baseline I. 
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Table 21 
Correlations between AAQ and Distress Ratings for Stages 1 and 2 in Experiment 10 
 
 Baseline Post- Induction Post-Intervention 
Dis. Anx. Stress Dis. Anx. Stress Dis. Anx. Stress 
AAQ 
Baseline 
I 
 
 
.33* 
 
1.85 
 
.202 
 
.463** 
 
.363** 
 
.37** 
 
.84*** 
 
.31* 
 
.3* 
AAQ 
Baseline 
II 
 
 
.554*** 
 
.485*** 
 
.444** 
 
.301* 
 
.348* 
 
.426** 
 
.425** 
 
.416** 
 
.372** 
* p > .05    **  p > .01   *** p > .001 
 
 
RQ Results 
The four reactions questions were collated by condition and stage and the means for 
each are presented in Table 22. 
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Table 22 
The Means and Standard Deviations for the RQ across Time and Condition in Experiment 10 
 
Reactions 
Questionnaire Time 
Self 
Distinction 
M (SD) 
Self 
Hierarchy 
M (SD) 
Object 
Distinction 
M (SD) 
Object 
Hierarchy 
M (SD) 
Please rate your level of 
willingness to engage 
with your thoughts of the 
sentence 
 
Post-
induction I 
57.24 
 (27.24) 
56. 08 
(19.81) 
64. 95 
(22.02) 
45. 58 
(31. 9) 
Post-
intervention 
I 
60. 72 
(32. 59) 
65. 42 
(23. 86) 
59. 63 
(28. 18) 
49. 69 
(31. 27) 
Post-
induction II 
53. 97 
(25. 57) 
49. 53 
(30.53) 
48. 58 
(25. 29) 
42. 12 
(27.94) 
Post-
intervention 
II 
58. 12 
(24. 81) 
58.67 
(28.52) 
50. 05 
(29.43) 
41. 66 
(32. 63) 
Please rate how 
believable the sentence 
was to you 
Post-
induction I 
64.76 
(25.1) 
59.04 
(26.97) 
53.95 
(18.6) 
75.91 
(14.91) 
Post-
intervention 
I 
57.43 
(27.32) 
47.75 
(21.6) 
43.46 
(23.65) 
53.38 
(21.54) 
Post-
induction II 
56.5 
(23.94) 
47.33 
(32.91) 
59.42 
(19.21) 
51.5 
(28.41) 
Post-
intervention 
II 
46.02 
(25.19) 
36.67 
(23.95) 
45.2 
(16.82) 
38.3 
(27.17) 
Please rate how vivid 
your thoughts and images 
were of the sentence 
 
Post-
induction I 
62.72 
(19.29) 
49.83 
(28.81) 
55.74 
(20.07) 
67.41 
(23.33) 
Post-
intervention 
I 
53.04 
(21.8) 
30.08 
(17.64) 
 
44.32 
(18.44) 
 
44.97 
(28) 
Post-
induction II 
54.88 
(26.73) 
50.58 
(21.22) 
59.87 
(21.17) 
54.99 
(25.53) 
Post-
intervention 
II 
34.27 
(22.4) 
33.92 
(19.5) 
38.13 
(16.36) 
39.82 
(27.22) 
Please rate how much 
guilt you feel right now  
 
Post-
induction I 
34.42 
(27.63) 
37.42 
(22.81) 
24.21 
(21.54) 
38.53 
(33.4) 
Post-
intervention 
I 
28.25 
(28.68) 
21 
(19.01) 
20.3 
(16.18) 
19.27 
(18.71) 
Post-
induction II 
31.01 
(23.07) 
40 
(20.94) 
 
31.51 
(28.25) 
18.28 
(20.28) 
Post-
intervention 
II 
25.68 
(21.09) 
33.25 
(31.26) 
16.51 
(17.03) 
14.23 
(20.76) 
Please rate how much 
you tried to distract from 
the sentence 
Post-
induction I 
44.13 
(26.83) 
31.67 
(28.7) 
45.56 
(21.45) 
48.39 
(29.31) 
Post-
intervention 
I 
33.23 
(29.21) 
30.69 
(29.28) 
28.16 
(28.7) 
28.5 
(23.18) 
Post-
induction II 
29.3 
(19.87) 
35 
(29.23) 
28.91 
(21.32) 
36.42 
(29.81) 
Post-
intervention 
II 
 
23.51 
(23.02) 
31.75 
(27.65) 
22.96 
(23.62) 
22.02 
(21.04) 
 
At post-induction I, willingness, believability, vividness, guilt and distraction were 
similar for all three conditions. A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that none of these 
differences were significant (all ps > .43). At post-intervention I all conditions decreased 
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believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. Willingness increased for self distinction, self 
hierarchy and object distinction at this point, while objective distinction decreased. At post-
induction II, all conditions decreased willingness, believability and vividness. Guilt increased 
for self distinction, self hierarchy and object distinction but decreased for object hierarchy. 
Distraction increased for self distinction, self hierarchy and object distinction, but it increased 
for object hierarchy. At post-intervention II, all conditions decreased believability, vividness, 
guilt and distraction. Self distinction, self hierarchy and object distinction increased 
willingness, while object hierarchy decreased it. 
A series of mixed between within 4x4 ANOVA revealed a significant effect for time 
for believability [Wilkes Lambda = .44, F (3, 42) = 10.81, p = .000, partial eta squared = .44] 
that accounted for a substantial amount of the variance (44%), for vividness [Wilkes Lambda 
= .42, F (3, 42) = 19.22, p = .000, partial eta squared = .58] that accounted for a substantial 
amount of the variance (58%), for guilt [Wilkes Lambda = .65, F (3, 42) = 7.4, p = .000, 
partial eta squared = .35] that accounted for a medium amount of the variance (35%), and for 
distraction [Wilkes Lambda = .63, F (3, 42) = 8.22, p = .000, partial eta squared = .37] 
that accounted for a medium amount of the variance (37%), (all other ps > .12).   
 
Results Summary 
 The results demonstrated that the self-criticism significantly increased distress for all 
four conditions after both exposures. Thereafter, there were significant changes across time in 
all three dependent variables across all four conditions, although no significant effect was 
recorded for the condition or interaction effects. Interestingly, there was a significant 
decrease in AAQ scores for the two hierarchical conditions, but not for the two distinction 
conditions. The results from the RQ demonstrated significant effects for time in believability, 
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vividness, guilt and distraction, although the condition or interaction effects were not 
significant. 
 
Discussion 
The findings from Experiments 9 and 10 demonstrated the utility of the self-criticism 
task as a method of experimental distress induction and the fact that it appeared to lend itself 
well to the inclusion of brief therapeutic analogue components. The current procedure was, of 
course, selected because it was deemed to be more ACT-consistent, hence potentially more 
conducive to manipulation by ACT components. This feature offered the possibility of 
recording positive outcomes for ACT components in distress reduction which had not been 
recorded in Experiments 2-5 using the single-sentence paradigm.  
Experiments 9 and 10 were also concerned with exploring the potential conceptual 
overlap between relational frames and self as context. In short, we asked whether targeting 
specific relational frames within our interventions would potentially enhance outcomes for 
self as context techniques. Doing so might also provide some insight into the verbal relational 
processes that underpin ACT’s middle level concepts, such as self as context. 
The results for both studies demonstrated that the self-criticism task not only 
successfully allowed the inclusion of self as context interventions, but also allowed us to 
parse out those that targeted hierarchical vs. distinction relations. Indeed, the data from both 
experiments consistently showed superiority for the hierarchical interventions and the 
benefits of these interventions even extended to reductions in avoidance, as measured on the 
AAQ. Overall, these findings attested to the robustness and utility of the self-criticism task in 
achieving the current experimental aims and are among the first to provide empirical 
evidence of the utility of using bottom-up RFT concepts to account for ACT middle level 
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concepts. These issues will be explored in greater detail in the General Discussion chapter 
that follows. 
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
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General Discussion 
 
The current programme of research had four main aims. 1. Our primary methodological 
concern involved experimental emotional distress induction procedures, which were 
employed across all ten experiments. Specifically, we wanted to find an experimental 
preparation that would lend itself to the exploration of brief analogue therapeutic 
interventions with non-clinical samples. Experiment 1 compared two existing and almost 
identical procedures. One of which was used again in Experiments 2-5. A third procedure 
was then investigated in Experiments 6-10. 2. Our primary intervention concern involved 
brief analogues of self as context exercises derived from ACT. Specifically, we were 
concerned with the potential for a focus on self as context to enhance the distress reduction 
observed with other ACT-related analogue interventions. 3. Our secondary intervention 
concern involved selecting a range of core ACT hexaflex processes and evaluating their 
distress reduction potential. This was the focus of Experiments 2-5. 4. Our tertiary 
intervention concern sought to explore the relationship between self as context and 
mindfulness. These interventions were investigated across Experiments 6-8. 5. A broad 
conceptual concern centred on the potential for RFT-based concepts to provide functional 
accounts of ACT’s middle level terms. Based upon this, Experiments 9 and 10 sought to 
manipulate perspective-taking, distinction and hierarchical relations within self as context 
exercises.  
 
Summary of Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) 
On the path towards identifying a method of emotional distress induction that would 
potentially lend itself to the exploration of brief analogue therapeutic interventions, we 
selected a procedure by Rachman et al. (1996). This simply required participants to write a 
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single-sentence about the hypothetical involvement of a loved one in a road traffic accident. 
Although widely used, and with established success in the induction of self-reported 
emotional distress, no published studies show any comparisons with other procedures. Hence, 
Experiment 1 systematically compared this with an adaptation of a short defusion-based 
intervention from ACT, widely used in experiential exercises and also involving a 
hypothetical accident. The simple methodological question concerned which procedure 
(single-sentence vs. multi-sentence) would generate the larger increases in subjective distress 
in an undergraduate non-clinical sample. Based on the view that the longer manipulation 
might generate greater vividness of (and thus distress associated with) the imagined scene, we 
hypothesised that this would generate larger increases in the dependent measures of 
discomfort, anxiety and stress. However, this hypothesis was not borne out and both 
procedures significantly and similarly increased distress on all three subjective measures.  
In order to ascertain whether any potential differential impact of the interventions was 
mediated through vividness, for example, we developed the Reactions Questionnaire (RQ) to 
explore a range of participant reactions to the imagined scenario. Although the two 
procedures were equally effective in increasing distress, participants reported different 
reactions to them. Specifically, the multi-sentence procedure showed: significantly higher 
willingness to engage with thoughts; significantly greater vividness of these thoughts; and 
higher believability (this difference was not significant). In contract, guilt and moral 
wrongness were higher for the single-sentence condition, although this difference was not 
significant. 
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Issues Raised by Chapter 2 
The existing literature contains a range of experimental distress induction procedures 
that differ primarily in terms of the stimuli or situations used to evoke affect and/or the types 
of responses measured (e.g. physiological, subjective, etc.). One short and easy-to-use 
procedure that appears to have good subjective effects with largely non-clinical samples is 
Rachman et al.’s (1996) single-sentence preparation. Because there appear to be no published 
studies that have systematically compared distress induction procedures, it is difficult to draw 
comparisons across studies. Furthermore, a wide variety of dependent variables has also been 
targeted. So, how do the current outcomes compare to other procedures?  
In their original study, Rachman et al. (1996) reported that the single-sentence 
procedure increased subjective anxiety by as much as 53 points on a visual analogue scale 
(VAS), with a self-selected sample of undergraduates categorised as high in thought action 
frequency (TAF). Perhaps less impressive, but still positive, outcomes have been reported by 
other authors using the same procedure with random samples of undergraduates. Specifically, 
Bocci and Gordon (2007), van den Hout et al. (2002) and Zucker et al. (2002) reported mean 
increases in anxiety of 36, 29 and 27 VAS points, respectively. On the whole, the latter are 
more consistent with our findings with a random sample of undergraduates from Experiment 
1, in which both the single-sentence and multi-sentence procedures generated a mean 
increase in anxiety of 21 points on the VAS. Similarly, Kehoe et al. (in press) reported a 
mean anxiety level of 26/100 at post-induction, using radiant heat induction with a non-
clinical sample of undergraduates. Furthermore, these outcomes are also similar to those 
reported with the CO2 challenge. Specifically, Levitt et al. (2004) found that this procedure 
increased anxiety in a clinical sample of persons with panic disorder and recorded a rating of 
approx. 40 (using conversion from a Likert scale) after a CO2 challenge.  
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Only one other study by Kehoe et al. (in press) appears to have recorded subjective 
discomfort. The mean discomfort ratings recorded for both procedures in Experiment 1 were 
between 7 and 10 at baseline and these increased to 29 at post-induction. This yielded an 
increase of between 19 and 22 points on the discomfort VAS across the two procedures. 
While Kehoe et al. did not record baseline discomfort, their mean discomfort level at post-
induction was 55/100, somewhat higher than that recorded here. However, it is worth 
considering that this difference may be accounted for in part by the possibility that 
participants in the heat induction study interpreted discomfort in that context as physical. 
Indeed, the instructions provided to participants with the radiant heat apparatus advised them 
to keep their fingers on the heat pad to the point at which it becomes intolerable. As a result, 
it seems likely that a physical pain induction procedure such as this would generate higher 
‘discomfort’ ratings than a more emotionally-based procedure could hope to achieve.  
Support for this type of suggestion also comes from comparisons of the current 
subjective stress outcomes with other research. Only one other study by Karekla, Forsyth and 
Kelly (2004) appears to have recorded subjective stress. The mean ratings recorded for both 
procedures in Experiment 1 were 7-8 at baseline and 23-24 at post-induction. This yielded an 
increase of 14-16 points on the stress VAS across the two procedures. Again, this is 
considerably lower than the findings reported by Karekla et al. who found that the CO2 
challenge increased stress by 36 points in a non-clinical sample. Once again, ‘stress’ is 
perhaps a more apt descriptor for the impact of the CO2 challenge than for the current 
emotional procedures and this likely accounts for the sizeable difference in outcomes on that 
dependent measure. 
A central hypothesis of Experiment 1 was that distress induction would be greater in 
the multi-sentence procedure, possibly because it would generate greater vividness of the 
imagined scene. Controlling for these potential mediating effects was the primary purpose of 
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the RQ. Although no differences emerged between subjective outcomes with the two 
procedures, the RQ data did indicate that the mean vividness rating was significantly greater 
(52/100) in the multi-sentence than in the single-sentence (30/100) procedure. Hence, the 
longer manipulation did, as predicted, generate greater vividness, but contrary to our 
prediction, this had little or no effect on distress induction.  
Interestingly, even the larger vividness outcome recorded on the multi-sentence 
condition here (i.e. 52) was smaller than that recorded by Marcks and Woods (2007) on the 
single-sentence manipulation (i.e. 69/100). Indeed, the vividness outcome for our single-
sentence condition (i.e. 27) was nearly three times smaller than the figure reported by those 
authors. Furthermore, Marcks and Woods also reported high levels of willingness (66/100) 
compared to ours (i.e. 30-52). Taking the two strong outcomes for vividness and willingness 
recorded by these authors, one might suggest that better willingness with the task facilitates 
greater vividness.   
The outcome on believability of the scene also suggests a potential relationship 
between vividness and believability both for us and previous researchers. Specifically, the 
mean believability rating was almost significantly greater in the multi-sentence condition 
(36/100) than in single-sentence (25/100). Hence, one might suggest that the greater 
vividness associated with more sentences also increased the believability of the scenario. This 
relationship between vividness and believability is again supported by Marcks and Wood 
(2007), who, in conjunction with very high vividness (69/100) also recorded high 
believability (66/100).  
Rachman et al. (1996) proposed that the presence of negative feelings, such as guilt 
and moral wrongness, may also be critical to attaining increases in distress using the 
emotionally-based single-sentence procedure. This view is supported by the current RQ data 
for both guilt and moral wrongness. Indeed, both procedures employed in Experiment 1 
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generated considerable guilt (42-52/100) and moral wrongness (48-60/100). These outcomes 
are also consistent with other studies. Specifically, the guilt outcomes recorded here were 
very similar to those reported by Rachman et al. (54/100), Zucker et al. (2002; 58/100) and 
Marcks and Woods (2007; 43/100). The current moral wrongness outcomes (48-60/100) were 
also consistent with Marcks and Woods (43/100) and Zucker et al. (52/100).  
Interestingly, all of these outcomes recorded in other research were obtained with the 
single-sentence preparation. And the current data indicated that this manipulation was 
associated with greater guilt (52 vs. 42/100) and greater moral wrongness (60 vs. 48/100) 
than the longer manipulation, however these differences were not significant. These current 
differences suggest one reason why the multi-sentence condition is no more effective than the 
shorter single-sentence manipulation in the reduction of distress. That is, perhaps the longer 
manipulation begins to reduce feelings of guilt and moral wrongness (or generally negative 
feelings) and thus facilitates habituation to distress, which in turn may undermine its potential 
superiority in outcome, which might otherwise be assisted through greater vividness, 
willingness and believability. In any case, the current findings and their concordance with 
other published evidence, support the proposition by Rachman et al. (1996) that negative 
appraisals such as guilt and moral wrongness play a key role in the impact of the single-
sentence (and perhaps other) distress induction procedures.  
 
Summary of Chapter 3 (Experiments 2-5) 
The general aim of Experiments 2-5 was to compare the relative impact of brief 
analogue ACT interventions on experimentally induced distress generated by the single-
sentence procedure. In simple terms, we reasoned that if, as suggested by the hexaflex, self as 
context is pivotal to other ACT processes, distress outcomes associated with ACT 
interventions would likely be enhanced by the addition of a self as context component. 
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Specifically, we asked if interventions based on acceptance, defusion, values and contact with 
the present moment would successfully reduce experimentally induced distress and if so, 
could these effects be enhanced by adding a self as context intervention? In order to facilitate 
better comparisons of the four ACT interventions, we investigated all using an identical 
experimental design. Furthermore, given that the results from Experiment 1 showed no 
superiority of the longer multi-sentence distress induction procedure over Rachman et al.’s 
(1996) single-sentence paradigm, we chose the latter shorter methodology as our focus for 
these comparisons.   
Experiment 2. The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to systematically compare the 
potential for a brief acceptance-based intervention vs. an identical but self-enhanced 
acceptance intervention to reduce subjective experimentally induced distress. Based on the 
hexaflex, we predicted that the self-enhanced acceptance condition would show greater 
efficacy than the acceptance condition alone in reducing discomfort, anxiety and stress. 
However, the primary outcomes did not support this prediction and both interventions 
demonstrated little or no beneficial effects in any regard. While some non-significant 
reductions in discomfort, anxiety and stress were observed in the self-enhanced condition 
(but not in the acceptance condition), all three dependent variables remained higher than 
baseline at post-intervention for both conditions. At post-intervention, the values condition 
increased willingness, while self-enhanced values decreased it. Believability and vividness 
decreased for values and increased for self-enhanced values. Guilt and moral wrongness 
decreased in both conditions and distraction increased in both conditions. None of these 
changes for the RQ were significant. 
Experiment 3. The primary aim of Experiment 3 was to systematically compare the 
potential for a brief defusion-based intervention vs. an identical but self-enhanced defusion 
intervention to reduce subjective distress. Again, we predicted that the self-enhanced 
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condition would show greater efficacy than the defusion condition alone. Again however, the 
primary outcomes did not support this prediction and both interventions demonstrated even 
poorer effects than the acceptance-based interventions from Experiment 1. That is, 
discomfort and anxiety increased after the self-enhanced defusion intervention. These 
changes were not significant. After the defusion alone intervention discomfort and anxiety 
remained unchanged. However there was a significant increases in stress for all participants 
at this point. The RQ data demonstrated that the defusion condition decreased willingness and 
vividness non-significantly, while self-enhanced defusion increased both non-significantly. 
Both conditions increased guilt non-significantly and believability significantly. Defusion 
increased moral wrongness, while self-enhanced defusion decreased it. Both these changes 
were non-significant. 
 Experiment 4. The primary aim of Experiment 4 was to systematically compare a 
brief values-based intervention vs. a self-enhanced values intervention. Again, we predicted 
that the self-enhanced condition would show greater efficacy in reducing distress. Again 
however, the primary outcomes did not support this prediction. Indeed, although all changes 
in discomfort and anxiety were minimal and non-significant, there was superiority for the 
values alone intervention in reducing stress compared to the self-enhanced condition which 
actually increased it. In general, the RQ data showed that the values condition increased 
willingness, believability and guilt non-significantly while the self-enhanced values condition 
decreased these non-significantly. Vividness decreased for values and increased for self-
enhanced values. There was a significant increase in distraction for both conditions. Moral 
wrongness decreased significantly in both conditions. 
Experiment 5. The primary aim of Experiment 5 was to systematically compare a 
brief contact with the present moment intervention vs. a self-enhanced contact intervention. 
Again, we predicted that the self-enhanced condition would show greater efficacy in reducing 
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distress. Again however, the primary outcomes did not support this prediction and the 
outcomes for both interventions were weak and variable. Specifically, both conditions 
showed small and non-significant decreases in discomfort. The contact alone intervention 
decreased anxiety, but increased stress, while self-enhanced contact increased anxiety and 
decreased stress. None of these changes were significant. The RQ data demonstrated that 
guilt, moral wrongness and distraction decreased non-significantly for both conditions. In 
contrast, the self-enhanced contact condition increased willingness, vividness and 
believability while the contact condition decreased these and these changes were not 
significant. 
 
Issues Raised by Chapter 3 
Across Experiments 2-5, all four brief analogue interventions (acceptance, defusion, 
values and contact with the present moment) failed to significantly, or even reliably, reduce 
discomfort, anxiety, or stress to near baseline levels. (We will deal with the outcomes of the 
related self as context interventions in the section below which discusses broader theoretical 
issues raised by the thesis). Collectively, all four stand-alone conditions comprised of 45 
participants and the consistency of data across them is remarkable. Taken together, the 
findings are, at one level, inconsistent with ACT and indicate that none of the target 
interventions appeared to facilitate the separation of participants’ from their negative content 
associated with the distress induction manipulation.  
Only a limited number of published studies have investigated therapeutic components 
of the hexaflex with experimental preparations other than distress induction and these have 
focused only on acceptance and/or values. Among these, several have shown positive 
outcomes for acceptance in terms of reductions in level of chronic pain and associated 
distress in a sample of individuals diagnosed with chronic pain (McCracken, 1998; 
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McCracken, Spertus, Janeck, Sinclair, & Wetzel, 1999; Summers, Rapoff, Varghase, Porter, 
& Palmer, 1991). Similar research by Jacob, Kerns, Rosenberg and Haythornthwaite (1993) 
also found that sufferers who accepted their pain showed less overt pain behaviour and 
depression. Exploring the use of acceptance in an organisational context, Bond and Bunce 
(2003) reported that levels of acceptance predicted mental health and job satisfaction. Even 
more broadly, Butler and Ciarrochi (2007) demonstrated that greater psychological 
acceptance was associated with better quality of life in terms of: health; safety; sense of 
community; and emotional well-being. 
Similarly positive outcomes have been recorded for values interventions. Specifically, 
Creswell et al. (2005) found that values clarification exercises were associated with 
significantly lower cortisol responses to stress than controls. Sheldon, Kasser, Smith and 
Share (2002) found that lifelong goal pursuit correlated with better psychological and 
physical health throughout life. And, even brief values writing exercises have been shown to 
increase school performance in stigmatised minority students (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & 
Master, 2006) and to improve reactions to health messages (Harris & Napper, 2005). The 
experimental design of these studies does not permit sound comparisons with Experiments 2 
(acceptance) and 4 (values) currently. However, the poor results recorded here are generally 
not consistent with the strong and positive published outcomes at least with regard to 
acceptance and values. 
A review of the published evidence for these components when combined with 
experimental distress induction procedures likely affords a better comparison with current 
outcomes. Gutierrez et al. (2004) reported that acceptance resulted in a significant increase in 
pain tolerance with brief electric shock apparatus, but these authors did not include subjective 
measures similar to ours. Hayes, Bisset et al. (1999) also reported positive outcomes for 
acceptance in terms of longest immersion time in the cold pressor task. This study did use 
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subjective measures and found that both discomfort and believability decreased by 12 and 8 
VAS points, respectively. These outcomes differ from Experiment 2 here which found that 
discomfort did not change after exposure to the acceptance intervention. However, our 
believability data from Experiment 2 concords with Hayes et al. in showing decreases in 
belief of 10 VAS points. Kehoe (2008) explored acceptance with radiant heat induction 
presented to undergraduates. Again, acceptance significantly increased pain tolerance, but 
there was no change in either anxiety or discomfort. These findings are consistent with the 
results from Experiment 2, although it is worth noting that the mean discomfort rating 
reported by Kehoe was approximately twice as high (60 vs. 32) than that recorded here. 
Taken together, these outcomes perhaps support the suggestion made above that brief 
acceptance interventions are more beneficial in a context of physical rather than emotional 
distress when induced experimentally. 
Masuda et al. (2004) attempted to investigate the utility of a brief defusion technique 
(based on word repetitions) in the context of a self-criticism task presented to undergraduates 
and similar to that employed in Experiments 6-10. They reported that defusion reduced both 
believability and subjective distress. In a similar study, Healy et al. (2008) also found that 
defusion decreased discomfort and increased willingness, but also increased believability. 
Again however, it is worth noting that their mean believability rating was considerably higher 
than that recorded in Experiment 3 (85 vs. 58). Taken together, these two published outcomes 
showed stronger defusion effects than current findings, even though all three studies 
employed a somewhat similar emotional distress induction procedure.  
Only one published study by Paez-Blarrina et al. (2008a) appears to have explored the 
utility of a values intervention (independently of other ACT components) in the context of 
distress induction. These researchers found that values increased task persistence, but no 
subjective measures were recorded.  
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In addition to comparing the findings from Experiments 2-5 with published evidence 
(with and without the use of distress induction procedures), it also seemed worthwhile to 
compare the outcomes we observed across our four separate ACT processes to determine 
which was the most effective at reducing distress. In Figures 37-39 we compared all four 
stand alone interventions (acceptance, defusion, values and contact with the present moment) 
in the reduction of discomfort, anxiety and stress (i.e. one graph per measure).  
There were some notable differences among conditions in changing discomfort (see 
Figure 37). That is, the contact and defusion exercises decreased discomfort (but not to near 
baseline levels), while values and acceptance increased discomfort. However, results from a 
3x4 ANOVA demonstrated that although the effect for time was significant (p = .00), 
condition and the interaction were not (both ps > .86). 
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Figure 37. Mean discomfort ratings across time for the four stand alone interventions in Experiments 2-5. 
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There were also notable differences among conditions in changing anxiety (see Figure 
38). On this occasion, the contact and acceptance exercises decreased anxiety (only 
marginally), while values and defusion increased anxiety. Again, a 3x4 ANOVA 
demonstrated that the effect for time was significant (p = .00), but condition and the 
interaction were not (both ps > .65). 
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Figure 38. Mean anxiety ratings across time for the four stand alone interventions in Experiments 2-5. 
 
There were notable differences among conditions in changing stress also (see Figure 
39). In this case, only the values exercise decreased stress and did so to close to the baseline 
level. The acceptance exercise resulted in no change in stress, while contact and defusion 
increased stress. Again, a 3x4 ANOVA demonstrated that the effect for time was significant 
(p = .004), but condition and the interaction were not (both ps > .54). 
202 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Baseline Post-induction Post-intervention
M
ea
n
 
St
re
ss
 
R
a
tin
gs
Acceptance
Defusion
Values
Contact
 
Figure 39. Mean stress ratings across time for the four stand alone interventions in Experiments 2-5. 
 
Although one cannot assume that the lack of effects for all interventions resulted from 
the same process (or lack thereof), it is perhaps safe to say that participants showed little or 
no defusion from the emotional content associated with the hypothetical accident (not even in 
the defusion intervention). This is based on the assumption that had defusion taken place 
there would likely have been some decrease in subjective distress. In defence, however, one 
could not also assume that participants showed little acceptance, values, or contact with the 
present moment. From an ACT perspective, one might indeed argue that if participants are 
encouraged to accept such content or make contact with it in the present then distress might 
be expected to increase, rather than decrease. The difficulty with this proposition, however, 
rests on the fact that no consistent or significant changes in any direction were recorded. The 
appropriateness of using ACT-based analogue interventions to reduce emotional discomfort 
is discussed further in the section below which explores broader theoretical issues raised by 
the thesis. 
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Summary of Chapter 4 (Experiments 6-8) 
Chapter 4 included Experiments 6-8 which comprised of empirical analyses of the 
utility and role of mindfulness in distress reduction using a new more ACT-related 
experimental preparation. This simply asked participants to present a self-criticism which 
caused them distress (Masuda et al., 2004). Although, the use of this alternative procedure 
was in part designed to rectify the high drop-out rates (approx. 10% of overall participants) of 
the previous experiments (primarily due to the large numbers of participants with previous 
experience of motor accidents), it also served to provide a distress induction procedure that 
might yield better to brief ACT-based analogue interventions. 
Experiment 6. The aim of Experiment 6 was to explore the potential functional 
distinction (or overlap) between self as context and mindfulness. While the same self as 
context intervention as Experiments 2-5 was employed here, it was now compared to a 
mindfulness exercise taken from the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) 
programme. Based on the little beneficial effects of the interventions in Experiments 2-5 we 
decided to stop making specific predictions at this point.  
We chose to conduct the specific comparison between self as context and mindfulness 
because although elements of both types of interventions require participants to focus on 
aspects of themselves, they are nonetheless distinct in the nature of what is focused upon. 
That is, self as context techniques encourage a focus on psychological events, such as 
thoughts, while mindfulness techniques encourage a focus on somatic events (i.e. the body). 
Hence, comparing the two would perhaps allow us to determine whether it is the self-focus 
per se or the target of this focus that facilitates distress reduction.  
While developing the rationale above, we also reasoned about the possibility that 
there may be a difference between the acts of focusing on content that pertained to the self 
(either psychologically or physically) vs. a more simplified self-focus. Hence, in Experiment 
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6, we introduced a third condition to address this issue. That is, we included a self-focus 
condition in which participants were required to answer a series of questions about 
themselves while being audio-taped. They subsequently listened back to their own voice as 
the audio-recording was replayed. This provided a self-focus but not one that directed 
participants towards their psychological or somatic content. 
 The results demonstrated significant increases in discomfort, anxiety and stress at 
post-induction and thus indicated that the new experimental procedure was a viable means of 
inducing subjective emotional distress. Furthermore, both self as context and mindfulness 
interventions reduced discomfort, anxiety and stress. Although the self-focus condition 
generated a small reduction in discomfort, it actually increased both anxiety and stress, albeit 
marginally. The RQ data showed some further differences among conditions. Specifically, 
willingness decreased in mindfulness, while self-focus and self as context showed little 
change. Believability decreased in all three conditions, with the biggest decrease in 
mindfulness. Vividness remained stable for self as context and self-focus while there was a 
strong decrease for mindfulness. Distraction decreased for mindfulness and self-focus but 
increased for self as context. Guilt decreased in self as context and mindfulness (although it 
was moderately bigger in the latter), but increased marginally in self-focus. 
Experiment 7. Experiment 7 adopted a more specific focus on mindfulness and 
attempted to determine the relative effects of focusing mindfully on physical sensations or on 
thoughts. Although the data from Experiment 6 indicated no such difference, it remained 
possible that when both components are presented within the same therapeutic format (i.e. 
both as mindfulness), some difference might emerge. For this distinction, mindfulness was 
differentiated into two techniques, referred to as physical mindfulness and verbal mindfulness. 
We then compared their relative utility in reducing distress generated by the same induction 
procedure from Experiment 6. 
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Although there was again a significant increase in discomfort and anxiety at post-
induction, the increase in stress ratings on this occasion was not significant. Thereafter, both 
interventions significantly reduced all three dependent measures. The RQ data demonstrated 
that both conditions decreased believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. Willingness 
decreased for physical mindfulness and increased for verbal mindfulness.  
Experiment 8. While both mindfulness interventions from Experiment 7 appeared to 
be equally effective at reducing subjective distress, we then considered the possibility that 
combining both elements would enhance the effects. However, exploring this possibility 
raised the question of whether the sequencing of the two components might influence the 
outcome. For example, mindfulness programmes (e.g. MBCT) always train participants to 
focus on physical events before focusing on psychological events. Hence, we wondered if 
this specific sequencing of the two components (i.e. physical mindfulness followed by verbal 
mindfulness) would be more effective than the reverse (i.e. verbal mindfulness followed by 
physical mindfulness).  
In Experiment 8, the self-criticism task once again significantly increased all three 
dependent measures. Both conditions reduced discomfort and anxiety, but did not do so 
significantly and the conditions did not differ in either regard. While both also reduced stress, 
the physical-verbal mindfulness condition was significantly better than the verbal-physical 
condition. The RQ data showed that both conditions decreased willingness, believability, 
vividness, guilt and distraction. 
 
Issues Raised by Chapter 4 
Numerous authors (e.g. Cardaciotto et al., 2008) have highlighted overlaps between 
ACT and mindfulness, and the most common among these is reliance by both traditions on 
the utility and centrality of acceptance of one’s somatic and psychological content (Hayes et 
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al., 1999; Kabat-Zinn, 2004). In contrast, however, each of these respective traditions at times 
appears to adopt a different perspective with regard to the role and importance of the self. For 
example, some aspects of the mindfulness tradition are silent on the issue of self (Kabat-Zinn, 
1994), while other traditions propose that the verbal self must be targeted and its power and 
influence decreased (Hayes, 1995). As a result, mindfulness techniques vary widely on the 
extent to which they focus explicitly on self. One might, nonetheless, argue that even if self is 
implicit in mindfulness (given that most of the techniques are actually self-focused), then it is 
reasonable to assume that outcomes are potentially influenced by this variable. Experiments 
6-8 were designed to explore this and related issues concerning why mindfulness might have 
the effects it does.  
The results from Experiment 6 showed that self as context and mindfulness were 
equally effective in distress reduction. There are little available studies to compare our results 
with, as the literature generally assumes that mindfulness sits within the ACT model and thus 
it is not necessary to compare each individual component. Only one previous study by 
Wilson (2009) investigated the effects of mindfulness and acceptance strategies for reducing 
anxiety associated with an academic test in a non-clinical sample and found that both 
demonstrated similar efficacy. These results are consistent with those obtained in Experiment 
6. While this concord of evidence is good news for both mindfulness and self as context 
interventions, it again raises questions about the extent to which mindfulness and self as 
context share, as ACT clinicians argue, the same basic process. Even if one supports this 
view, the question about what precisely this shared process is comes into view. Unfortunately 
the fact that all of these concepts are middle level terms makes identification of one such 
process extremely difficult in an experimental context. 
Experiments 7 and 8 did, in some way, tackle this issue by taking the mindfulness 
exercise from Experiment 6 and separating it into two experimental components of physical 
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vs. verbal focus. At the very least the results from Experiment 8 demonstrate that these 
exercises are better combined rather than given as stand alone techniques. And this is 
consistent with the data from contemporary mindfulness therapeutic packages like MBSR 
and MBCT where mindfulness skills are cultivated in a combination of ways. The current 
physical-verbal sequence (which was significantly better at reducing stress than the verbal-
physical sequence) parallels with the sequence in MBSR where cultivating awareness of 
bodily sensations through the Body Scan exercise is the first skill participants are required to 
learn. This skill is then sharpened and applied to problematic psychological content such as 
worrisome thoughts. However, much more empirical work is needed to parse out the 
relationship between these two mindfulness components and to explore the overlap with other 
ACT processes. 
  
Summary of Chapter 5 (Experiments 9-10) 
Chapter 5 included Experiments 9 and 10 which comprised of empirical analyses of 
the utility of hierarchical and distinction relations in ACT techniques in distress reduction 
using the same experimental preparation as Experiments 6-8.  
Experiment 9. Experiment 9 employed two brief self as context interventions with a 
non-clinical sample of undergraduates, presented in the context of the self-criticism task. 
Although the interventions employed were broadly similar to the self as context exercises we 
had employed previously in Experiments 2-6, Experiment 9 used abbreviations of other self 
as context interventions developed by Luciano et al. (2011). The main reason for using these 
modified interventions was to enable us to emphasise specific relations within the techniques 
and to some extent to be able to draw clear comparisons between our data and those reported 
by Luciano et al. Specifically, one self as context intervention explicitly emphasised the 
distinction between self and content, while the other explicitly emphasised a hierarchical 
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relation between these to explore the potential role of the deictic relations in self as context 
techniques.   
Some differences were recorded between the two interventions in terms of their 
efficacy in reducing the dependent measures. Specifically, while the distinction intervention 
did not reduce discomfort or anxiety, the hierarchical intervention reduced both. In contrast, 
while the hierarchical intervention significantly reduced stress, the distinction intervention 
significantly increased it. Outcomes on the RQ demonstrated that both conditions increased 
willingness but decreased believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. 
Experiment 10. Experiment 10 attempted to further explore the relative utility of 
distinction vs. hierarchical relations in self as context interventions, using the same self-
criticism task as previous experiments. However, a second aspect of the research examined 
the extent to which a focus on the self potentially played a role in the outcomes described 
above. Specifically, Experiment 10 compared interventions that focused on participants’ 
thoughts about the self-criticism (i.e. self-focused) vs. interventions that focused on thoughts 
about an inanimate object (i.e. object-focused). In short, participants in both groups were 
asked to focus on thoughts, but only in the self-focused interventions did they focus on 
thoughts about themselves. This manipulation sought to determine the extent to which a focus 
on self-specific content affected the utility of the intervention. Within each of these two pairs 
of conditions, the experimental design also sought to manipulate the relational nature of this 
distancing, through which distinction or hierarchy relations were specifically targeted. Hence, 
this created four conditions in total, two self-focused (self hierarchy and self distinction) and 
two object-focused (object hierarchy and object distinction). 
 The results demonstrated significant changes across time in all three dependent 
variables across all four conditions showing that there were little differences between the four 
conditions in terms of distress reduction. However, there was a significant decrease in AAQ 
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scores for the two hierarchical conditions (self hierarchy and object hierarchy), but not for the 
two distinction conditions. In addition the correlational data demonstrated superiority of both 
hierarchical interventions over distinction as a longer practice period for both object 
hierarchy and self hierarchy were associated with lower scores on the AAQ and lower 
distress. In addition, there were little differences between the utility of the object-focused vs. 
self-focused interventions. The results from the RQ demonstrated that at post-intervention I 
all conditions decreased believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. Willingness increased 
for self distinction, self hierarchy and object distinction at this point, while objective 
distinction decreased. At post-induction II, all conditions decreased willingness and 
believability, while all conditions increased vividness. Guilt increased for self distinction, self 
hierarchy and object distinction but decreased for object hierarchy. Distraction increased for 
self distinction, self hierarchy and object distinction, but it increased for object hierarchy. At 
post-intervention II, all conditions decreased believability, vividness, guilt and distraction. 
Self distinction, self hierarchy and object distinction increased willingness, while object 
hierarchy decreased it. 
 
Issues Raised by Chapter 5 
The integration of RFT and ACT is central to the CBS reticulated model and the 
programme of research it promotes and relies upon. In the General Introduction, we argued 
that the third generation of RFT research contained the beginnings of the integration of RFT 
and ACT through componential analyses and the application of RFT protocols to clinical 
samples. We also proposed that we are on the cusp of a fourth generation of RFT research 
that attempts to define concepts that are central to ACT in RFT terms. Experiments 9 and 10 
were derived from this latter research endeavour and explored ways in which specific 
relations (e.g. hierarchical) may underpin ACT’s self as context techniques. 
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In both Experiments 9 and 10, the hierarchical interventions resulted in a reduction in 
all three dependent measures, including a significant reduction in stress. Specifically, 
Experiment 9 reported only marginal superiority of the hierarchical intervention in reducing 
discomfort and anxiety, although the superiority was significant in reducing stress (stress 
actually increased in the distinction intervention). The data from Experiment 10 concord 
almost entirely with these outcomes. Specifically, Experiment 10 found little or no 
differences between the hierarchical and distinction interventions on discomfort and anxiety. 
However, similar to the findings reported in Experiment 9, Experiment 10 showed superiority 
for the hierarchical interventions with regard to stress. Specifically, both hierarchical 
interventions were associated with significant reductions in stress after both exposures to the 
intervention. In Experiment 10 this extensive outcome was superior overall to the distinction 
interventions which reduced stress after the first distress induction but did not do so 
significantly, although both did reduce stress significantly or near significantly after the 
second distress induction. In summary, the stress measure not only generated the most 
positive outcomes, but also parsed out the relative utility of the hierarchical vs. distinction 
interventions and found hierarchical to be superior. 
Unlike Experiment 9, Experiment 10 incorporated a short practice period between 
exposures to further explore the relative benefits of the interventions across time. In doing so, 
Experiment 10 showed superiority for the hierarchical interventions on the two exposures to 
the AAQ. Specifically, the hierarchical interventions were associated with a significant 
reduction in AAQ means from before the first distress induction (baseline I) to after the 
practice period (baseline II), while the distinction interventions were not. In other words, only 
the hierarchical interventions significantly reduced emotional avoidance. While this finding 
enhances the benefits observed with the hierarchical interventions, it also points to some 
interaction between avoidance and reductions in stress. Although the current research does 
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not permit speculation about the nature of this relationship and we would not go as far as 
saying that avoidance mediated the outcomes even to some extent, the correlational data also 
support some relationship between these two variables. That is, in general, the AAQ 
correlated significantly with all three types of distress at all six time points at which the 
dependent variables were measured. Hence, the higher participants’ AAQ scores, the higher 
their discomfort, anxiety and stress. Further research would be needed to specifically address 
this interesting relationship and to explore the possibility that avoidance mediates distress. 
The follow-up feature of Experiment 10 permitted by the practice period also 
highlighted the superiority of the hierarchical interventions. Only these interventions, not 
distinction, showed a significant correlation between length of the practice period and level of 
distress in Stage 2. That is, the longer the interval between the stages, the lower the distress 
afterwards. Furthermore, object hierarchy was the only intervention that showed a significant 
correlation between length of the practice period and scores on the AAQ at baseline II. In 
other words, the longer the interval between stages, the lower the avoidance for this condition. 
The practice period data were also informative with regard to the superiority of the 
hierarchical interventions in indicating stronger correlations than distinction between practice 
amount and level of distress in Stage 2.  
The superiority for the hierarchical conditions in Experiment 9 and 10 is consistent 
with Luciano et al (2011)’s data, in which the defusion II intervention resulted in a significant 
reduction in problematic behaviours, along with a significant increase in mindfulness and 
psychological flexibility for the high-risk adolescents. The lack of effect for the distinction 
intervention is also similar to the findings from Luciano et al. who reported only limited 
effects for defusion I. It is important to emphasise, however, that the distinction interventions 
in Experiment 10 did reduce stress (but not discomfort or anxiety) significantly or near 
significantly at post-intervention II. Furthermore, there were procedural differences between 
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Experiments 9 and 10, and the original (including differences in the length and focus of the 
interventions), which make drawing close comparisons somewhat difficult.  
One methodological feature of the current study which differs from the original by 
Luciano et al. (2011) is the generation here of only one self-criticism as the distress induction 
procedure. In contrast, the original researchers required participants to generate several target 
thoughts and feelings as part of the intervention. At a methodological level, the distress 
induction procedure may be even more effective if several pieces or types of self-referential 
content were targeted. However, doing so may function as a type of exemplar training, which, 
in and of itself, potentially serves as an intervention. Again, future research might explore the 
potential utility of having multiple self-criticisms, while paying attention to their possible 
influence on selected interventions.  
 
Broader Issues Pertaining to Experiments 1-10 
Efficacy of self as context interventions. The role of self is explicit in the hexaflex 
via the term ‘self as context’. However, the same term is, unfortunately, also used to describe 
therapeutic exercises that address this component. Although designated as an individual 
component process, self as context is deemed to be at the core of the hexaflex because it 
encompasses all other ACT processes. Specifically, self as context is said to encompass 
acceptance, defusion, values and contact with the present moment, because all five processes 
are necessary for the construction of a secure sense of self that is distinct from one’s 
psychological content. 
Experiment 6 contained the last use of the first type of self as context intervention we 
explored (i.e. the Observer exercise). Hence, there may be some utility in comparing the 
outcomes recorded across the five types of exposure to this intervention in Experiments 2-6. 
For illustrative purposes, the data from these are graphed in Figure 40 (N = 55). However, it 
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is important to draw attention to two caveats that pertain to this type of comparison. 1. In 
Experiments 2-5, the four self as context interventions were actually combined with the four 
target hexaflex processes. 2. The self as context intervention in Experiment 6 was delivered 
in conjunction with a different distress induction procedure than that employed in 
Experiments 2-5. Please also note that the strong similarity in outcomes associated with each 
of the five self as context interventions rendered it more feasible to employ one graph that 
presented discomfort, anxiety and stress, rather than three separate graphs as we generally 
employed thus far. 
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Figure 40. Mean distress ratings for all self as context interventions in Experiments 2-6. 
 
Figure 40 clearly demonstrates a lack of efficacy for the self as context interventions 
on all three measures of distress. And as expected a series of paired samples t-tests confirmed 
that the ratings did not differ significantly from post-induction to post-intervention (all 
ps > .35). These poor outcomes do not concord with the only available published study that 
has highlighted self as context techniques as reported by Williams (2006). That is, although 
we found that self as context interventions were ineffective at reducing emotional distress, 
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Williams reported these techniques reduced symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) scale for war veterans.  
A somewhat different experimental path was adapted in our investigations of self as 
context techniques in Experiments 9 and 10. And fortunately, these showed much more 
positive outcomes for the target self as context interventions than our previous attempts. 
Indeed in the later experiments the self as context interventions were generally effective in 
reducing subjective distress and the hierarchical interventions were distinctly successful. 
Although we are limited in drawing comparisons between the self as context outcomes in 
Experiments 2-5 (the single-sentence task) with those in Experiments 6, 9 and 10 (self-
criticism task) because of methodological differences, the collective data and strong 
differences in outcomes still warrant some discretion about the role of self in these techniques. 
We hoped that the unusual comparison between the self-focused and object-focused 
interventions in Experiment 10 would allow us to parse out whether what was actually been 
focused on was important, but the data suggested not. In other words, it did not matter 
whether participants focused on their own thoughts about the self-criticism directly or on 
thoughts about an inanimate object, distress went down in either case. In hindsight however, 
one might argue that in both cases participants are still focusing on their own thoughts, hence 
on themselves. As a result, in practice the object-focused interventions were no less focused 
on the self than the interventions we labelled as self-focused. 
On balance, this short-coming is offset to some extent by the interesting outcomes we 
recorded for the hierarchical vs. distinction based self as context interventions. These quite 
successfully showed that establishing a hierarchical relationship between an individual and 
his/her psychological content is better at reducing distress than establishing a distinction 
relation between these two. Not only does this support our starting position that RFT may 
provide a useful inroad towards a better understanding of ACT’s middle level terms, but it 
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also permits quite a fine grained analysis of the important relationship between one’s self and 
one’s content. The superiority not only of hierarchy over distinction but also of these later 
self as context interventions over our early endeavours suggest (as also suggested by Luciano 
et al., 2011) that this may be the most productive route into an empirical understanding and 
account of the benefits and processes of self as context. 
A methodological issue. The results from Experiments 1-5 add to a large literature on 
the use of experimental distress induction procedures that include the cold pressor task, 
electric shock and radiant heat (e.g. Gutierrez et al., 2004; Hayes, Bisset et al., 1999; Kehoe 
et al., in press). Although, the Rachman et al’s (1996) single-sentence paradigm is short, 
simplistic and requires no apparatus, it appeared to be an effective means of inducing distress. 
Furthermore, these features made it procedurally easy to co-ordinate the methodology with 
brief analogue interventions. The procedure’s main drawbacks relate to its reliance on 
emotional rather than physical reactions, and thus on subjective self-report measures as 
dependent variables. But the extent to which these are actually problematic relative to other 
distress induction formats has not been explored in the literature. Suffice to say that the data 
indicated that in the current context this short distress induction procedure was effective in 
increasing participants’ discomfort, anxiety and stress to levels at which the relative efficacy 
of brief interventions in reducing this elevated distress could then be investigated. On balance 
the high drop rates (approx 10%) associated with this distress induction task, due to the large 
number of participants who had previous related experience with car accidents, was both 
surprising and inconvenient. It is indeed something that researchers using this procedure 
should be aware of.  
To address this and other ACT-based issues, Experiments 6-10 employed a different 
distress induction procedure. Indeed in the course of the thesis we employed three distress 
induction procedures overall: the single-sentence procedure; the multi-sentence procedure; 
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and the self-criticism task. Although it was not entirely our intention to explore such an array 
of procedures, doing so has nonetheless given us an opportunity to compare these in terms of 
their relative efficacy in inducing emotional distress. For illustrative purposes, we collated the 
data for each procedure and have represented this in Figures 41, 42 and 43 in terms of 
discomfort, anxiety and stress, respectively. 
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Figure 41. Mean discomfort ratings across time for all distress induction procedures in Experiments 1-10. 
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Figure 42. Mean anxiety ratings across time for all distress induction procedures in Experiments 1-10. 
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Figure 43. Mean stress ratings across time for all distress induction procedures in Experiments 1-10. 
 
Figure 41 shows that all three procedures were effective in inducing emotional 
discomfort, although no one was more effective in this regard. Indeed a 3x3 ANOVA 
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demonstrated that the effect for time (p = .00) and the interaction effect (p = .01) were 
significant, although condition was not (p = .1).  
Figure 42 again shows that all three procedures were effective in inducing emotional 
anxiety although no one was more effective in this regard. Indeed a 3x3 ANOVA 
demonstrated that the effect for time (p =.00) and the interaction effect (p = .04). 
Figure 43 again shows that all three procedures were effective in inducing emotional 
stress although no one was more effective in this regard. Indeed a 3x3 ANOVA demonstrated 
that the effect for time (p =.00) and the interaction effect (p = .05) were significant, although 
condition was not (p = .57). 
How appropriate is it to measure ACT outcomes as distress reduction? One 
might reasonably argue that attempts to alter emotional content are not applicable to ACT 
techniques, which by contrast foster valued action over changing emotional content. As a 
result, the lack of consistent changes in emotional content are in fact consistent with ACT. Of 
course, this issue cannot be resolved in the context of a distress induction paradigm, which is 
fundamentally based on manipulating self-reported emotional distress. However, we would 
argue that the distress induction procedure provided a robust experimental means of 
exploring the processes at work in manipulating emotional responding and an exploration of 
the possibility that whether it is intended or not, some of the benefits associated with ACT 
components may relate to their ability to reduce emotional distress. There remains only 
limited published evidence on individual ACT components and their relative efficacy and this 
type of componential analysis is best conducted with a tried-and-tested experimental 
preparation. It is also fair to say that there is at present only a very limited number of 
experimental preparations available that might be applicable to these empirical aims. The 
development of such procedures is a critical weakness in research efforts to subject middle 
level ACT processes to empirical and functional analyses. 
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Naturally, there is a range of methodological limitations within the current work, 
which have implications for future research. For example, the dependent variables chosen 
here may have limited applicability in an ACT context, whereas the use of a behavioural 
approach task may be a more appropriate outcome measure. For example, Kehoe et al. (in 
press) used radiant heat apparatus as the distress induction procedure and this allows amount 
of heat tolerance in time to be measured. Doing so circumvents the reliance on self-report 
measures and supplements the work with more direct measures of functional processes. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of a behavioural task allows for the collection of more robust 
follow-up data than subjective measures as taken at any one point in time. This, in turn, 
potentially demonstrates the stability and generalization of outcomes across time and is also a 
better analogue of what happens in a therapeutic context.  
The stress measure. Interestingly subjective stress appeared to be the most malleable 
dependent measure throughout this programme of research. Indeed, in Experiment 8 the 
stress measure successfully separated the two mindfulness sequences and highlighted the 
superiority of physical-verbal mindfulness over verbal-physical mindfulness. In addition, 
Experiments 9 and 10 also showed significant reductions in stress for the hierarchical 
interventions, but not for distinction. One explanation for the sensitivity of the stress measure, 
relative to discomfort and anxiety, perhaps lies with the meaning of the word ‘stress’ for an 
undergraduate sample. That is, these participants may perceive of stress as more transient and 
less serious (e.g. a stressful day at college) than discomfort and anxiety and as a result it is 
more malleable through a brief intervention. These relative interpretations are not only a 
weakness that is hard to circumvent with subjective measures, but are also a potential factor 
when a non-clinical sample is brought into an experiment and asked to disclose something 
that is painful to them. In other words, it is highly unlikely that participants will disclose 
something that causes them persistent discomfort or anxiety, but may be more willing to 
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disclose something that is more transiently ‘stressful’ than anxiety-provoking or discomfort-
inducing.  
The issue of middle level terms. The current programme of research is among the 
first to attempt to target specific components of the ACT model and the functional elements 
of mindfulness and relational frames in the context of ACT exercises. In doing so, it fits the 
broader research agenda of scientific bridge building between ACT and RFT, while 
recognising the difficulties inherent in the use of middle level terms, such as self as context 
and defusion. Consider Experiments 9 and 10. One notable difference between these two 
studies and the original study presented by Luciano et al. (2001) concerned the terminology 
used to describe the core component shared by both interventions. That is, we conceptualised 
these as self as context-based interventions, while the original authors described these as 
defusion. The very fact that two sets of researchers can employ two different labels (that are 
distinguished as two separate hexaflex processes) for what is basically the same intervention 
indicates a lack of precision and functionality in these core processes. In the General 
Introduction, we described work which we have published in which we articulate the details 
and benefits of looking to RFT for an answer to these critical problems of definition.  
On balance, it is important to emphasise that the concept of the three selves is no less 
of a middle level term than the concept of defusion, in the sense that it is not a laboratory 
identified process. And we recognise that there are limits to this type of translation exercise 
(or point-by-point mapping) in which ACT-based middle level terms are translated into RFT 
concepts. For us, the ultimate goal is to employ bottom-up RFT terms that will be subject to 
on-going scientific scrutiny and where possible and useful, to replace untestable middle level 
terms with these more basic and organic scientific processes. From that scientific perspective, 
only bottom-up functional behavioural processes are an acceptable unit of investigation and 
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analysis. While top-down concepts are pragmatically, heuristically and clinically useful, they 
have little or no scientific value. 
One of the central ways forward in dealing with middle level terms is to replace them 
with more functionally sound, empirically tested concepts, such as replacing the terms self as 
context with distinction or hierarchical deictic relations. Although Experiments 9 and 10 are 
only one small step in that direction, the findings suggest that RFT concepts may have more 
clinical application than might have been previously recognised.      
Concluding Comments. A strong aim in CBS is to explore the potential overlap 
between clinical and basic research concepts. Historically, the two broad pillars of CBS, 
namely ACT and RFT emerged in tandem but did not speak directly to one another. In simple 
terms, clinicians use language that serves clinical and therapeutic purposes, while researchers 
use language that is of largely scientific value. Indeed, this dissociation of clinical and basic 
research interests is not specific to CBS, but the organization is perhaps unusual in its focused 
efforts to integrate these two pillars. The current programme of research is in line with this 
bridge-building between the basic and applied nature of CBS and in particular is focused 
distinctly in its efforts on the role of self.  
The hexaflex is a heuristic model of processes which to date have not been subject to 
functional analyses. If one was to start with a bottom-up analysis, there would be no hexaflex 
because such a model is top-down. If we start with a top-down model then the aim becomes 
about searching for functional analytic terms which might map onto those already present 
within the model. But this may be neither possible nor useful. For example, if existing 
processes turn out not to be functionally identifiable, then they would have to be abandoned. 
That is difficult to do once a model gets established in a verbal community, especially when 
this occurred in the absence of functional evidence. So, in a sense what we are trying to do in 
integrating RFT concepts into a top-down heuristic model is the mixing of two types of 
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analyses. However, if the hexaflex model is widely adhered to and understood by a specific 
verbal community, then perhaps the type of integration we present here is a good place to 
start.  
There are obvious merits to reticulated models and indeed it is hard to see how to 
integrate clinical and basic research concepts in any other way without essentially becoming 
solely either top-down or bottom-up. Psychological traditions, on the whole, have not been 
particularly successful in this regard; hence it is hard to look for comparisons elsewhere. But, 
it is also difficult to see in advance what this reticulation of concepts will ultimately look like. 
For example, if ACT-based concepts eventually yield to RFT interpretations. Consider the 
example from the current research where self as context may be operationally defined in 
terms of a combination of deictic and hierarchical frames. This would in practice be bottom-
up. It is certainly the case that this approach is appropriate for integrating ACT and RFT at 
the present time when the two pillars rely on distinctly different concepts. However, it may 
be the case eventually that middle level clinical concepts are no longer valuable and that 
clinicians will be trained to use bottom-up concepts from the beginning. In such a scientific 
ideal, a reticulated model would no longer be necessary.   
Of course, there are a number of inherent areas of clear overlap between ACT- and 
RFT-based concepts because they hail from the same functional, behavioural, contextual 
tradition. However, recent discussion and research has added to this integration by beginning 
to identify specific areas in which the two pillars appear, at least, to be talking about the same 
thing. The current programme of empirical work is part of this new endeavour. It is not its 
aim to decide whether CBS should follow or reject a reticulated model of its basic processes. 
That is a matter for conceptual debate and something that will emerge across years of 
empirical research. All that we have done here is to illustrate what the beginnings of such a 
debate and such a research agenda might look like. 
223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 
 
References 
Bach, P. B., & Hayes, S. C. (2002). The use of acceptance and commitment therapy to prevent the 
rehospitalization of psychotic patients: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 70, 1129-1139. 
Baer, R. A., & Krietemeyer, J. (2006). Overview of mindfulness-and acceptance-based treatment 
approaches. In R. A. Baer (Ed.), Mindfulness-based treatment approaches: Clinician’s 
guide to evidence base and applications (pp. 3-27). London: Academic Press. 
Baer, R., A., Smith, G. T., & Allen, K. B. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-report: The 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills. Assessment, 11, 191-206. 
Barnes, D. (1994). Stimulus equivalence and relational frame theory. The Psychological Record, 
44, 91-124. 
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Smeets, P. M., & Luciano, C. (2004). The derived 
transfer of mood functions through equivalence relations. The psychological Record, 54, 96-
114. 
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Smeets, P. M., Strand, P., & Friman, P. (2004). 
Establishing relational responding in accordance with more-than and less-than as 
generalized operant behaviour in young children. International Journal of Psychology and 
Psychological Therapy, 4, 531-558. 
Barnes-Homes, D., Hayes, S. C., & Dymond, S. (2001). Self and self-directed rules. In S. C. 
Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational Frame Theory: A post-Skinnerian 
account of human language and cognition (pp. 119-140). New York: Klumer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., & Gregg, J. (2001). Religion, spirituality, and transcendence. In 
S. C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational Frame Theory: A post-
225 
 
Skinnerian account of human language and cognition (pp. 239-252). New York: Plenum 
Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindeness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Theory of mind and autism: A fifteen year review. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. 
Tager-Flusberg, & D. J. Cohen (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from 
developmental cognitive neuroscience (pp. 3-20). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of 
mind?” Cognition, 21, 37-46. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., & Cohen, D. J. (2000). Understanding other minds: 
Perspectives from developmental cognitive neuroscience. Oxford: University Press. 
Berens, N. M., & Hayes, S. C. (2007). Arbitrarily applicable comparative relations: Experimental 
evidence for relational operants. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 40, 45-71. 
Bishop, S. R., Lau, M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L., Anderson, N., Carmody, J., Segal, Z. V. et al., 
(2004). Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition. Clinical Psychology: Science and 
Practice, 11, 230-241. 
Blackledge, J. T., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2009). Core processes in Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy. In J. Blackledge, J. Ciarrochi, & F. Deane (Eds.), Acceptance and commitment 
therapy: Contemporary theory, research, and practice (pp. 41-58). Bowen Hills, Australia: 
Australian Academic Press. 
Bocci, L., & Gordon P. K. (2007). Does magical thinking produce neutralising behaviour? An 
experimental investigation.  Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1823-1833. 
Bond, F. W., & Bunce, D. (2003). The role of acceptance and job control in mental health, job 
satisfaction, and work performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 1057-1067. 
226 
 
Bond, F. W., & Flaxman, P. E. (2006). The ability of psychological flexibility and job control to 
predict learning, job performance, and mental health. Journal of Organizational Behavior 
Management, 26, 113-130. 
Bond, F. W., Flaxman, P. E., & Bunce, D. (2008). The influence of psychological flexibility on 
work redesign: mediated moderation of a work reorganization intervention. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 93, 645-654. 
Bond F. W., Hayes, S. C., Baer, R. A., Carpenter, K. C., Guenole, N., Orcutt, H. K, Waltz, T., et 
al. (2011). Preliminary psychometric properties of the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-II: A revised measure of psychological flexibility and acceptance. Behavior 
Therapy, 42, 676-688. 
Brown, K., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: mindfulness and its role in 
psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-48. 
Butler, J., & Ciarrochi, J. (2007). Psychological acceptance and quality of life in the elderly. 
Quality of Life Research, 16, 607-615. 
Cardaciotto L., Herbert, J. D., Forman, E. M., Moitra, E., & Farrow, V. (2008). The assessment of 
present-moment awareness and acceptance: The Philadelphia mindfulness scale. Assessment, 
15, 204-223. 
Carr, D., Wilkinson, K. M., Blackman, D., & McIlvane, W. J. (2000) Equivalence classes in 
individuals with minimal verbal repertoires. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 74, 101-114. 
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, M. R. 
Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, and 
treatment (pp. 69-93). New York: Guilford Press. 
Cohen, G. L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N., & Master, A. (2006). Reducing the racial achievement gap: A 
social psychological intervention. Science, 313, 1307-1310. 
227 
 
Crane, C., & Barnhofer, T., Duggan, D. S., Hepburn, S., Fennel. M. V., & Williams, M. G. 
(2008). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy and self discrepancy in recovered depressed 
patients with a history of depression and suicidality. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32, 
775-787. 
Creswell, J. D., Welch, W. T., Taylor, S. E., Sherman, D. K., Gruenewald, T. L., & Mann, T. 
(2005). Affirmation of personal values buffers neuroendocrine and psychological stress 
responses. Psychological Science, 16, 846-851. 
Dimeff, L., & Linehan, M. M. (2001). Dialectical behaviour therapy in a nutshell. The California 
Psychologist, 34, 10-13. 
Duval, T. S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1997). Behavior-analytic approaches to self-awareness. Psychological 
Record, 47, 181-200. 
Dymond, S., Roche, B., Forsyth, J. P., Whelan, R., & Rhoden, J. (2008). Derived avoidance 
learning: Transformation of avoidance response functions in accordance with same and 
opposite relational frames. The Psychological Record, 58, 269-286. 
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited: Or a theory of a theory. American Psychologist, 28, 
404-414.  
Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: W. W. Norton Publishers. 
Farb, N. A., Segal, Z. V., Mayberg, H., Bean, J., McKeon, D., Fatima, Z., & Anderson A. K. 
(2007). Attending to the present: mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural modes of 
self-reference. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2, 313-322. 
Flaxman, P. E., & Bond, F. W. (2006). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) in the 
workplace. In R. A. Baer (Ed.), Mindfulness-based treatments approaches: Clinician’s 
guide to evidence based and application (pp. 377-399). London: Academic Press. 
228 
 
Fletcher, L., & Hayes, S. C. (2005). Relational Frame Theory, Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy, and a functional analytic definition of mindfulness. Journal of Rational-Emotive & 
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 23, 315-336. 
Foody, M., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2012). The role of self in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT). In L. McHugh & I. Stewart (Eds.), The self and perspective 
taking: Research and applications (pp. 125-142). Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Press.  
Foody, M., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Törneke, N., Luciano, C., & Stewart, I. 
(under review). Using RFT to construct and deconstruct clinical metaphors. Journal of 
Contextual Behavioral Science. 
Gifford, E. V., & Hayes, S. C. (1999). Functional contextualism: A pragmatic philosophy for 
behavioural science. In W. O’Donohue & R. Kitchener (Eds.), Handbook of behaviourism 
(pp. 285-327). San Diego: Academic Press. 
Gil, E., Luciano, C., Ruiz, F. J., & Valdivia-Salas, V. (2012). A preliminary demonstration of 
transformation of functions through hierarchical relations. International Journal of 
Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 12, 1-19. 
Gregg, J. A., Callaghan, G. M., Hayes, S. & Glenn-Lawson, J. L. (2007). Improving diabetes self-
management through acceptance, mindfulness, and values: a randomized controlled trial. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 75, 336-343. 
Griffee, K., & Dougher, M. J. (2002). Contextual control of stimulus generalization and stimulus 
equivalence in hierarchical categorization. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
78, 433-447. 
Gutiérrez, O., Luciano, C., Rodríguez, M., & Fink, B. C. (2004). Comparison between an 
acceptance-based and cognitive-based protocol for coping with pain. Behavior Therapy, 35, 
767-783. 
229 
 
Harmon, K., Strong, R., & Pasnak, R. (1982). Relational responses in tests of transposition with 
rhesus monkeys. Learning and Motivation, 13, 495-504. 
Harris, P. R., & Napper, L. E. (2005). Self-affirmation and the biased processing of threatening 
health-risk information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1250-1263. 
Hartman, L. M. (1983). A metacognitive model of social anxiety: Implications for treatment. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 3, 435-456. 
Hayes, S. C. (1984). Making sense of spirituality. Behaviorism, 12, 99-110. 
Hayes, S. C. (1995). Knowing selves. The Behavior Therapist, 18, 94-96. 
Hayes, S. C. (2002). Buddhism and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. Cognitive and 
Behavioral Practice, 9, 58-66. 
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (Eds.) (2001) Relational Frame Theory: A post-
Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New York: Plenum Press. 
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Wilson, K. G. (2012). Contextual behavioural science: 
Creating a science more adequate to the challenge of the human condition. Journal of 
Contextual Behavioral Science, 1, 1-16. 
Hayes S. C., Bisset, R. T., Korn, Z., Zettle, R. D., Rosenfarb, I. S., Cooper, L. D., & Grundt, A. 
M. (1999). The impact of acceptance verses control rationales on pain tolerance. The 
Psychological Record, 4, 33-47. 
Hayes, S. C., Fox, E., Gifford, E., Wilson, K., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Healy, O. (2001). Derived 
relational responding as learned behavior. In S. C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche 
(Eds.), Relational frame theory: A post-Skinnerain account of human language and 
cognition (pp. 21-50). New York: Plenum Press. 
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J., Bond, F., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy: Model, processes, and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1-25. 
230 
 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: An 
experiential approach to behavior change. New York: Guilford Press. 
Hayes, S. C., Wilson, K. W., Gifford, E. V., Follette, V. M., & Strosahl, K. (1996). Experiential 
avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional approach to diagnosis and 
treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1152-1168. 
Healy, H., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Keogh, C., Luciano, C., & Wilson, K. (2008). 
An experimental test of a cognitive defusion exercise: Coping with negative and positive 
self-statements. The Psychological Record, 58, 623-640. 
Hope, D. A., Gansler, D. A., & Heimberg, R. (1989). Attentional focus and causal attributions in 
social phobia: Implications from social psychology. Clinical Psychology Review, 9, 49-60. 
Howlin, P., Baron-Cohen, S., & Hadwin, J. (1999). Teaching children with autism to mind-read: 
A practical guide. Chichester, England: Wiley Publishers. 
Ingram, R. E. (1990). Self-focused attention in clinical disorders: Review and a conceptual model. 
Psychological Bulletin, 107, 156-176. 
Jacob, M. C., Kerns, R. D., Rosenberg, R., & Haythornthwaite, J. (1993). Chronic Pain: intrusion 
and accommodation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 519-527 
Jain, S., Shapiro, S. L., Swanick, S., Roesch, S., Mills, P. J., Bell, I, et al., (2007). A randomized 
controlled trial of mindfulness meditation versus relaxation training: effects on distress, 
positive states of mind, rumination, and distraction. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 323, 
11-21. 
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology (Vol. 1), New York: Henry-Holt and Co.  Publishers. 
James, W. (1910). Psychology: The briefer course. New York: Holt Publishers. 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1982). An out-patient program in behavioral medicine for chronic pain patients 
based on the practice of mindfulness meditation: Theoretical considerations and preliminary 
results. General Hospital Psychiatry, 4, 33-47.  
231 
 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Wherever you go, there you are: Mindfulness meditation in everyday life. 
New York: Hyperion Press. 
Kabat-Zinn, J., Lipworth, L., & Burney, R. (1985). The clinical use of mindfulness meditation for 
the self-regulation of chronic pain. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 8, 163-190. 
Kabat-Zinn, J., Wheeler, E., Light, T., Skillings, A., Scharf, T., Cropley, G., Hosmer, D., et al. 
(1998). Influence of a mindfulness based stress reduction intervention on rates of skin 
clearing in patients with moderate to severe psoriasis undergoing phototherapy (UVB) and 
photochemotherapy (PUVA). Psychosomatic Medicine, 60, 625-632. 
Kaplan, K. H., Goldenberg, D. L., & Galvin-Nadeau, M. (1993). The impact of meditation-based 
stress reduction on fibromyalgia. General Hospital Psychiatry, 15, 284-289.  
Karekla, M., Forsyth, J. P., & Kelly, M. M. (2004). Emotional avoidance and panicogenic 
responding to a biological challenge procedure. Behavior Therapy, 35, 725-746.  
Kehoe, A. (2008). Experimental analyses of pain: Understanding processes and developing 
interventions. Unpublished Doctorate, National University Ireland, Maynooth. 
Kehoe, A., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Luciano, C., Bond, F., & Foody, M. (in 
press). Systematic analyses of the effects of acceptance on tolerance of radiant heat pain. 
The Psychological Record. 
Keogh, C. (2008). Cognitive and emotional defusion: Investigations of the underlying 
psychological processes using explicit and implicit measures. Unpublished Doctorate, 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth. 
Keogh, E., Bond, F. W, Hanmer, R., & Tilston, J. (2005). Comparing acceptance-and control-
based coping instructions on the cold-pressor pain experiences of healthy men and women. 
European Journal of Pain, 9, 591-598. 
Kristeller, J. L., & Hallet, C. B. (1999). An exploratory study of a meditation-based intervention 
for binge eating disorder. Journal of Health Psychology, 4, 357-63. 
232 
 
Leekman, S. R., & Perner, J. (1991). Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit? 
Cognition, 40, 203-218. 
Levin, M. E., & Hayes, S. C. (2009). ACT, RFT, and contextual behavioral science. In .T. 
Blackledge, J. Ciarrochi, & F. P. Deane (Eds.), Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: 
Contemporary research and practice (pp. 1-40). Sydney: Australian Academic Press. 
Levin, M. E., Hildebrandt, M. J., Lillis, J., & Hayes, S. C. (2012). The impact of treatment 
components suggested by the psychological flexibility model: A meta-analysis of 
laboratory-based component studies. Behavior Therapy, 43, 741-756. 
Levitt, J. T., Brown, T. A., Orsillo, S. M., & Barlow, D. H. (2004). The effects of acceptance 
versus suppression of emotion on subjective and psychophysiological response to carbon 
dioxide challenge in patients with panic disorder. Behavior Therapy, 35, 747-766. 
Lillis, J., Hayes, S. C., Bunting, K., & Masuda, A. (2009). Teaching acceptance and mindfulness 
to improve the lives of the obese: A preliminary test of a theoretical model. Annals of 
Behavioral Medicine, 37, 58-69. 
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder.  
New York: Guilford Press. 
Lipkins, G., Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J. (1993). Longitudinal study of derived stimulus relations 
in an infant. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 201-239. 
Luciano, C., Berens, N. M., Rodríguez, M., Manas, I., Ruiz, F., & Valdivia-Salas, S.  (2009). 
Acquiring the earliest relational operants: Coordination, difference, opposition, comparison, 
and hierarchy. In Y. Barnes-Holmes, & R. A. Rehfeldt (Eds.), Derived relational 
responding: Application for learners with autism and other developmental disabilities (pp. 
149-170). Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Press. 
233 
 
Luciano, C., Gómez-Becerra, I., & Rodríguez-Valverde, M. (2007). The role of multiple-
exemplar training and naming in establishing derived equivalence in an infant. Journal of 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 87, 349-365. 
Luciano, C., Ruiz, F. J., Vizcaíno-Torres, R. M., Sánchez-Martín V., Gutiérrez-Martínez, O., & 
López-López, J. C. (2011). A relational frame analysis of defusion in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy: A preliminary and quasi-experimental study with at-risk adolescents. 
International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 11, 165-182. 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1993). Self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric 
rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 339-349. 
Marcks, B. A., & Woods, D. W. (2007). Role of thought-related beliefs and coping strategies in 
the escalation of intrusive thoughts: An analog to obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 45, 2640-2651. 
Masuda, A., Hayes, S. C., Sackett, C. F., Twohig, M. P. (2004). Cognitive defusion and self-
relevant negative thoughts: Examining the impact of a ninety year old technique. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 42, 477-485. 
Masuda, A., Hayes, S. C., Twohig, M. P., Drossel, C., Lillis, J., & Washio, Y. (2009). A 
parametric study of cognitive defusion and the believability and discomfort of negative self-
relevant thoughts. Behavior Modification, 33, 250-262. 
McCracken, L. M. (1998). Learning to live with the pain: Acceptance of pain predicts 
adjustments in persons with chronic pain. Pain, 74, 21-27. 
McCracken, L. M., Spertus, I. L., Janeck, A. S., Sinclair, D., & Wetzel, F. T. (1999). Behavioral 
dimensions of adjustment in persons with chronic pain: Pain-related anxiety and acceptance. 
Pain, 80, 283-290. 
McCracken, L. M., & Yang, S-Y. (2006). The role of values in a contextual cognitive-behavioral 
approach to chronic pain. Pain, 123, 137-145. 
234 
 
McHugh, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2004). Perspective-taking as relational 
responding: A developmental profile. The Psychological Record, 54, 115-144. 
McHugh, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2009). Understanding and training 
perspective taking as relational responding. In R. A. Rehfeldt, & Y. Barnes-Holmes (Eds.), 
Derived relational responding: Application for learners with autism and other 
developmental disabilities (pp. 281-300). Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Press. 
McMullen, J., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Stewart, I., Luciano, C., & Cochrane A. 
(2008). Acceptance versus distraction: Brief instructions, metaphors, and exercises in 
increasing tolerance for self-delivered electric shocks. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 
122-129. 
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviourist. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Miller, J. J., Fletcher, K. E., & Kabat-Zinn, J. (1995). Three-year follow up and clinical 
implications of a mindfulness meditation-based reduction intervention in the treatment of 
anxiety disorders.  General Hospital Psychiatry, 17, 192-200. 
Mor, N., & Winquist, J. (2002). Self-focused attention and negative affect: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 128, 638-662. 
Nyklícek, I., & Kuijpers, K. F. (2008). Effects of mindfulness-bases stress reduction on 
psychological well-being and quality of life: Is increased mindfulness indeed the 
mechanism? Annals of Behavior Medicine, 35, 331-340. 
O’Connor, J., Rafferty, A., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Barnes-Holmes, Y. (2009). The role of verbal 
behavior, stimulus nameability and familiarity on the equivalence performances of autistic 
and normally developing children. The Psychological Record, 59, 53-74. 
235 
 
O’Hora, D., Barnes-Holmes, D., Roche, B., & Smeets, P. M. (2004). Derived relational networks 
and control by novel instructions: A possible model of generative verbal responding. The 
Psychological Record, 54, 437-460. 
Paez-Blarrina, M., Luciano, C., Gutierrez-Martinez, O., Valdivia, S., & Rodriguez-Valverde, M., 
& Ortega, J. (2008a). The role of values with personal examples in altering the functions of 
pain: Comparison between acceptance-based and cognitive-control-based protocols. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 84-97. 
Paez-Blarrina, M., Luciano, C., Gutierrez-Martinez, O., Valdivia, S., Rodriguez, M., & Ortega, J. 
(2008b). Coping with pain in the motivational context of values: Comparison between an 
acceptance-based and a cognitive-control-based protocol. Behaviour Modification, 32, 403-
422. 
Plumb, J., Stewart, I., Dahl, J., & Lundgren, T. (2009). In search of meaning: Values in modern 
clinical behavior analysis. The Behavior Analyst, 32, 85-103. 
Polusny, M. A., Rosenthal, M. Z., Aban, I., & Follette, V. M. (2004). Experiential avoidance as a 
mediator of the effects of adolescent sexual victimization on negative adult outcomes. 
Violence and Victims, 19, 109-120. 
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral 
and Brian Sciences, 4, 515-526. 
Psychological Society of Ireland (2003). Code of professional ethics. Dublin: Psychological 
Society of Ireland. 
Pyszczynski, T., Hamilton, J. C., Herring, F. H., & Greenberg, J. (1989). Depression, self-focused 
attention, and the negative memory bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 
351-357. 
236 
 
Pyszczynski, T., Holt, K., & Greenberg, J. (1987). Depression, self-focused attention, and 
expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 994-1001. 
Rachman, S., Shafran, R., Mitchell, D., Trant, J., & Teachman, B. (1996). How to remain neutral: 
An experimental analysis of neutralization. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 889-898. 
Reese, H. W. (1961). Transposition in the intermediate-size problem by pre-school children. 
Child Development, 32, 311-314.  
Rimes, K. A., & Watkins, E. (2005). The effects of self-focused rumination on global negative 
self-judgements in depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 1673-1681. 
Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1996). Arbitrarily applicable relational responding and human sexual 
categorization: A critical test of the derived difference relation. The Psychological Record, 
46, 451-475. 
Rogers, C. R. (1964). Toward a modern approach to values: The valuing process in the mature 
person.  Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68, 160-167. 
Sarbin, T. R. (1952). A preface to a psychological analysis of the self. Psychological Review, 59, 
11-22.  
Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
for Depression. New York: Guilford Press. 
Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. 
American Psychologist, 55, 5-14. 
Shapiro, S. L., Schwartz, G. E., & Bonner, G. (1998). Effects of mindfulness-based stress 
reduction on medical and premedical Students. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 21, 581-
299. 
237 
 
Sheldon, K. M., Kasser, T., Smith, K., & Share, T. (2002). Personal goals and psychological 
growth: Testing an intervention to enhance goal attainment and personality integration. 
Journal of Personality, 70, 5-31. 
Skinner, B.F. (1974, reprinted 1993). About behaviorism. London: Penguin Press. 
Skinner, B.F. (1984). The evolution of behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 41, 217-222. 
Speca, M., Carlson, L. E., Goddey, E., & Angen, M. (2000). A randomized, waitlist controlled 
clinical trial: The effect of a mindfulness meditation-based stress reduction program on 
mood and symptoms of stress in cancer outpatients. Psychosomatic Medicine, 62, 613-622. 
Stewart, I., Barnes-Holmes, D., Roche, B., & Smeets, P. M. (2001). Generating derived relational 
networks via the abstraction of common physical properties: A possible model of analogical 
reasoning. The Psychological Record, 51, 381-408. 
Stewart, S. H., Zvolensky, M. J., & Eifert, G. H. (2002). The relations of anxiety sensitivity, 
experiential avoidance, and alexithymic coping to young adults’ motivation for drinking. 
Behavior Modification, 26, 274-296. 
Suddendorf, T., & Fletcher-Flinn, C. M. (1997). Theory of mind and the origins of divergent 
thinking. Journal of Creative Behavior, 31, 169-179. 
Summers, J. D., Rapoff, M. A., Varghese, G., Porter, K., & Palmer, R. E. (1991). Psychosocial 
factors in chronic spinal cord injury pain. Pain, 47, 183-189. 
Swettenham, J., Baron-Cohen,S., Gomez, J-C., & Walsh, S. (1996). What’s inside a person’s 
head? Conceiving of the mind as a camera helps children with autism develop an alternative 
theory of mind. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 1, 73-88. 
Taylor, M. (1988). Conceptual perspective taking: Children’s ability to distinguish what they 
know from what they see. Child Development, 59, 703-718. 
238 
 
Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., Ridgeway, V. A., Soulsby, J. M., & Lau, M. A. 
(2000). Prevention of relapse/recurrence in major depression by mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68, 615-623. 
The British Psychological Society (2010). Code of Human Research Ethics. London: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Torneke, N. (2010). Learning RFT. An introduction to relational frame theory and its clinical 
application. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications. 
Torneke, N., Luciano, C., & Valdivia, S. (2008). Rule-governed behavior and psychological 
problems. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 8, 141-156. 
Towe, A. L. (1954). A study of figural equivalence in the pigeon. Journal of Comparative and 
Physiological Psychology, 47, 283-287.  
Twohig, M. P., Hayes, S. C., & Masuda, A. (2006). Increasing willingness to experience 
obsessions: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy as a treatment for Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder. Behavior Therapy, 37, 3-13. 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 82, 1-8. 
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of 
thought suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 5-13. 
Whelan, R., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2004). The transformation of consequential functions in 
accordance with the relational frames of same and opposite. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior, 82, 177-195. 
Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. (1997). Machiavellian intelligence II: Evaluations and extension. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
239 
 
Williams, L. M. (2006). Acceptance and commitment therapy: An example of third-wave therapy 
as a treatment for Australian Vietnam veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Unpublished Doctorate, Charles Stuart University, Bathurst, New South Wales. 
Wilson, C. (2009). Acceptance, suppression and other therapeutic strategies in anxiety and 
relaxation. Unpublished Doctorate, National University Ireland, Maynooth. 
Wulfert, E., Greenway, D. E., Farkas, P., Hayes, S. C., & Dougher, M. J. (1994). Correlation 
between self-reported rigidity and rule-governed insensitivity to operant contingencies.  
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 27, 659-671. 
van den Hout, M., Kindt, M., Weiland, T., & Peters, M. (2002). Instructed neutralization, 
spontaneous neutralization and prevented neutralization after an obsession-like thought. 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 33, 177-189. 
Villatte, M., Monestès, J., McHugh, L., Freixa i Baqué, E., & Loas, G. (2008). Assessing deictic 
relational responding in social anhedonia: A functional approach to the development of 
Theory of Mind impairments. International Journal of Behavioral Consultation and 
Therapy, 4, 360-373. 
Vowles, K. W., & McCracken, L. M. (2010). Comparing the influence of psychological 
flexibility and traditional pain management coping strategies on chronic pain treatment 
outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 141-146. 
Zettle, R. D., & Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rule-governed behaviour. A potential theoretical framework 
for cognitive behavioral research and therapy. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitive 
behavioral research and therapy (pp. 73-118). New York: Academic Press. 
Zettle, R. D., & Hayes, S. C. (1987). Component and process analysis of cognitive therapy. 
Psychological Reports, 61, 939-953. 
240 
 
Zettle, R. D., & Hayes, S. C. (2002). Brief ACT treatment of depression. In F. Bond & W. 
Dryden (Eds.), Handbook of brief cognitive behaviour therapy (pp. 35-54). Chichester, 
England: Wiley Publishers. 
Zucker, B. G., Craske, M. G., Barrios, V., & Holguin, M. (2002). Thought action fusion: Can it 
be corrected? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 653-664. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
Appendix 1 
Consent Form 
 
I………………………………..consent to participate in an experimental psychology study being run by 
Mairead Foody in the Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth. I understand and 
consent to the following: 
• The experimental procedure will likely involve brief periods of anxiety and/or emotional discomfort 
at various stages.  The purpose of this cannot be explained to me at the beginning of the experiment 
but I will be fully debriefed at the end. 
• The experimental procedure will involve scoring psychological measures. These scores are not used to 
make decisions about the experiment and I can be provided with the scores at the end of the 
experiment. However I understand that these scores do not represent clinical outcomes. 
• The experiment will last approximately thirty minutes or less. 
• I will be required to fill in various questionnaires and perform a task 
• I am free to terminate my participation in the study at any time and may withdraw the data obtained 
from my participation, if I so wish. 
• I understand that I participate under my own volition and that my participation will not have any 
effect on my subsequent academic results. I also understand that no monetary remuneration will result 
from participation. 
I have received this information in an understandable way. All my questions have been answered. 
Please print and sign your name below if you are willing to abide fully by the conditions stated above. 
Name: ___________________________________(Please print in block capitals) 
Signature: ________________________________ 
Date: ____________________________________ 
EXPERIMENTER: 
I, Mairead Foody, as primary experimenter, accept full responsibility for the care of all experimental 
participants and I confirm that all the necessary safety precautions have been taken and that 
additional experimental conditions followed in other studies have also been introduced. 
Signature of experimenter: ____________________________ 
Date: _________________________ 
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Appendix 2 
Experimental Screening Questionnaire 
 
THIS INFORMATION IS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
1. Age:_______________ 
2. Sex:_______________ 
3. Do you suffer from any of the following conditions? (please tick) 
Yes     No     
___      ___        Anxiety or Phobic Disorder 
___      ___        Panic Attacks 
___      ___        Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
___      ___        Depression 
___      ___        Any mental health problem that you think would be adversely  
                          affected by very brief periods of anxiety  
4.  Do you have a driver’s license?  
Yes           No  
 
5. Have you ever been in a traumatic road accident? 
Yes No  
 
6. Has a close relative or friend passed away in the recent past? 
Yes No  
7. Has a close relative or friend ever been killed or seriously affected by a road 
traffic accident? 
 Yes No 
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                                                             Appendix 3 
AAQ-II 
 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always 
true 
always  
true 
       
1. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I 
would value. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I’m afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Emotions cause problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Worries get in the way of my success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix 4 
                    Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS) 
 
 
Instructions: Please circle how often you experienced each of the following 
statements  within the past week.  
 
1. I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
2. I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
3. When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
4. There are aspects of myself I don’t want to think about.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
5. When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
6. I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings from coming to mind.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
7. When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
8. I wish I could control my emotions more easily.  
  
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
 
9. When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face.  
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1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
10. I tell myself that I shouldn’t have certain thoughts. 
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
11. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
12. There are things I try not to think about.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
13. I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
14. I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel sad.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
15. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles  
getting tense.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
16. If there is something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get 
 it out of my mind.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
17. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
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18. I try to put my problems out of mind.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
19. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am 
 experiencing.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
 
20. When I have a bad memory, I try to distract myself to make it go away.  
 
1   2   3   4   5  
        Never            Rarely       Sometimes          Often      Very Often  
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Appendix 5 
                                                Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Please rate the level of discomfort you feel right now. Please place an X at this point along 
the line. 
 
 
No Discomfort                    Very Much Discomfort 
 ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Please rate the level of anxiety you feel right now. Please place an X at this point along the 
line. 
 
 
No Anxiety                                      Very Much Anxiety 
   ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Please rate the level of stress you feel right now. Please place an X at this point along the 
line. 
 
 
No Stress                                         Very Much Stress 
   ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
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Appendix 6 
                                                 Reactions Questionnaire 
 
1) Please rate your level of willingness to engage with your thoughts of the accident. Place an 
X at this point along the line. 
 
No effort                                           Lots of effort 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
 
2) Please rate how vivid your thoughts and images were of the car accident.     
      Place an X at this point along the line. 
 
Not vivid                                               Very vivid 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
3) Please rate how believable the accident scenario was to you.  
      Place an X at this point along the line. 
 
Not believable                           Very believable 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
4) Please rate how much guilt you feel right now.  
Place an X at this point along the line. 
 
Not guilt                                           Lots of guilt 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
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5) Please rate how morally wrong you felt it was to write or say the sentence(s).  
Place an X at this point along the line. 
 
Not morally wrong                  Very morally wrong 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
6) Please rate how much you tried to distract from the sentence(s).  
Place an X at this point along the line. 
 
 
Not morally wrong                  Very morally wrong 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0% 25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
* Question 6 was not included in Experiments 1 and 3. 
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Appendix 7 
     Debriefing Form 
 
Thank you for giving up your time to participate in this experiment, particularly as it involved 
experiencing unpleasant thoughts and feelings. I would be more than happy to answer any of 
your questions regarding the study at this time. Do you have any questions you would like to 
ask? 
 
 
At this point, I am going to briefly summarise for you the purpose of the experiment and 
explain any aspects which, for procedural reasons may not have been explained prior to the 
experiment. As you are probably aware, the aim of the task in this experiment was to 
encourage you to make direct contact with negative thoughts. When this contact was 
established (and you may have felt anxious for example, at this stage), the intervention was 
implemented to target these negative thoughts. The general goal of the experiment was to 
investigate the extent to which the intervention worked on reducing your believability of your 
negative thoughts. 
 
Please sign below if you believe you have been fully debriefed on this experiment and you are 
satisfied that all of your questions have been fully answered.      
 
Signature: _______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Thank you again for your time, without participants this research would not be possible. 
 
Mairead Foody 
Department of Psychology 
NUI Maynooth 
Mairead.foody@nuim.ie 
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Appendix 8 
Experimental Screening Questionnaire  
 
 
THIS INFORMATION IS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
4. Age:_______________ 
5. Sex:_______________ 
6. Do you suffer from any of the following conditions? (please tick) 
Yes     No     
___      ___        Anxiety or Phobic Disorder 
___      ___        Panic Attacks 
___      ___        Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
___      ___        Depression 
___      ___        Any mental health problem that you think would be adversely 
affected by very brief periods of anxiety  
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Appendix 9 
                                                 Reactions Questionnaire 
 
 
1) Please rate your level of willingness to engage with your thoughts of the sentence. Please 
place an X at this point along the line. 
 
No effort                                                      Lots of effort 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0%  25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
 
 
2)  Please rate how believable the sentence was to you. Please place an X at this point along the 
line. 
 
 
Not believable                                      Very believable 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0%  25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
3) Please rate how vivid your thoughts and images were of this sentence. Place an X at this 
point along the line. 
 
 
Not vivid                                                         Very vivid 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0%  25% 50% 75%            100% 
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4) Please rate how much guilt you feel right now. Place an X at this point along the line. 
 
Not guilt                                           Lots of guilt 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0%  25% 50% 75%            100% 
 
 
 
 
5)      Please rate how much you tried to distract from the sentence. Place an X at this point 
along the line. 
 
 
No distraction                                 A lot of distraction 
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
0%  25% 50% 75%            100% 
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Appendix 10 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
1. What is you name? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What do you study? 
4. What year are you in? 
5. Where are you from? 
6. Where do you live? 
7. How many brothers and sisters do you have? 
8. What are your hobbies? 
9. What hair colour do you have? 
10. What colour are you eyes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
